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Preface and Acknowledgments 
 
The origins of this project were twofold.  
First was ongoing work updating The Watershed 
Source Book, a seminal study in the Natural 
Resources Law Center’s research pertaining to 
the world of watershed initiatives and similar 
efforts in community-based, collaborative 
resource management. As part of the ongoing 
Source Book revision, the Center promised to 
undertake one or more “special studies” of issues 
that emerged as most significant in shaping the 
long-term health and viability of the western 
watersheds movement.  At this point in time, no 
issue is of more obvious concern than the 
emerging backlash against consensus-oriented, 
community-based strategies of resources 
problem-solving and management. 
The other motivation for this study came 
from several dozen parties, mostly 
environmentalists and academics, that have 
approached me in the past year with a troubling 
problem.  It seems that individuals raising thorny 
issues regarding the effectiveness and 
appropriateness of watershed initiatives and 
similar collaborative groups have not been 
welcomed into what should be an active and 
constructive arena of debate, but have rather 
been encouraged to remain silent.  This 
“encouragement” has certainly not been anything 
sinister, but has rather taken the form of 
systematic exclusion at events and in 
publications, and in the competition for limited 
research funds.   
I chose to test the pervasiveness of this 
experience by floating an article in the Chronicle 
of Community articulating the need for a more 
rigorous and impartial examination of 
collaborative groups, and immediately began to 
hear from dozens of individuals I had never met 
in my previous research endeavors.  Each, to 
paraphrase the general sentiment, had been 
labeled a radical or heretic by one or more 
groups for raising issues that, at the least, seemed 
worthy of consideration and discussion.  In most 
cases, the issues they raised were disturbing and 
quite complex—issues that I, as a researcher, 
could not (and still cannot) answer.  But that is 
not what prompted me to undertake this report.  
Rather, I was troubled that in such an important 
area of public policy, an open debate including 
researchers, practitioners, and other concerned 
parties was not adequately being fostered.  This 
seems particularly ironic given that the 
substantive background of this debate is tenets of 
consensus, collaboration, community, and trust 
building. 
Fortunately, I think that the need to openly 
examine the thorny issues is now becoming more 
widely recognized.  Thoughtful research, on all 
sides of the issues, has begun to emerge, although 
these are only first steps.  The following report is 
one of those first steps, designed mainly to 
organize and frame questions, rather than to 
provide answers.  Frankly, I don’t feel qualified 
at the present time to offer strong opinions on 
most of the issues raised in the following report; I 
am only certain that those issues are important.  
Initial feedback from the draft report has 
convinced me that the time for this research has 
arrived.    
 In publishing this report, I wish to thank 
those funding organizations that have, either 
directly or indirectly, supported this line of 
inquiry. Research for the initial Source Book was 
primarily provided by the Ford Foundation, while 
support for the revision has been provided by the 
General Service Foundation, U.S. Bureau of 
Reclamation, Ford Foundation, Hewlett 
Foundation, and the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency.  I am also greatly indebted to 
those individuals who have brought these issues 
to my attention, and that have been so willing to 
share their experiences and thoughts with me—
albeit often on the condition of anonymity.  I 
certainly cannot thank all of those parties, but 
some of the individuals that have helped shaped 
my thinking include (alphabetically): David 
Bayles, Reed Benson, Gail Bingham, Louis 
Blumberg, Steve Born, Ron Brunner, Guy and 
Heidi Burgess, Sam Burns, Hanna Cortner, Ann 
Dahl, Maxine Dakins, Don Elder, Michael Fife, 
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John Folk-Williams, Robert Frodeman, Karen 
Hamilton, Mike Hart, Dan Helig, DeWitt John, 
Rick Knight, Peter Lavigne, Ralph Longobardi, 
Mark Lubell, Dan Luecke, Larry MacDonnell, 
Sean McAllister, Roz McClellan, Matt 
McKinney, Sarah Michaels, Ann Moote, 
Deborah Paulson, Maggie Shannon, Toddi 
Steelman, Steve Toben, Dan Tarlock, Sarah Van 
de Wetering, and my colleagues here at the 
Natural Resources Law Center, University of 
Colorado School of Law.  Of course, this report 
has also been shaped by those authors cited 
throughout the report—especially those from 
whom I have extensively quoted.  While I alone 
take full responsibility for the content herein, I 
must acknowledge that many of the opinions 
expressed reflect a much broader community of 
voices than simply my own thinking, and in 
several cases, are not even consistent with my 
own thinking.  The following document is not 
intended as an essay of my own arguments, but 
rather as a synthesis and overview of ideas 
emerging from a community that I respect, but 
with whom I only partially agree.   
 







Problem-Solving in a New Era 
 
Recent years have seen a tremendous 
increase in watershed initiatives and other 
collaborative groups in the western United States.  
Although highly variable from case to case, these 
efforts often take the form of working groups of 
both public (i.e., federal, state, and local 
agencies) and private (e.g., citizens, water users) 
interests, organized in largely ad hoc associations 
to address natural resources problems of mutual 
concern.  The self-defined mandates of these 
efforts typically recognize the legitimacy of both 
environmental and economic aspirations, and 
support the design and/or implementation of on-
the-ground problem-solving strategies at the 
watershed (or similar) scale.    
Given their emphasis on local involvement, 
deliberative processes, and consensus-based 
decision-making, these efforts are described as 
featuring a “community/collaborative model” of 
governance, part of a larger set of institutional 
reforms currently endorsed by parties as 
ideologically diverse as the Clinton 
Administration and the Western Governors’ 
Association.  These new trends in “governance” 
are most notable for featuring a strong reliance 
on positive incentives (i.e., the carrot rather than 
the stick); partnership arrangements (both 
intergovernmental and public/private) providing 
an enhanced decision-making role for local 
stakeholders; enhanced substantive, geographic, 
and intergovernmental integration and/or 
coordination; and a more explicit commitment to 
ad hoc and consensus-based decision-making 
processes based on field-level experimentation 
and learning.   
 Frequently lost in the fervor to endorse and 
implement these “alternative problem-solving” 
tools are the concerns of “skeptics” who fear that 
these approaches may have significant limitations 
and drawbacks that are not fully appreciated.  Of 
particular interest in this report are those 
criticisms questioning the merits of watershed 
initiatives and similar collaborative groups (e.g., 
forestry partnerships).  Without question, the 
most common source of such skepticism is from 
the community of environmental activists, many 
of whom are understandably concerned about the 
possible on-the-ground ramifications of 
significantly modifying arrangements in natural 
resources governance and problem-solving.  On 
the other hand, few parties—including the 
skeptics—are completely (or even remotely) 
content with the functioning of the existing 
institutional framework.  Some of the most 
common criticisms of existing arrangements 
focus on the high costs (both time and money) of 
decision-making, the frequency of gridlock, the 
failure to embrace integrated and creative 
solutions, and the subordinated decision-making 
role of local interests and other sectors of the 
public. 
 Widespread dissatisfaction with the existing 
“system” is a strong rationale for trying new 
solutions, but does not invalidate the importance 
or practical necessity of evaluating these new 
approaches on their own merits.  Measuring 
success, however, is a deceptively difficult 
challenge, since many efforts are relatively young 
(and many problems long-term) and operate in a 
complex institutional and social environment, and 
given that both the process and outcome 
characteristics of collaborative problem-solving 
approaches raise difficult questions and evoke 
widely different opinions.  Some of these 
opinions are normative in nature, describing what 
a party may believe to be appropriate or 
desirable, while others are presumably more 
factual in nature—although a closer examination 
of the underlying working assumptions suggests 
that many of these assertions may feature more 




Common Arguments for and Against 
Collaborative Groups 
 
 The argument in favor of collaborative 
groups often begins with the assertion that 
traditional means of management and problem-
solving do not work, and that traditional means 
of management and problem-solving will not 
work in the future.  These arguments are 
frequently used in a roundabout manner to 
support the use of collaborative groups based on 
the reasoning that, even if they are largely 
unproven experiments in resources management 
and problem-solving, collaborative groups are 
not likely to be any worse than existing 
processes and have a real potential to be 
notable improvements in terms of speed, cost, 
equity, and on-the-ground results.   
 Many other supporting arguments are based 
on collaborative groups’ alleged track record of 
success.  Two arguments are of particular 
importance:  first is the argument that many 
collaborative groups have already achieved 
significant organizational objectives (e.g., 
establishment, holding meetings, building 
relationships); and second, that many 
collaborative groups have already achieved 
significant on-the-ground improvements in 
natural resource conditions.  The reason it is 
useful to distinguish between these two 
arguments is that the first of these opinions is 
typically married to the idea that organizational 
achievements will lead to on-the-ground 
success, and/or the idea that organizational 
gains are of intrinsic value regardless of any on-
the-ground consequences.   
Other common arguments include the idea 
that local residents should be involved in 
making decisions with local impacts, an 
assertion that is typically linked to the 
assumption that this local involvement does not 
occur in existing (traditional) arrangements, 
and/or the opinion that this desired outcome can 
be better achieved through the use of 
collaborative groups.  Also pervasive is the 
argument that cooperative approaches to 
decision-making are inherently preferable to 
conflict oriented approaches (especially 
litigation).  Closely tied to this argument is the 
idea that cooperative interactions within a 
specified locale help to build a sense of 
community and of place, which in turn, 
improves the quality of life for all residents, and 
improves the ability of a community to achieve 
social, economic and environmental goals. 
 The arguments of the skeptics often begin 
with the notion that existing processes of 
decision-making and problem-solving, while 
admittedly far from perfect, are not 
fundamentally flawed, and can be expected to 
work now and in the future.   Additionally, 
without the regulatory framework provided by 
the frequently maligned programs (deriving 
from legislation such as the Clean Water Act 
and Endangered Species Act), it would likely be 
impossible to even attempt collaborative 
approaches.  This line of argument is at least 
partially reactionary—offered as a defense to 
those that would dismantle existing systems.   
The most direct argument made by the skeptics is 
the assertion that most collaborative group 
processes have not been effective in solving on-
the-ground problems, and are not likely to be so 
in the future.  Additionally, in those cases where 
some success is difficult to deny, it can be argued 
that the success was achieved by concentrating 
on those problems that had obvious solutions 
that were easy to implement, but long-term 
effectiveness will not be maintained once those 
opportunities are quickly exhausted (the so-
called “low hanging fruit” argument).  Also in 
those cases, it is often argued that these goals 
were not achieved any faster or cheaper than 
what would have been possible through 
traditional means.   
 Another major set of arguments against 
collaborative processes deal with issues of 
representation and decision-making.  Specific 
criticisms include the assertion that 
environmental viewpoints are not adequately 
represented in collaborative group processes, or 
conversely, that commodity interests are over-
represented.  Additionally, to the extent that 
environmental interests are represented, they 
are likely to be at a strategic disadvantage given 
the greater financial resources and training of 
their “anti-environmental” counterparts.  Also 
 vii
common is the opinion that the typical decision-
rule of consensus (often implemented as 
unanimity) does not lead to efficient or 
productive decision-making exercises.   
 Responding to the frequent call for greater 
local control, skeptics counter that most natural 
resources are, at least to some degree, public 
resources, and should managed in accordance 
with the values held by the nation and society at 
large—not just a local constituency.  A related 
argument is that public policy-making is a 
function of government, and it is inappropriate 
to shift these decisions to ad hoc, public/private 
groups that may not satisfy democratic norms 
regarding representation, process, professional 
expertise, and related considerations.  It is also 
argued that conflict-oriented processes are a 
legitimate and essential approach to decision-
making, and that venerating consensus can 




Searching For Answers 
 
 Given the difficulty in assessing the 
performance of collaborative groups, both in 
terms of data collection and interpretation, this 
report does not provide a definitive assessment of 
the merits of western watershed initiatives and 
other collaborative groups, but rather seeks to 
better illuminate and explore those working 
assumptions that currently separate the 
proponents from the skeptics.  It is the hope that 
this effort will encourage both parties to engage 
in a richer debate of these emerging mechanisms 
of problem-solving, a real need given that many 
policy-makers appear anxious to formally adopt 
these new approaches in law and practice.   
 The logical starting place for this debate is 
the recognition that much of the argument in 
favor of collaborative groups (and related tools) 
is a negative one, based on highlighting the 
presumed deficiencies of the existing system of 
governance.  These assessments frequently focus, 
for example, on the existing system’s emphasis 
on highly formalized (and frequently adversarial) 
modes of decision-making, the prevalence of 
intergovernmental and inter-agency competition, 
the high cost of resources management, the 
phenomenon of institutional inertia and the 
constraints of incremental change, the 
subordination of public interests to special 
interests, the failure to use science effectively, 
and most importantly, the frequently 
disappointing on-the-ground track record of 
many programs presumably designed to protect 
resources. 
 While there is undoubtedly considerable 
room for improvements, a closer look at existing 
systems of natural resources and environmental 
management suggests that both successes and 
failures can be found in abundance.  
Furthermore, it is difficult to conclude that the 
system is “broken” or “fundamentally flawed” 
without calling into question many of the 
elemental concepts of the American system of 
governance.  Some of these concepts include 
dispersed power with multiple checks and 
balances, competing forums of decision-making, 
interest group activity, and federalism.  To the 
extent that these features are viewed as 
deficiencies to be overcome, then dramatic 
reforms are in fact called for—not only in natural 
resource institutions, but in broader arrangements 
in American governance.  If, instead, these 
qualities are viewed as reasonable constraints to 
work within, then the challenge is to more 
selectively and strategically implement 
substantive reforms within that framework that 
promise to more efficiently achieve agreed-upon 
goals, and procedural reforms that promise to 
better reconcile or balance competing objectives.  
Collaborative efforts can presumably play a role 
under either scenario, but very different roles—
viewed in the first as a replacement for existing 
processes and, in the second, as a supplement.   
 This line of inquiry takes on added 
complexity when future natural resource 
problems are considered.  For example, 
controlling nonpoint source pollution (the 
primary unmet management challenge in current 
and future water quality programs) presents a 
very different challenge than point source 
pollution.  Similarly, resources restoration can 
feature different obstacles than attempts at 
resources preservation.  In order to understand 
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which types of problem-solving approaches are 
most likely to be effective in a given situation, it 
is necessary to consider these differences 
carefully.  For example, there is reason to believe 
that collaborative processes (due mostly to their 
consensus orientation) are likely to be most 
effective in those situations in which parties have 
similar interests (i.e., value-based conflicts are 
not significant) and incentive structures.  This, of 
course, is only a broad generalization.  However, 
generalizations of this nature become very 
powerful when they are explicitly based on the 
recognition that different types of problems, just 
like different types of problem-solving strategies, 
offer different sets of incentives, opportunities, 
and constraints.  A better understanding of this 
conceptually simple observation can provide real 
insights into the debate over collaborative 
groups, given that the empirical field-level data 
needed to provide definitive answers about 
effectiveness may still be several years away.1   
 A better understanding of the incentives, 
opportunities and constraints provided by 
different problem-solving approaches is also 
central to understanding the relationship between 
the so-called “alternative” means of problem-
solving and the “traditional” means.  As a 
practical matter, these different types of 
approaches often go hand-in-hand, a phenomenon 
perhaps best illustrated by the use of litigation to 
encourage negotiation.  A working understanding 
of this relationship strongly encourages viewing 
watershed initiatives and similar collaborative 
efforts as supplements, rather than replacements, 
for traditional processes such as regulation and 
litigation.  In fact, many of the arguments that 
distinguish proponents from skeptics are largely 
diminished when the working assumption is that 
the “alternative” processes are intended, both 
                                                        
1 The Natural Resources Law Center is among those 
research organizations engaged in this empirical 
research.  Currently, the Center is compiling survey 
data on western watershed initiatives, including 
those first investigated by the Center in 1995 leading 
to publication of The Watershed Source Book 
(NRLC, 1996).  Research of this kind begins to 
satisfy the need for long-term data necessary to offer 
more precise conclusions about effectiveness. 
now and in the immediate future, to be 
supplementary in nature. 
Also of note is the idea that locally-oriented, 
consensus-based processes are often endorsed 
based on concepts drawn from the “social 
capital” literature, which asserts that certain 
types of activities help to build closely-knit 
communities of skilled individuals better able to 
jointly solve problems of community interest.  
Certainly this line of thought is supported by 
many natural resource problem-solving efforts in 
the third world.  However, those are situations in 
which technical and financial resources are 
frequently unavailable and where well-developed 
legal and administrative systems are lacking—not 
the conditions in the American West.  
Additionally, to the extent that certain activities 
can build these skills, is it accurate to assume 
that only consensus-based processes have this 
quality?  The educational value of watershed 
initiatives and similar collaborative efforts is well 
established and provides considerable reason for 
enthusiasm; but education and problem-solving 
are not necessarily equivalent activities, 
especially to the extent that conflicts are linked to 
value differences.  Furthermore, if community 
interactions and the joint pursuit of “community 
interests” are the key to solving modern natural 
resource problems, why then are market 
mechanisms the other pillar—along with 
collaborative processes—in comprehensive 
reform proposals of the National Performance 
Review and the Western Governors’ Association 
(e.g., Enlibra), among others?  Clearly, more 
thought is needed to fully explore the social 
capital argument when applied to natural 
resources management and problem-solving in 
the American West. 
 One of the research areas most in need of 
scholarly attention is how a reliance on consensus 
decision-making—often interpreted in practice as 
a unanimity requirement—impacts the 
functioning of collaborative groups.  Throughout 
much of western philosophy is a rich mythology 
that surrounds consensus processes.  Of 
particular note are the ideas that consensus is a 
social good, and that consensus decisions are 
inherently more accurate or valid than other types 
of decisions.  While there is sound theory and 
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credible evidence to support both ideas, there is 
also reason to challenge these assumptions.  For 
example, current democratic norms suggest that 
diversity and value pluralism (rather than 
homogeneity) are key elements of healthy 
democracies, and current patterns of interest 
group governance suggest that group decisions 
are neither inherently right nor wrong, but are 
simply viable.  On a more practical level, there is 
reason to question some consensus-based 
processes on the basis of inadequate 
representation, the further concentration of power 
in already powerful interests, and the potentially 
coercive quality of processes demanding 
consensus decisions.  Of course, these alleged 
qualities of consensus processes, both pro and 
con, vary considerably from case to case, 
discouraging sweeping generalizations and 
promoting caution—ideas equally applicable to 






 Perhaps the most significant conclusion 
emerging from this exploration of collaborative 
groups is that the merits of consensus-building 
processes are largely interpreted by both 
proponents and skeptics based on normative 
criteria, and those criteria tend to evolve over 
time as key assumptions about democracy 
change.  For example, modern popular discourse 
increasingly promotes participatory democracy 
(i.e., Jeffersonian democracy), an ideal that is 
arguably more popular today than during the 
Constitutional Convention when Madison’s ideas 
about representative democracy carried the day.  
In the context of natural resources management, 
this familiar debate over participatory versus 
representative democracy is complicated by two 
related factors: the role of science and scientists 
in decision-making, and the merits of an interest 
group mode of public policy-making.  Both of 
these factors have been the focus of considerable 
change in the past century.  Thus it is not 
surprising that virtually all parties “arguing 
about consensus” can, and do, support their 
opinions by appealing to “democracy,” a term 
surpassing even “consensus” in its ability to 
promote confusion, misunderstanding, and 
hollow dogma. 
This and other observations herein reinforce 
the working premise upon which this study was 
initiated: i.e., that assessing the merits of western 
watershed initiatives and similar collaborative 
groups is not easy, but is a topic of sufficient 
importance to encourage a more active and 
rigorous exploration of all opinions, both in favor 
and against.  Given that the opinions of the 
skeptics still comprise the minority in both the 
scholarly and “gray” literatures,2 it is particularly 
important to note that those opinions generally 
stand-up well to an initial examination, and 
certainly therefore deserve more serious 
attention.  This conclusion, however, comes with 
two caveats.  First of all, the relevance of any 
specific criticism or supporting argument is 
ultimately something that must be concluded on a 
case-by-case situation.   Generalizations are 
extremely valuable, but only to the extent that 
they are not blindly applied to specific cases.  
Secondly, the normative content of this subject 
area is quite high, suggesting that the academic 
community may prove more useful in structuring 
and informing the debate, than in reaching 
defensible conclusions.   
The Natural Resources Law Center 
continues to recommend that the experimentation 
with collaborative groups continue, guided by a 
policy of “guarded optimism” and explicit 
scholarly critiques.   Learning through 
experimentation is a legitimate means of crafting 
improved institutional arrangements only to the 
extent that the scientific construction of 
experimentation is honored—namely, that issues 
and assumptions are well defined, that 
information is collected and analyzed in a 
credible manner to test those assumptions, that 
measurable results are used to shape conclusions, 
                                                        
2 “Gray literature” is the term given to publications 
that are not subject to peer review or extensive 
critical editing.  The gray literature includes 
newspapers, newsletters, most Internet postings, 
many in-house publications, and other documents 
outside the world of academic journals and scholarly 
books. 
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and that peer review is used to validate results.  
That process is underway, but is far from 
completed.  Until that research is mature, it is 
prudent to listen to all ideas and arguments 
regarding the merits of watershed initiatives and 
other collaborative groups. 
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Examining the Case Against Western Watershed Initiatives and Other 






In recent years, problem-solving approaches 
in the natural resources realm have increasingly 
featured a “community/-collaborative” model of 
governance.  One of the best examples of this 
phenomenon has been the 1990s-era proliferation 
of “watershed initiatives”3 in the western United 
States (NRLC, 1996; Kenney, 1997).  Although 
highly variable from case to case, these efforts 
typically take the form of working groups of both 
public (i.e., federal, state, and local agencies) and 
private (e.g., citizens, water users) interests, 
organized in largely ad hoc associations to 
address natural resources problems of mutual 
concern.  The self-defined mandates of these 
efforts typically recognize the legitimacy of both 
environmental and economic aspirations, and 
support the design and/or implementation of on-
the-ground problem-solving strategies at the 
watershed (or similar) scale.  These efforts have 
been a primary focus of research conducted by 
the Natural Resources Law Center, and are 
consequently the most frequently referenced 
phenomena in this report.  However, many other 
prominent modern examples of the 
community/collaborative model permeate through 
                                                        
3 Watershed initiatives are also frequently known as 
watershed partnerships, watershed councils, or 
watershed groups.  Whatever the name, these efforts 
are one example of a type of organizational structure 
known herein and elsewhere as a collaborative 
group.  These groups typically feature both public 
and private (citizen) participants, usually operating 
in a largely ad hoc and self-guided manner to 
address natural resource problems of common 
concern at a physically relevant geographic scale, 
such as a watershed. 
the realm of natural resources governance, 
including the emergence of “community forestry” 
efforts (Wondolleck and Yaffee, 1994) and the 
diversity of programs organized under the 
moniker of ecosystem management (Yaffee et al., 
1996).  At a somewhat larger scale are 
collaborative efforts for basin-level ecosystem 
restoration, such as the CALFED process, the 
Everglades remediation, and the South Platte 
restoration. 
Proponents typically see these loosely 
related innovations as satisfying the long unmet 
need for effective and democratic mechanisms of 
governance and problem-solving at the local 
level.  In such efforts, citizens, stakeholders, and 
government officials can join to collaboratively 
design and implement pragmatic solutions to 
problems of environmental and community 
sustainability.   To date, most investigations of 
these phenomena have focused on describing case 
studies, in part for the purpose of identifying 
lessons and keys to success, and in part to 
generate greater enthusiasm and support—
political, financial, and popular—for these 
efforts.  Clearly, this is working.  For example, a 
conservative estimate is that the number of 
watershed initiatives, and similar groups, has 
grown 10-fold during the 1990s.4  Watershed 
initiative participants number in the thousands, 
                                                        
4 This estimate is based on several years of research 
at the Natural Resources Law Center.  Note that it is 
very difficult to provide firm numerical estimates of 
watershed initiatives and other collaborative groups 
simply due to the definitional issues involved.  Using 
the criteria utilized in The Watershed Source Book, 
watershed initiatives in the West probably number 
over 400, however, only a slightly more liberal 
definition could potentially double this number.   
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and many agencies are committing time and 
resources to these efforts at staggering rates. 
Many parties, however, are skeptical.  
These collaborative efforts, they suggest, are 
largely unproven experiments, bolstered more by 
desperate enthusiasm and unsubstantiated 
generalizations than by real and documented 
results.  Were these comments arising from a 
lunatic fringe, they would not be so 
disconcerting, but that is typically not the case.  
These observations are primarily coming from 
veterans of the environmental protection wars—
from organizations committed to protecting 
resources, minimizing pollution, and providing a 
strong public voice in natural resources decision-
making.  Many academics are increasingly 
joining in this questioning, asking both practical 
and philosophical questions pertaining to the 
effectiveness of these arrangements, and to the 
merits of deviating from proven, although 
imperfect, mechanisms of decision-making and 
problem-solving.   
These are serious questions, the answers to 
which are of interest to both proponents and 
opponents of watershed initiatives and related 
efforts.  To ignore these questions would do the 
dual disservice of pushing proponents forward in 
a cloud of ignorance, perhaps never realizing the 
full potential of these mechanisms, and of turning 
a honest line of questioning and healthy 
skepticism into a full-fledged backlash.  If it is 
true we fear what we do not understand, then 
proponents of collaborative efforts should not try 
to silence the skeptics, but should embrace this 
challenge by gathering and distributing more 
detailed information on the functioning of these 
efforts.  Failure to do so could be a disastrous 
strategic mistake, potentially fracturing an 
environmental community that should be unified 
by common enemies and the goals of ecological 
restoration and protection. 
The purpose of this report is to help identify 
the lines of inquiry and debate regarding the 
merits of watershed initiatives and similar 
collaborative groups.  The report begins by 
describing the modern enthusiasm behind 
collaborative approaches to problem-solving, 
part of a still larger trend reshaping natural 
resource institutions in a variety of ways.  This 
discussion leads into a review of issues 
associated with defining and measuring success 
of watershed initiatives and similar efforts, and a 
summary of major arguments and assumptions, 
both pro and con, that speak to the issue of 
effectiveness.  A preliminary review of literature 
and data follows.  This review is broadly-focused 
and highly strategic (rather than exhaustive), 
straining for insights both from narrowly-focused 
empirical studies and broad, philosophical 
essays.  Given the focus of this report, emphasis 
is on the skeptical/critical sources. While 
questions significantly out-number answers at 
this point in time, there is much to be learned 
from earlier research.  Few definitive conclusions 
are reached, but themes and tentative findings do 
emerge that are likely to encourage further 
research, debate, and ultimately, understanding.   
 
 
Resource Management and Problem-
Solving in a New Era 
 
Several well documented demographic 
trends have converged in recent decades to 
dramatically reshape western landscapes.  In 
their recent report to the Western Water Policy 
Review Advisory Commission, Case and Alward 
(1997) paint a disconcerting picture of a region 
struggling to simultaneously accommodate 
accelerated population growth, demographic 
change, and socioeconomic transformation.  Over 
the last 25 years, the population of the West has 
grown by approximately 32 percent, far 
exceeding predictions and the national growth 
rate of 19 percent.  This should continue: the 
U.S. Census Bureau estimates that 9 of the 10 
fastest growing states from 1995 to 2025 will be 
in the West.  Spurred on largely by opportunities 
in advanced technology industries (e.g., 
telecommunications and computing), outdoor 
recreation opportunities and careers, a robust 
service economy, and plentiful environmental 
amenities, a rapidly expanding network of “urban 
archipelagos” have brought pockets of 
urbanization to regions previously featuring low 
population densities and extractive natural 
resource industries.   
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Equally important, but much less obvious to 
the causal observer, has been a parallel 
transformation of the institutional landscape 
pertaining to arrangements for resources policy-
making, program administration, and field-level 
management.  These new trends in “governance” 
are most notable for featuring a strong reliance 
on positive incentives (i.e., the carrot rather than 
the stick); partnership arrangements (both 
intergovernmental and public/private) providing 
an enhanced decision-making role for local 
stakeholders; enhanced substantive, geographic, 
and intergovernmental integration and/or 
coordination; and a more explicit commitment to 
ad hoc and collaborative decision-making 
processes based on field-level experimentation 
and learning.  In the context of decision-making 
and problem-solving activities, these trends are 
described by Kenney and Lord (1999) as 
comprising the “era of alternative problem 
solving.”  Prominent tools of this era include 
ADR (alternative dispute resolution) techniques 
and negotiated rule-making processes, the use of 
market mechanisms to establish or implement 
policy, and the use of “collaborative groups” as 
vehicles for situation-specific exercises in 
decision-making and, ultimately, problem-
solving.  Watershed initiatives are among the 
most obvious expressions of the community-
based environmental protection (CBEP)5 
movement, although other examples—
particularly community forestry—are also 
enjoying a newfound popularity.  These efforts 
are based on a community/collaborative model of 
action that is fundamentally different than many 
of the “traditional” modes of decision-making, 
particularly regulatory and litigation-oriented 
approaches to policy design and implementation.   
In the natural resources and environmental 
realm, no agency has been more vocal in 
embracing these new trends in governance than 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.  
Relatively few of the reform ideas espoused by 
the agency’s leadership have been fully or 
                                                        
5 Note that many documents utilize the generally 
analogous term of community-based environmental 
management (CBEM) as implemented by 
community-based collaboratives (CBCs). 
successfully translated into new modes of on-the-
ground behavior; regulation is still the bread and 
butter of the agency.  However, an environment 
of reform has been established by the current 
leadership (EPA:1996a:1), spurred on in part by 
the “reinventing government” ideals of the 
National Performance Review: 
 
Over the last several years, an 
important change has been taking place 
in our national strategy for protecting 
the environment.  Through an array of 
partnership programs that we 
collectively refer to as Partners for the 
Environment,6 EPA is demon-strating 
that voluntary goals and commitments 
achieve real environmental results in a 
timely and cost-effective way.  In 
addition to traditional approaches to 
environmental protection, EPA is 
building cooperative partnerships with 
a variety of groups, including small and 
large businesses, citizen groups, state 
and local governments, universities and 
trade associations. ...  These partners 
                                                        
6 Twenty-eight programs were developed between 
1991 and 1996.  These programs are primarily 
aimed at one of three related goals: (1) reducing 
toxic emissions and other pollutants (33/50, 
Common Sense Initiative, Design for the 
Environment, Environmental Accounting, Green 
Chemistry Program, Pesticide Environmental 
Stewardship Program, Project XL, State and Local 
Outreach Program, Voluntary Standards Network, 
and the Waste Minimization National Plan); (2) 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions (AgSTAR, 
Climate Wise, Coalbed Methane Outreach Program, 
Landfill Methane Outreach Program, Natural Gas 
Star Program, Ruminant Livestock Methane 
Program, Transportation Partners, U.S. Initiative on 
Joint Implementation, and the Voluntary Aluminum 
Industrial Program); and/or (3) promoting energy 
conservation and resource conservation (Energy Star 
Buildings, Energy Star Office Equipment, Energy 
Star Residential Programs, Energy Star Transformer 
Program, Green Lights, WasteWi$e Program, and 
the Water Alliances for Voluntary Efficiency).  
Other typical goals include improving compliance 
(Environmental Leadership Program) and public 
health (Indoor Environments Program). 
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are achieving measurable 
environmental results often more 
quickly and with lower costs than 
would be the case with regulatory 
approaches.  EPA views these 
partnership efforts as key to the future 
success of environmental protection.  
 
Of particular relevance in this study has 
been the agency’s adoption of the “watershed 
approach framework.”  The western watershed 
movement is of high interest to the agency, which 
is an active participant and supporter of many 
efforts: 
 
Many public and private organizations 
are joining forces and creating multi-
disciplinary and multi-jurisdictional 
partnerships to focus on [water quality] 
problems, community by community 
and watershed by watershed.  These 
watershed approaches are likely to 
result in significant restoration, 
maintenance and protection of water 
resources in the United States.  
Supporting them is a high priority for 
EPA’s national water program.  (EPA, 
1996b:2). 
 
Many other federal agencies are also active 
participants in supporting watershed initiatives.  
The Natural Resources Conservation Service 
(formerly the Soil Conservation Service) merits 
particular attention, given the agency’s well 
established links to the national network of 
approximately 3,000 conservation districts 
established nationwide largely in response to 
Great Depression dust bowl conditions (NRCS, 
1996).  Major federal land managers (e.g., the 
Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management) 
and the Bureau of Reclamation are also among 
those federal agencies demonstrating a growing 
commitment to community-based environmental 
protection.  The final report of the Western 
Water Policy Review Advisory Commission 
(1998) is also very supportive of the 
community/collaborative model of watershed-
based management. 
One recent articulation of the federal 
commitment to watershed initiatives is found in 
the Clean Water Action Plan, the core element in 
the Clinton Administration’s “Clean Water 
Initiative,” developed by ten federal interagency 
workgroups: 
 
The Vice President called for the Clean 
Water Action Plan to be developed 
within 120 days [of October 18, 1997, 
the 25th anniversary of enactment of the 
Clean Water Act] and that it be based 
on three principles.  First, federal 
agencies are to develop cooperative 
approaches that promote coordination 
and reduce duplication among federal, 
state, and local agencies and tribal 
governments wherever possible.  
Second, agencies are to maximize the 
participation of community groups and 
the public, placing particular emphasis 
on ensuring community and public 
access to information about water 
quality issues.  Finally, agencies are to 
emphasize innovative approaches to 
pollution control, including incentives, 
market-based mechanisms, and 
cooperative partner-ships with 
landowners and other private parties. 
(EPA and USDA, 1998:x-xi). 
 
Support for watershed initiatives at the state 
level in the West is also considerable and 
growing, especially in the Pacific Northwest 
(NRLC, 1998; WSWC, 1998; Craig, 1999).  
The situation in Oregon is particularly notable.  
Beginning in 1987 with establishment of a 
Governor’s Watershed Enhancement Board and 
buoyed by creation of the Watershed Health 
Program in 1993, state funding has been 
provided to assist community-based watershed 
initiatives throughout Oregon (GWEB, 1999).  
This effort continues, now under the control of an 
independent commission known as the Oregon 
Watershed Enhancement Board.  Several other 
western states have closely watched the Oregon 
experience, and a few—specifically, Washington, 
California, and Montana—have experimented 
with several formal mechanisms for providing 
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state support and coordination to watershed 
efforts (NRLC, 1998).  The watershed approach 
to water quality management has also been 
formally embraced in many other western states, 
including Alaska, Arizona, Utah, Colorado, 
Idaho, Nevada, Wyoming, and New Mexico. 
Providing further state support is an idea 
with considerable political momentum in the 
West, a sentiment easily distilled from statements 
of the Western Governors’ Association (WGA) 
calling for natural resource and environmental 
decisions to emerge “through balanced, open and 
inclusive approaches at the ground level, where 
interested public and private stakeholders work 
together to formulate critical issue statements and 
develop locally based solutions to those issues” 
(WGA, 1998).  Along similar lines, earlier WGA 
publications called for the use of policy 
frameworks “based upon improving the way we 
establish environmental priorities, creating better 
price signals, encouraging voluntary initiatives, 
working within ecosystems, and resolving 
disputes without litigation” (WGA, 1993:I, 
remarks of WGA Chairman Fife Symington).  
The most recent articulation of this philosophy is 
the so-called doctrine of Enlibra, a term coined 
by the governors to describe an approach to 
environmental management emphasizing balance 
and stewardship: 
 
The doctrine speaks to greater 
participation and collaboration in 
decision making, focuses on outcomes 
rather than just programs, and 
recognizes the need for a variety of 
tools beyond regulation that will 
improve environmental and natural 
resources management. … The 
Governors recognize that to succeed at 
environmental management people need 
to be empowered to do the right thing.  
This requires good information; 
inclusive processes that respect 
different values and provide individuals 
a role in designing and implementing 
solutions; and meaningful incentives to 
complement existing laws.7 
 
 Perhaps the best example of Enlibra in 
action is the Oregon Plan for Salmon and 
Watersheds, a state effort to restore imperiled 
salmon and trout populations “through locally-
driven, voluntary cooperative efforts.”8  The 
Oregon Plan is an alternative to the federal 
regulatory model embodied by the Endangered 
Species Act (ESA), which is a prominent 
institutional feature of watershed governance 
throughout the Pacific Northwest.  At the heart 
of the Plan initially was a Memorandum of 
Agreement (April, 1997) between the State and 
the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) 
which called for the State to take actions to 
restore coho salmon along the Oregon Coast, 
with the understanding that NMFS would 
consider these actions in deciding if these species 
merited listing under the ESA.  While NMFS 
initially agreed to this arrangement and did not 
list the population in question, a subsequent 
District Court opinion9 (of June 1, 1998) held 
that the agency should not have taken into 
account those parts of the Oregon Plan and MOA 
that are not "current regulatory measures,” a 
decision that prompted the agency to 
subsequently list the species (on October 2, 
1998).10  Timber interests that had agreed to 
financially support the Plan, presumably as a 
cost-effective means of avoiding federal ESA 
regulations, while disappointed by the District 
Court decision and ESA listing by NFMS, have 
decided to remain partners in the effort, which 
                                                        
7 http://www.westgov.org/Enlibra/.  The Enlibra 
principles were primarily crafted by Governors 
Leavitt (Utah) and Kitzhaber (Oregon).  In addition 
to encouraging collaborative problem-solving and a 
greater use of incentive-based management tools, 
Enlibra stresses the need to address problems from a 
regional perspective guided by good science.  
Additionally, Enlibra recognizes a need for 
continuing regulatory programs as a balance against 
processes reliant on voluntary action and incentives. 
8 http://www.oregon-plan.org/. 
9 Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Daley, 6 
F.Supp. 2d, 1139 (OR 1998). 
10 Additional listings occurred in March of 1999.  
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enjoys the strong support of Enlibra architect 
Governor John Kitzhaber.11 
                                                        
11 See Governor Kitzhaber’s Executive Order 99-01, 
January 8, 1999; <http://www.oregon-
plan.org/Eo99-01.htm>.  While it is much too early 
to assess the effectiveness of the approach, the Plan 
does boast of many on-the-ground habitat restoration 
efforts.  For example, in 1996-1997, watershed 
councils (i.e., watershed initiatives) and conservation 
districts completed 138 stream fencing projects 
(involving at least 301 miles of streambank), 196 
riparian area planting projects (involving at least 
111 miles of streams), and 458 instream habitat 
improvement projects.  Some observers remain 
skeptical about the long-term effectiveness of the 
approach, in part due to a perception that the 
industry “partners” are attempting to sabotage the 
effort from within. 
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The Issue of Defining and Measuring Success 
 
 
Given the widespread (and growing) 
popularity of watershed initiatives and related 
approaches, it is surprising, and more than a little 
disturbing, that the advocates of alternative 
problem-solving approaches rarely offer hard 
evidence to support claims of effectiveness.  
Countless “success stories” can be found, but 
upon closer examination, many appear to be 
exaggerations, and others are of limited universal 
applicability.  For example, the review by 
Hockenstein et al. (1997) of market-based 
strategies for pollution control show a level of 
progress often significantly below what was 
expected or commonly assumed.  Similarly, 
studies by Coglianese (1997, 1999) on negotiated 
rule-making and collaborative decision-making 
approaches raise serious doubts about the 
claimed efficiency of these alternative efforts 
regarding the time and cost of decision-making, 
and the frequency of judicial challenges, and of 
equal importance, suggest that claims of 
inefficiency regarding “traditional” processes 
may also be overstated.  Related concerns 
regarding the effectiveness of environmental 
dispute resolution techniques are identified by 
Amy (1990), Daniels (1993) and Sipe (1998).  
On the other hand, it seems highly unlikely that 
the wealth of anecdotal evidence in support of 
alternative problem-solving is without some basis 
in fact, and the widespread (and growing) 
popularity of these processes undoubtedly 
reflects that some real benefits are arising to 




The Challenge of Performance-Based 
Management (PBM) 
 
One of the major features of the era of 
alternative problem-solving is the belief that 
management approaches should primarily be 
evaluated with respect to their actual on-the-
ground impact in addressing the problems they 
were created to solve (NAPA, 1997).  This 
philosophy is known as “performance-based 
management” (PBM), an outcome-based 
administrative approach that, in the natural 
resources realm, has been most aggressively 
promoted as an alternative to the activity-based 
approach traditionally employed by EPA and 
other agencies utilizing regulatory tools: 
 
EPA’s present system for evaluating 
the successfulness of its enforcement 
work is based on a set of numerical 
indicators.  EPA officials keep a record 
of the number of administrative orders, 
civil referrals, and criminal referrals 
issued or made by the agency over the 
course of a fiscal year, as well as the 
total amounts of administrative and 
civil penalties it has assessed against 
environmental violators.  These figures, 
which play a role in EPA internal 
allocation of resources, are then made 
available to the Congress and interested 
members of the public.  This system, 
which has been widely referred to as 
“bean counting,” has been subject to 
extensive and sometimes heated 
criticism, both within the agency and 
from outside it.  (Mintz, 1995:119-
120). 
 
Critics have also found much to criticize in 
the failure in the Endangered Species Act to 
accomplish the stated goal of restoring threatened 
and endangered species (Wilcove, 1998).  As of 
September, 1999, the federal endangered species 
list contained 1,197 threatened or endangered 
species in the United States, with dozens more 
being added each year.12  Despite the existence of 
525 approved (and 361 unapproved) recovery 
                                                        
12 Updated statistics are available at the Endangered 
Species Home Page of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service (http://endangered.fws.gov/).   
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plans, about the only way off the list has been 
through extinction, an embarrassing statistic that 
prompted the Interior Department in recent years 
to consider delisting several well-known species, 
including the bald eagle.  Furthermore, critics 
contend that this lack of results has come at the 
expense of significant public and private costs, 
including the diminution of private property 
rights and values (Pendley, 1995; Kirchheim, 
1999).  Several other programs dealing with 
environmental protection, resource management, 
and ecological restoration attract similar 
criticisms of poor performance and intrusiveness. 
These and related criticisms of ineffective 
government have proven to be highly resonant 
with a broad cross-section of the American 
people, as has the obvious logic of PBM.  
Consequently, many agencies—such as EPA—
have recently implemented a variety of PBM 
strategies (NAPA, 1997), with more efforts 
forthcoming due to legislation in 1993 calling for 
PBM in all federal agencies and programs.  The 
Government Performance and Results Act 
(GPRA)13 (or “Results Act”) requires all federal 
agencies by 2000 to submit “performance 
reports” showing how their programs are 
performing with respect to stated evaluation 
criteria.  Initial implementation of the Results Act 
has been conducted using a series of pilot 
programs, which according to a 1997 General 
Accounting Office (GAO) report, has not been 
highly successful (GAO, 1997).  Most (93 
percent) resource managers/administrators 
contacted by the GAO identified at least one 
“great” or “very great” challenge impeding 
progress.  Many of those challenges occur at the 
beginning of the process, including defining 
annual performance standards for achieving 
otherwise long-term goals.  Most problems 
associated with data collection were considered 
less fundamental or serious, while problems in 
data analysis primarily concerned separating 
impacts of the program from exogenous factors. 
It is easy to see how challenges of this 
nature can impede PBM.  For example, how can 
the success of EPA programs be precisely 
                                                        
13 P.L. 103-62; 107 Stat. 285 (1993) (codified in 
various sections of 5 and 31 U.S.C.). 
assessed given that many parties, programs, and 
processes play a role in creating and abating 
pollution (Mintz, 1995)?  As the GAO observed: 
 
[T]he outcomes of many federal 
programs are the result of the interplay 
of several factors, and only some of 
these are within the program’s control.  
….  More importantly, many programs 
consist of efforts to influence highly 
complex systems or phenomena outside 
government control.  In such cases, one 
cannot confidently attribute a causal 
connection between the program and its 
outcomes.  (GAO, 1997:16-17). 
 
In lieu of obvious one-to-one relationships 
between actions and outcomes, perhaps activity 
measures such as administrative orders, civil 
referrals, and criminal referrals are, at least in 
part, appropriate measures of success.  Similarly, 
the recovery of endangered species is often, for 
biological reasons, an inherently long-term 
challenge.  Many listed species are now stable or 
improving, and those listed for the longest time 
are making the most progress.14  Perhaps that is 
proof of incremental success, even if the long-
term goal of delisting remains elusive?  And even 
if these methodological challenges can be 
overcome, PBM analyses say little about the 
equity or legitimacy of the processes utilized—
i.e., the means rather than the ends. These 
observations suggest that PBM mandates, despite 
their obvious theoretical appeal, are likely to only 
be a partial remedy to problems of evaluating the 
performance of various problem-solving 
strategies. 
                                                        
14 For example, 58 percent of species listed between 
1968 and 1973 are stable or improving, compared to 
just 22 percent of those listed between 1989 and 
1993 (FWS, 1994:12). 
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The Special Case of Watershed Initiatives 
 Measuring the “success” (or “performance”) 
of watershed initiatives is extremely difficult for 
many reasons.15  First and foremost is the 
definition of success.  Clearly, two different 
measuring scales are currently in widespread use.  
The first states that success is achievement of a 
specific on-the-ground goal described in terms of 
improved environmental health.  Using this 
classic PBM definition, a group organized to 
restore salmon populations is successful only if 
and when sampling data shows real, quantitative 
population increases.  Given that this is the 
primary definition utilized by critics to measure 
the performance of well-established governmental 
programs and entities, it seems fair and 
reasonable to apply this standard as well to 
“alternative” means of problem-solving and 
management.  On the other hand, many 
environmental problems are the result of decades 
of abuse or ignorance, and tangible, measurable 
progress probably cannot realistically be 
expected in many cases for decades.  
Consequently, imposing this definition of success 
on a community-based watershed restoration 
effort can be unfairly burdensome. 
That argument leads to the second definition 
of success, which is more forgiving.  This 
definition states that success can be measured by 
“organizational” criteria, such as changes in the 
level of trust (and/or satisfaction) among 
stakeholders and resource managers, the degree 
to which management efforts better recognize 
systemic and transboundary qualities of natural 
resources, and the enhanced involvement of local 
actors in decision-making.  Determining if this 
type of criteria should be used to measure 
success is dependent, in part, upon whether or 
not it can be shown that organizational 
achievements are a prerequisite to achieving the 
more fundamental, on-the-ground form of 
success that results in measurable improvements 
in resource health.  From a methodological 
                                                        
15 This discussion is largely taken from the article, 
“Are Community-Based Watershed Groups Really 
Effective? Confronting the Thorny Issue of 
Measuring Success,” published in Chronicle of 
Community (Kenney, 1999a). 
standpoint, that can be an extremely difficult 
determination, due to factors such as the relative 
youth of many efforts, and to concerns over 
translating highly case-specific outcomes into 
generalized conclusions.  Additionally, even in 
the absence of this cause-and-effect data, it can 
be argued that collaborative, bottom-up 
processes have an intrinsic value regardless of 
their outcomes.  Values attributed to process 
rather than outcomes are difficult to capture in a 
PBM approach, but should not be 
underestimated.16 
 Issues and arguments of this nature have 
stymied more than one effort to measure the 
success of watershed initiatives, including a  
forum of the Northwest Water Law and Policy 
Project (Water Project).17  Commenting on the 
fall-out of that process, organizer Michael Fife 
concludes: 
 
I find myself drifting at a steady rate 
toward the position that community 
processes are worth supporting whether 
or not we can judge them as successful 
according to some objective standard of 
success.  There is something organic 
about community groups that make 
them good in themselves; we just know 
they are a good thing whether or not we 
are able to articulate why.18 
 
 While the perspective of Fife is widely held 
and is compelling on many levels, the fact 
remains that many modern policy initiatives are 
moving forward under the assumption that the 
community/collaborative model offers more than 
intrinsic, procedural benefits, but also promises 
to satisfy the nearly universal demand for greater 
efficiency and pragmatism in resource 
management and problem-solving.  If these on-
the-ground benefits are not realized, this does not 
mean that the “procedural gains” are irrelevant or 
                                                        
16 This idea was well articulated by Winston 
Churchill when he remarked that democracy is the 
worst form of government, except for all the rest. 
17 “Watershed Council Success Forum,” August 31, 
1998.   
18 E-mail communication of January 24, 1999.  
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not worthy of pursuit, but does call into question 
the fervor with which many alternative problem-
solving strategies are being pursued—often at the 
expense of other methods.  Some effort, however 
incomplete, is needed to address these thorny 
issues of success currently attracting more 
rhetoric than real analysis.  One product of this 
research would be advice to policy-makers 
considering a greater use of watershed initiatives.  
Equally important, however, would be additional 
insights identifying those structural, functional, 
and “contextual” qualities that most contribute to 
(or impede) success in a collaborative watershed 
effort.19  This information would be useful to 
both proponents and opponents of watershed 
initiatives. 
 
A Working Definition of Success 
 This report provides a general overview of 
many of these questions, based on new research 
and literature reviews.  For the purposes of 
discussion, the following definition of success is 
offered: 
 
A collaborative group (e.g., watershed 
initiative) is successful if it contributes 
(or can be reasonably expected to 
eventually contribute), in whole or in 
part, to the achievement of current or 
future on-the-ground natural resource 
objectives, defined in accordance with 
prevailing societal norms and laws, 
beyond what would have occurred (or 
will likely occur) in the absence of the 
collaborative group. 
 
This definition features several 
compromises, caveats and qualifications that 
render it a “general working definition” rather 
                                                        
19 Some organizations and publication outlets have 
begun to fill this void.  Of particular note are efforts 
sponsored by River Network (including the 
Innovators Report and the 4 Corners Initiative), 
many recent graduate theses (e.g., Coughlin et al., 
1999), several thoughtful essays published through 
the Chronicle of Community and Ecology Law 
Quarterly, and ongoing studies by the Natural 
Resources Law Center. 
than an absolute defendable standard upon which 
to structure empirical research.  For example, the 
“on-the-ground orientation” typical of PBM is 
featured, but there is the acknowledgement that 
progress of this nature may only be a practical 
long-term success criterion.  The definition also 
implicitly acknowledges that watershed initiatives 
and similar efforts are established to play 
different roles, ranging from field-level action 
(e.g., planting trees) at one extreme to public 
education at another.  For the purposes of 
defining success, the role played by the 
watershed initiative is not the primary concern; 
the primary concern is determining if that role 
helps to create or contribute to processes leading 
to on-the-ground problem-solving.  Also 
significant is the idea that the effort must pursue 
goals consistent with prevailing social norms and 
laws, otherwise it is not an effort in improving 
management, but is more akin to an interest 
group seeking special benefits or, at worst, a 
criminal effort.  This qualifier can also be 
interpreted as interjecting the idea of fair and 
balanced representation, which again, is offered 
to distinguish collaborative groups from interest 
groups.  Finally and most importantly, the 
definition suggests that performance of watershed 
initiatives and similar efforts are best measured 
when compared to the level of problem-solving 
that would have occurred in their absence, a 
criterion with obvious logic and practical value 
but defying easy measurement.  Initiatives not 
meeting the standards contained within the 
definition are not necessarily “failures,” but 
simply do not meet the highly pragmatic standard 





Positive, Speculative, and Normative 
Opinions Regarding Collaborative 
Groups 
 
 Any discussion of success regarding 
collaborative groups yields many strong opinions 
from both proponents and skeptics.  In order to 
critically evaluate these opinions, it is necessary 
to identify the underlying assumptions and 
assertions upon which they are founded.  Some 
opinions refer to matters of fact, and presumably 
can—at least in theory—be tested for accuracy 
against empirical data.  In most cases, these 
opinions are what scholars refer to as “positivist” 
(or positive), in that they presume to describe an 
existing situation.  A closely related set of 
opinions are those that are somewhat more 
“speculative” in nature, in that they refer to 
situations that may or may not arise in the future.  
While these speculative opinions cannot be tested 
in the present with absolute certainty, it is often 
possible to evaluate the “reasonableness” of these 
views by comparing them to trends and findings 
distilled from existing data.  This is a common 
task in scientific inquiries, taking on its most 
formal incarnation in the world of predictive 
statistics and probability theory.  A 
fundamentally different class of opinions are 
“normative,” which do not necessarily refer to a 
current or the expected future situation, but 
rather describe an “ideal” or “correct” condition 
based on personal values more so than objective 
facts.  While normative opinions have a much 
greater philosophical content than the positive or 
speculative opinions, they also typically include 
assumptions about the cause-and-effect 
relationship between particular types of 
institutional arrangements and eventual on-the-
ground results. 
 Both the proponents and skeptics of 
collaborative groups in the natural resources and 
environmental realm offer opinions of the 
“positive” (i.e., the way things are), “speculative” 
(i.e., the way things are expected to become), and 
“normative” (i.e., the ways things should be) 
variety.  The distinctions between these classes of 
opinions are not always clear, as disputes over 
the availability and credibility of supporting data 
are a frequent point of contention.  For example, 
what one party sees as a factual, “positive” 
statement, another may view as “speculative.”  
While these distinctions may be unimportant in 
informal conversation, they take on particular 
importance to the analyst asked to independently 
assess the credibility of such opinions.  
Presumably, the analyst can be expected to offer 
a more solid critique of the positive opinions than 
the speculative opinions, although both are 
amenable to formal scientific scrutiny.  
Conversely, the analyst can be expected to 
contribute less to the normative debate except to 
better identify underlying values and 
assumptions.  For this reason, the positive and 
speculative arguments are grouped together in the 
following discussions, while the normative 
opinions are presented separately.  These 
arguments are also summarized at the end of this 
discussion in Table 1. 
 
Positive and Speculative Arguments:  Pro 
and Con20 
 Pro.  Perhaps the most prevalent “positive” 
opinion articulated by the proponents of 
collaborative groups is to assert that traditional 
means of management and problem-solving do 
not work.  Existing mechanisms are often said to 
feature procedural inefficiencies and inequities, 
while failing to achieve on-the-ground 
performance measures.  The speculative 
corollary to this argument is that traditional 
means of management and problem-solving will 
not work in the future.  These arguments are 
frequently used in a roundabout manner to 
support the use of collaborative groups based on 
the reasoning that, even if they are largely 
unproven experiments in resources management 
and problem-solving, collaborative groups are 
not likely to be any worse than existing 
processes and have a real potential to be 
notable improvements.   
 Another significant argument of the 
proponents is that many collaborative groups 
                                                        
20 This discussion provides only a brief listing of 
major opinions, arguments, and assumptions.  
Additional details, including examples and citations, 
are provided throughout the report.  
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already meet the pragmatic definition of success 
presented earlier.  In actuality, this argument is 
best articulated as two distinct opinions: first, 
that many collaborative groups have already 
achieved significant organizational objectives; 
and second, that many collaborative groups have 
already achieved significant on-the-ground 
improvements in natural resource conditions.  
The reason it is useful to make this distinction is 
that the first of these opinions is typically 
married to the speculative idea that 
organizational achievements will lead to on-the-
ground success, and/or the normative idea that 
organizational gains are of intrinsic value 
regardless of any on-the-ground consequences.  
The speculative opinion is of particular relevance 
to the definition of success provided earlier, as it 
introduces the implied cause-and-effect 
relationship (between organizational and on-the-
ground achievements) that is at the heart of most 
pro-collaborative group arguments.  The 
normative opinion, like the other normative 
opinions identified in this report, is not readily 
accommodated by the aforementioned definition 
of success.  This does not mean that the 
normative opinion is unimportant or invalid, but 
is simply a question that is not well suited to 
formal scientific testing.21 
 Con.  The positive arguments of the 
collaborative group skeptics often begin with the 
notion that existing processes of decision-
making and problem-solving, while admittedly 
far from perfect, are not fundamentally flawed.  
To the contrary, many notable gains have been 
achieved through existing programs, and to 
deviate from those proven tools entails an 
inherent risk.  Additionally, without the 
regulatory framework provided by the frequently 
maligned programs deriving from legislation 
                                                        
21 Austrian philosopher Karl Popper is well known 
for making the distinction between scientific and 
non-scientific arguments, claiming that only the 
former category is capable of testing that could 
potentially find it false.  A non-scientific 
argument—such as a normative argument—cannot 
be disproven.  The distinction between positive and 
normative arguments has a long history, going back 
at least to Machiavelli’s writings in the sixteenth 
century. 
such as the Clean Water Act and Endangered 
Species Act, it would likely be impossible to 
even attempt collaborative approaches, much as 
it is difficult to pursue a negotiated settlement 
without a viable threat of litigation.  This line of 
reasoning highlights what is a fundamental and 
potentially divisive issue within the community of 
collaborative group proponents: To what extent 
should tools such as collaborative groups be 
viewed as a substitute for more traditional 
processes, rather than as a supplement.22  
Presumably, the answer to this question lies in 
the evaluation of the other opinions and 
assumptions regarding the efficacy of the 
collaborative group approach. 
 The most general (and damning) argument 
made by the skeptics of collaborative groups is 
the assertion that most collaborative group 
processes have not been effective in solving on-
the-ground problems (the positive argument) 
and are not likely to be so in the future (the 
speculative argument).  Additionally, in those 
cases where some success is difficult to deny, the 
so-called “low hanging fruit” argument is 
frequently offered to dampen any enthusiasm.  
This line of reasoning asserts that collaborative 
groups may experience some successes 
immediately after formation by concentrating on 
those problems that have obvious solutions 
amenable to efficient implementation, but long-
term effectiveness cannot be maintained once 
these opportunities are quickly exhausted. 
Issues of representation and decision-
making are also frequently raised to support the 
viewpoint that collaborative groups are not 
effective problem-solving vehicles, as well as to 
support normative criticisms.  Specific criticisms 
                                                        
22 Interestingly, parties most directly involved with 
watershed initiatives appear to be generally united in 
their belief that these processes are best viewed as 
supplements rather than replacements, a conclusion 
distilled from comments urging that formal authority 
not be transferred to watershed initiatives (Kenney, 
1997).  It is policy-makers and analysts, more so 
than actual participants, that most commonly argue 
in favor of greater authority and formality (e.g., 
WWPRAC, 1998).  Efforts like the Quincy Library 
Group best highlight this emerging debate about the 
proper role for community groups in policy-making. 
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include the assertion that environmental 
viewpoints are not adequately represented in 
collaborative group processes, or conversely, 
that commodity interests are over-represented.  
Presumably, in some cases this is seen as an 
inherent function of the incentive structure 
involved or the demographics of the region, while 
in other cases, it is attributed to a deliberate 
policy of exclusion.  Additionally, to the extent 
that environmental interests are represented, 
they are likely to be at a strategic disadvantage 
given the greater financial resources and 
training of their “anti-environmental” 
counterparts.  Also common is the opinion that 
the typical decision-rule of consensus does not 
lead to efficient or productive decision-making 
exercises.  Given that proponents of collaborative 
processes are often quick to cite the pragmatism 
and effectiveness of these efforts, these 
criticisms, if accurate, are devastating to any 
party utilizing a performance-based measure of 
success. 
 
Normative Arguments:  Pro and Con 
 Pro.  Many parties see the movement in 
favor of community-oriented, collaborative 
processes as having intrinsic values irrespective 
of their long-term contribution to problem-
solving.  Two types of supporting arguments are 
frequently mentioned.  The first is that local 
residents should be involved in making 
decisions with local impacts.  It is frequently 
argued that collaborative groups are desirable in 
that they often provide a vehicle for local 
stakeholders and governments to be more 
involved in making the decisions that affect their 
lives than they might otherwise be if the decisions 
were made by distant governments.  This concern 
is especially prevalent in communities that live 
within or adjacent to public lands, which are 
largely managed in accordance with national 
policy directives and regional planning processes.  
The second major normative argument is that 
cooperative approaches to decision-making are 
inherently preferable to conflict oriented 
approaches (e.g., litigation).  Closely tied to this 
argument is the idea that cooperative 
interactions within a specified locale help to 
build a sense of community and of place, which 
in turn, improves the quality of life for all 
residents, and improves the ability of a 
community to achieve social, economic and 
environmental goals. 
 Both of these normative opinions are 
founded upon positive and speculative 
assumptions that may be difficult to substantiate.  
For example, do collaborative processes really 
provide local residents with a measurably greater 
influence on policy outcomes than do other 
processes of decision-making?  Similarly, do 
collaborative processes really help to build an 
enhanced level of trust and cooperation among 
parties, and what are the consequences of that 
modified relationship?  Presumably, these are 
questions that can be addressed, at least partially, 
through scholarly research.  Whether or not the 
outcomes of such research are influential in 
modifying normative opinions, however, is a 
separate issue, as values rarely are modified by 
providing factual data. 
 Con.  Both types of normative opinions 
described above are matched in the public policy 
arena with strong counter opinions.  Some 
parties, for example, argue that most natural 
resources are, at least to some degree, public 
resources, and should managed in accordance 
with the values held by the nation and society at 
large—not just a local constituency.  A related 
argument is that public policy-making is a 
function of government, and it is inappropriate 
to subordinate these decisions to ad hoc, 
public/private groups that may not satisfy 
democratic norms regarding representation, 
process, professional expertise, and related 
considerations.  It is also argued that conflict-
oriented processes are a legitimate and 
important approach to decision-making, and 
that venerating consensus can promote an 
inappropriate social pressure to compromise.  
Again, each of these normative opinions is 
largely based on positive/speculative assumptions 
that may or may not survive critical 
examination—e.g., the premise that the values of 
local constituencies will frequently deviate from 
those held nationally, and the idea that existing 
governmental processes can produce reasonable 
outcomes. 
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Table 1.  Summary of Arguments Raised to Defend and Challenge the Use of Collaborative 
Groups in Natural Resources Management and Problem-Solving 
 
ARGUMENTS OF THE PROPONENTS ARGUMENTS OF THE SKEPTICS 
Positive Arguments (i.e., arguments presumably based on facts) and Speculative 
Arguments (i.e., those based on expected future outcomes).  
Traditional means of management and 
problem-solving do not work now, and/or 
will not work in the future.  Collaborative 
approaches offer greater future problem-
solving potential. 
Existing processes of decision-making and 
problem-solving, while imperfect, are not 
fundamentally flawed, and create the 
context within which collaboration can be 
attempted. 
Even if collaborative groups are not 
successful, they are (and will be) no worse 
than existing mechanisms. 
Due to problems of inadequate 
representation, unequal resources, and the 
limits of consensus, collaborative groups 
may exacerbate unfair concentrations of 
power and have a coercive affect on 
minority viewpoints. 
Many collaborative groups have already 
achieved significant organizational 
objectives.   Some have also already 
achieved significant on-the-ground results.   
Organizational achievements may not lead 
to on-the-ground results—the only valid 
measure of effectiveness.  Many “success 
stories” lack empirical proof, and involve 
implementing obvious solutions to easy 
problems—not a real test of success.  
Consensus processes help to overcome 
historic animosities, encourage learning 
and compromise, and facilitate problem-
solving in a way that adversarial and highly 
formalized processes cannot. 
A reliance on consensus discredits value 
differences, ensures that zero-sum problems 
cannot be addressed, encourages “lowest 
common denominator” decisions, and 
provides few due process protections.   
Collaborative processes offer advantages 
in time, money, and “durability” of 
outcomes. 
The costs of participating in collaborative 
processes are significant, and are usually in 
addition to—rather than instead of—costs 
of other traditional processes. 
Normative Arguments (i.e., arguments based on personal notions of right and wrong, 
and based on desired—rather than actual or predicted—conditions). 
Local residents should be more involved in 
decisions that have local consequences.  
The role of citizens in decision-making 
should be enhanced. 
The views of distant stakeholders should 
have equal weight in decisions involving 
public resources.  Public officials should 
make decisions about public resources. 
Collaborative processes are inherently 
preferable to those based on conflict.  
Consensus-building activities build 
cohesive communities more capable of 
pursuing appropriate social, economic and 
environmental goals. 
Conflict oriented processes—namely 
litigation—provide a healthy mechanism for 
expressing, rather than suppressing, 
divergent opinions.  Managed conflict, 
rather than suppressed conflict, is the real 
measure of a healthy democracy. 
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Salient Research Questions 
 This set of positive, speculative, and 
normative opinions, summarized in Table 1, is 
based on a variety of assumptions, some of which 
can be substantiated by the appropriate 
literatures and some which cannot.  It is an 
appropriate task for researchers to identify and 
critically analyze these assumptions, and to the 
extent that these efforts are fruitful, to then 
comment upon the credibility and strength of the 
expressed opinions.  Admittedly, this is an 
inexact science—especially with respect to the 
normative opinions—but is an activity that is 
needed to provide guidance to policy-makers and 
other activists concerned with issues of natural 
resources governance and institutional 
arrangements.   
 As a practical matter, it is impossible herein 
to identify and address all relevant research 
questions deriving from this set of opinions and 
assumptions.  Consequently, this report focuses 
primarily on the two following research areas of 
particular salience: 
 
(1) Merits of the Existing System 
• Are traditional means of management 
and problem-solving reasonably 
effective, or is the existing system 
broken?   
• Will traditional means of management 
and problem-solving work in the future? 
 
(2) Collaborative Groups in Context 
• What is the relationship between the 
traditional and alternative mechanisms of 
problem-solving? 
• Is there a cause-and-effect relationship 
between organizational achievements and 
subsequent on-the-ground success?  
Stated more generally, does the 
community/collaborative model of 
interaction and decision-making produce 
benefits that increase the ability of 
society to achieve social, economic and 
environmental goals? 
• How does the consensus decision-rule 
typical of collaborative groups influence 
the quality of decisions and decision-




A Preliminary Review of Literature and Data 
 
 
The following pages address many of these 
difficult questions, drawing upon a tremendous 
diversity of literatures and disciplines.  Given the 
breath of the subject matter under investigation, 
an effort is made throughout to distinguish 
between the positive/speculative and the 
normative elements of those “salient research 
questions” listed earlier.  To the extent possible, 
this report is primarily focused on the 
positive/speculative opinions, and especially 
those for which we have some hard data and/or 
experience.  This does not mean that the 
normative opinions are somehow inferior or less 
important than the other opinions, nor does this 
mean that normative issues are neglected entirely 
in the following pages.  To the contrary, several 
normative issues are identified in the discussion 
of the salient research questions, and it is not 
difficult to find a strong normative content in 
many of the arguments and quotes presented.  
Additionally, a few observations regarding 
normative arguments associated with the concept 
of “democracy” are presented in a separate 
discussion, an acknowledgement that watershed 
initiatives provide an excellent context for 
debating prevailing notions about what 
constitutes good government—an issue several 
orders of magnitude more complex than the 
already difficult subject matters addressed herein.   
 
 




Merits of the Existing System 
 
Question:  Are traditional means of 
management and problem-solving 
reasonably effective, or is the existing 
system fundamentally broken? 
 As many scholars have observed, the case in 
favor of many forms of alternative problem-
solving is often a negative one; i.e., it is more of 
an attack on traditional mechanisms than a 
reasoned endorsement of the merits of alternative 
approaches.23  Certainly there is no shortage of 
criticisms directed at existing natural resource 
and environmental management programs. 
Rosenbaum (1995:253), for example, calls 
Superfund24 “a legislative Titanic that only the 
most ardent environ-mentalists still believe is 
viable”; Pendley (1995:85) derides the 
Endangered Species Act as the “bit pull of 
environmental laws”; and Davies and Mazurek 
(1997:48) describe the pollution control 
regulatory system as having “deep and 
fundamental flaws.”  Many similarly harsh 
criticisms are directed at the implementing 
agencies, as evidenced by the comments of 
Senator Ted Stevens (R-Alaska), Chairman of 
the Senate Appropriations Committee: “No 
sector of the government is more rife with 
wasteful duplication, fragmentation and 
undependable service than the agencies that are 
involved in environmental and natural resource 
issues” (Senate Hearing, 1996:1).  While some 
arguments are of dubious merit, many are based 
on disturbing evidence, such as estimates that 
less than 3 percent of Bureau of Land 
Management rangelands are in excellent 
condition (NWF and NRDC, 1989), or that per 
                                                        
23 For example, political scientist Douglas Amy 
(1987:17-18) makes the following observation about 
environmental mediation: “As one listens to 
proponents of [environmental mediation], it becomes 
evident that much of their case is a negative one—
one based on criticisms of the legislative, 
administrative, and judicial institutions that we have 
traditionally relied upon to resolve these 
controversies.  … It is this perceived institutional 
failure that has motivated the interest in alternative 
forms of dispute resolution.” 
24 Superfund is the nickname given to the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (1980); 94 Stat. 
2767 (codified as amended at 42 §§ U.S.C. 9601-
9675 (1994 & Supp. II 1996)). 
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capita generation of solid waste has doubled 
since the 1960s (Davies and Mazurek, 1997).  As 
repeatedly documented by the national 
community of activists, significant problems 
exist in the health of environmental resources.25 
On the other hand, it is unrealistic to expect 
that an undertaking as massive as managing 
natural resources and environmental systems can 
be accomplished without some debate and 
criticism, especially given the inability of 
American society to agree on the appropriate 
balance between resource development and 
protection, between private rights and public 
interests, between short-term aspirations and 
long-term objectives, and between a host of other 
differing objectives so characteristic of our 
modern pluralist society.   
Additionally, there are many success stories 
in natural resources and environmental 
management, something readily acknowledged in 
the report by Davies and Mazurek (1997) entitled 
Regulating Pollution: Does the U.S. System 
Work?  Given the quantitative nature of pollution 
prevention outcomes and the obvious objective 
function (i.e., less pollution is better), programs 
for pollution control are well suited to empirical 
studies.  While concluding that “fundamental 
flaws” exist in U.S. systems for pollution control, 
Davies and Mazurek (1997) nonetheless 
acknowledge several notable accomplishments.  
For example, in the realm of air quality 
                                                        
25 Recent years have seen the emergence of a so-
called “brownlash” of works questioning the 
conclusion that serious environmental problems exist 
in the United States, a conclusion strongly refuted by 
Anne Ehrlich (1996) in Betrayal of Science and 
Reason.  Some examples of brownlash literature 
include Gregg Easterbrook’s 1995 work, A Moment 
on the Earth, in which he generally concludes that 
environmental protection programs have worked and 
the problems are solved; Mann and Plummer’s 1995 
critique of the Endangered Species Act (Noah’s 
Choice: The Future of Endangered Species) which 
concludes that the program is overly biased in favor 
of preservation at the expense of reasonable 
development and use; and Ray and Guzzo’s (1990) 
Thrashing the Planet and its conclusions that human 
impacts on the environmental are relatively minor 
and easily amenable to technology-based solutions. 
management, four of the six “criteria air 
pollutants” (sulfur dioxide, carbon monoxide, 
lead, and particulates) have shown significant 
improvements in recent decades, with the 78 
percent reduction in lead being the most dramatic 
accomplishment.  The other two criteria, ozone 
and nitrogen dioxide, have also improved, 
although only at modest levels.  Similarly, many 
water quality trends of the past quarter century 
are positive, especially as related to the treatment 
of sewage.  Improvements in drinking water 
quality are also generally acknowledged.26  Thus, 
the news from the field is not all bad. 
 An on-the-ground, performance-based 
assessment of natural resource (as distinct from 
environmental) management is considerably more 
difficult to apply, given that objectives are often 
not so easily defined.  Additionally, many 
agencies, such as the Forest Service and National 
Park Service, have mandates that require 
agencies to pursue multiple objectives that are, to 
various degrees, competitive rather than 
complementary, ensuring that some parties will 
be unhappy with the trade-offs selected.  
Reductions in federal timber harvests of old-
growth in the Northwest in the name of 
environmental protection, for example, are 
difficult to classify as a success or failure 
without relying on normative criteria specifying 
the proper balance between timber harvesting and 
resource preservation (Carroll, 1995).  Congress, 
for obvious political reasons, rarely provides 
agencies with detailed criteria for making these 
trade-offs, ensuring that “success” is a fiercely 
debated and highly qualitative concept.   
This is not to say that there is a dearth of 
relevant facts or statistics about the status of 
natural resources management efforts.  Much is 
known.  For example, on the federal public lands, 
consumptive uses such as timber harvesting, 
                                                        
26 Even the General Accounting Office has found 
reason to praise the U.S. system of pollution control 
as administered by the EPA:  “EPA has 
accomplished much to protect human health and the 
environment since its inception in 1970.  It has put 
in place a comprehensive regulatory structure and 
has made notable progress in identifying and 
combating many of the major causes of pollution” 
(GAO, 1988:216). 
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grazing, and mining are generally declining, 
while recreational uses and urbanization 
accelerate rapidly (Kenney, 1998).  Water 
withdrawals in the West have grown to 179 
million acre-feet as of 1990 (Solley, 1997), 
offering at least a partial explanation for reports 
suggesting that, in the past quarter century, over 
20 native fish species have become extinct, while 
approximately 100 more species, or 70 percent of 
all species in the region, are endangered, 
threatened, or otherwise of special concern 
(WWPRAC, 1998).27  Clearly, some of these 
trends—such as the fish declines—are widely 
acknowledged as negative, however, the solution 
to such problems is often highly debatable, and 
many additional trends cannot easily be classified 
as positive or negative in the court of public 
opinion due to different normative assumptions. 
 Given the mixed track record of most 
environmental and natural resource programs, 
why are so many authors, like Davies and 
Mazurek, so strongly convinced that the existing 
system is in need of fundamental reforms rather 
than more modest adjustments?  In many cases, 
the answer has as much to do with failures to 
meet preferred procedural norms and 
administrative criteria pertaining to program 
design, administrative and compliance costs, and 
decision-making mechanisms, than with 
dissatisfaction with program objectives or even 
outcomes.28 Perhaps the most pervasive 
criticisms are those of program inefficiency.  One 
                                                        
27 An excellent assessment of the nation’s biological 
resources has recently been published by the United 
States Geological Survey (1999). 
28 For example, Davies and Mazurek (1997) criticize 
the U.S. systems for pollution control for being 
overly fragmented, poorly integrated (ignoring the 
linkages between air, land and water), based on poor 
data, and frequently inefficient (e.g., spending 
priorities typically do not match risk factors).  Along 
somewhat similar lines, a 1994 conference of the 
American Society of Civil Engineers criticized water 
quality programs as featuring too many inflexible 
mandates, an inadequate policy-making role for state 
and local governments, questionable science, poor 
coordination among programs, inadequate use of 
benefit-cost analyses, high permitting costs, and 
excessive litigation (Holme, 1994). 
line of criticism contends that fiscal and temporal 
inefficiencies plague decision-making 
mechanisms, including planning processes under 
National Forest Management Act (NFMA), 
Federal Lands Policy and Management Act 
(FLPMA), and the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA), the issuance of 
administrative rules for pollution control, and a 
host of other procedures falling largely within the 
domain of federal and, presumably to a lesser 
extent, state agencies.29   Presumably, as Kagan 
(1999:720) observes, these problems are more 
pervasive in the United States than in other 
developed countries: 
 
Notwithstanding much-publicized EPA 
initiatives to make environmental 
regulation less legalistic, the case studies 
found that for regulated companies with 
cross-national experience American 
environmental regulatory processes are 
more detailed, prescriptive, complex, 
unpredictable, and costly to comply with 
than are comparable regulatory regimes 
in other economically advanced 
democracies.  American regulatory 
regimes are experienced as quicker to 
impose legal penalties for violations, and 
their legal sanctions tend to be much 
more severe.  These "procedural” 
differences, moreover, generally are far 
more salient to the regulated companies 
than differences in substantive regulatory 
norms, which usually differed, if at all, 
only slightly.30 
                                                        
29 Complaints of inefficiency have many other 
dimensions.  One of the more substantive arguments 
is that most natural resource activities and sectors 
are highly subsidized, a situation challenged by an 
awkward alliance of fiscal conservatives and 
environmental critics of extractive industries 
(Anderson, 1994). 
30 Higher costs in the U.S. system are primarily 
attributed to three causes: (1) legal services; (2) 
“accountability” measures, such as reporting 
requirements; and (3) high opportunity costs, largely 
associated with permitting delays.  On the other 
hand, these qualities are judged by Kagan 
(1999:721) as providing “stronger rights of public 
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 Similar observations can be found in the 
book Jurismania by law professor Paul Campos 
(1998), who argues that America has evolved 
into a culture of legal excesses.  This “vice of 
legal gluttony” (page x) is manifest in many 
ways, but is perhaps most evident by the rapid 
distillation of all controversies into legal terms, 
and by our insistence on solving all disputes with 
legal remedies—including those situations in 
which we have considerable evidence suggesting 
that those remedies do not work.  Our faith in 
law, according to Campos, is an unreasonable 
enthusiasm—by definition, a mania.  Arguably, 
this mania is in few instances stronger than in the 
natural resources and environmental realm. 
 Many other complaints about decision-
making processes focus on the fragmented focus 
presumably attributable to litigation, specialized 
legislation, narrow agency mandates, and more 
generally, the historic failure of policy and law to 
recognize the systemic quality of resources.  
Equally controversial is the belief that the 
“decide-announce-defend” model of public 
participation is inadequate, especially in regards 
to providing for meaningful local input and the 
sharing of expertise.31  The inadequacy (or 
inadequate use) of scientific information, and the 
reactionary nature of many policies, are 
additional criticisms focused more on the means 
of natural resource and environmental decision-
making than the ends.    
 Addressed independently, strong evidence 
can be found to support each of these criticisms.  
However, when viewed as a single line of 
criticism, several significant conclusions emerge.  
First, several of the problems identified, and the 
implied solutions, are not mutually consistent.  
Most important in the context of this paper is the 
notion that decision-making processes are too 
                                                                                   
participation, broader access to information 
concerning regulatory compliance, and easier access 
to the courts.” 
31 For example, research by Lyden, Twight, and 
Tuchmann (1990) on Forest Service planning 
processes showed that most participants, whether 
pro-industry or environmentalists, judged such 
efforts to be dismal failures. 
long, costly, and arduous; yet, reformers argue 
for the scope of decision-making to be broadened, 
with more parties playing an active role in policy 
deliberations.  For example, while Davies and 
Mazurek (1997) lament the inefficiency of 
pollution control programs that involve 
“thousands of interested groups,” they join with 
many others in calling for decision-making 
mechanisms which are more participatory.  
Neither historians of democracy nor students of 
comparative politics have much to offer in 
support of this idea that broadening participation 
is a precursor to greater efficiency; if anything, 
the contrary opinion is usually regarded as fact.32  
Very similar are calls for decision-making 
mechanisms that are more flexible and 
informal—and presumably more efficient—than 
traditional mechanisms, married to concerns that 
explicit standards and requirements must exist in 
decision-making processes to ensure broad 
representation of interests and due process.33 
 Also significant is the widely held notion 
that the source of the perceived inadequacies lies 
with the natural resource agencies in charge of 
planning processes, rule-making, and program 
implementation.  That perspective, however, 
ignores the fact that agencies frequently have 
little real discretion in the design or 
implementation of programs, and that many of 
the problems encountered in implementation 
derive from legislative mandates that are 
incomplete or inconsistent, a reflection not only 
of the reluctance of most congressional leaders to 
tackle divisive issues, but also a result of 
scientific uncertainties and the existence of 
fundamental value conflicts among the spectrum 
of parties involved in drafting and enacting 
legislation.  Agencies are also tightly constrained 
by the courts.  As Goodsell (1985:175) has 
                                                        
32 Traditionally, full participation is argued for on 
equity, not efficiency, grounds.   
33 As Dan Luecke (1999:6), Director of the Rocky 
Mountain office of the Environmental Defense Fund, 
has observed, “Collaborative forums for ecosystem 
restoration are tailor-made for each process, thus 
there are rarely, if ever, standard operating rules, a 
situation which always puts minority interests 
(where environmentalists find themselves) at 
disadvantage.” 
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observed, the power of bureaucrats in the United 
States is “probably more inhibited than in any 
other country on earth” due to chronic judicial 
intervention in agency decision-making.  And on 
an even more pragmatic level, some 
shortcomings—such as the frequent lack of 
adequate scientific data for decision-making—are 
simply the result of budgetary shortfalls, a 
problem not easily rectified by resource 
managers. 
 Perhaps most significant to this study 
examining the merits of collaborative processes 
are the arguments directed at decision-making 
processes dominated by litigation.  These attacks 
on litigation are frequently more than simply a 
critique of a single type of process, but are a 
challenge to the philosophy that disputes should 
be handled though formal and adversarial 
mechanisms featuring specialized actors, ideas 
that run counter to most notions of collaboration 
and, more generally, alternative problem-solving.  
Common arguments against litigation are that it 
is time-consuming, costly, zero-sum (often 
featuring the win/lose outcomes typical of 
adversarial conflicts), substantively narrow 
(often focusing on procedural issues rather than 
substance), and subordinating to many concerned 
parties (including the general public and local 
interests) at the expense of promoting technical 
elites (Amy, 1990).  Each of those arguments has 
a strong basis in fact, and understandably fuel a 
formidable desire among reformers to find 
something better.  Also true is that people are, in 
fact, increasingly looking to other mechanisms of 
dispute resolution.  After a sharp rise in the early 
1970s, the amount of environmental litigation 
leveled off in the mid 1970s and then began to 
decline (Amy, 1990).  This decline has been 
offset by a sharp rise in “collaborative” decision-
making approaches, namely environmental 
dispute resolution (EDR), negotiated rulemaking, 
and more recently, the use of ad hoc 
collaborative groups such as watershed initiatives 
(Bingham, 1997; NRLC, 1996).   
There is reason to believe, however, that 
collaborative approaches often do not address 
many of the complaints lodged against litigation, 
and can create new concerns.  For example, 
Bingham’s (1986) empirical research on EDR 
finds there is little evidence to support the claim 
that EDR is faster than litigation, a finding 
echoed by empirical studies by Coglianese (1997) 
on negotiated rule-making.34  Similarly, there is 
little to suggest that these processes are cheaper.  
In fact, Amy (1990:222) is among those 
concluding that “there is reason to believe that it 
could often prove more expensive,” in part since 
many collaborative decision-making efforts are 
typically conducted against a backdrop of 
ongoing litigation,35 and in part due to the 
tremendous time demands of multi-party, multi-
issue negotiations.  Alleged cost savings to the 
resource agencies using collaborative processes 
are difficult to substantiate.  For example, 
research by Manring (1998) focusing on the use 
of alternative dispute resolution tools in the 
Forest Service found that such approaches do 
reduce the administrative appeals workload at the 
national headquarters, but that these “gains” are 
offset by dramatic (and largely unbudgeted and 
unrecognized) workload increases at the local 
level.   
Also of questionable merit is the assumption 
that collaborative processes can overcome the 
win-lose quality so typical of litigation.  This 
assumption is perhaps most ingrained in 
proponents of the so-called “hot tub” school of 
mediation, which assumes that most conflicts are 
correctable mis-communications or negotiable 
interest conflicts, an assumption that is 
undoubtedly true in many circumstances, but is 
of dubious merit when the subject matter features 
elements of value conflict—a frequent component 
of environmental disputes.  As Amy (1990:227) 
                                                        
34 Research by Kerwin and Furlong (1992) suggests 
that negotiated rule-making takes only about three-
fourths as long as rules reached through traditional 
processes (778 days versus 1,108 days).  This 
research is frequently utilized as evidence in reports, 
such as those of the National Performance Review, 
supporting the idea that negotiation-based processes 
are more efficient.  However, Coglianese (1997) 
shows that if a larger sample set is included, pending 
negotiated rule-making exercises are considered, and 
different strategies of time measurement are utilized, 
then no time savings can be shown. 
35 The overwhelming majority of lawsuits, after all, 
are settled out of court. 
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has observed, the practical implications of this 
working assumption are of concern to many 
environmentalists: 
 
This vision of environmental issues as 
revolving around matters of principle, 
moral or otherwise, causes 
environmentalists to question another 
assumption of EDR [environmental 
dispute resolution]: that compromise is 
always a desirable approach to 
resolving these disputes.  …  As one 
environmental lawyer has argued, there 
are simply some issues where if one 
agrees to negotiate and compromise 
over them at the very beginning, one 
has already lost much of the battle.36  
 
 Much stronger arguments can be made 
challenging the other alleged weaknesses of 
litigation and related processes of decision-
making featuring formal and largely adversarial 
interactions.  Of particular strength is the 
argument that natural resources and 
environmental litigation is normally substantively 
narrow, even though many conflicts involve 
issues featuring complex ecological and 
socioeconomic systems.  This appears to be one 
of the most significant contributions of tools such 
as watershed initiatives, which frequently provide 
a vehicle for addressing issues that are broadly 
framed.37  The self-defined mandate of the 
Coquille Watershed Association (Oregon) is 
typical and illustrative:  
 
[The purpose of the Association is] to 
provide an organizational framework to 
coordinate the assessment of the 
                                                        
36 Arguably, the rise of militant and aggressive 
environmental organizations such as Earth First! in 
the 1980s is evidence that many environmentalists 
are unhappy with the acceptance of principles such 
as EDR by many mainstream environmental 
organizations. 
37 Many authors, such as Born and Genskow (1999), 
argue that the primary future challenge in resource 
management is the coordination of land and water 
management, an activity that is well-suited to the 
watershed approach.   
watershed’s conditions, implement and 
monitor proven management practices 
and test new management practices that 
are designed to support environmental 
integrity and economic stability for the 
communities of the Coquille 
Watershed.38    
 
The lack of such broadly-focused 
mechanisms or forums for public policy 
discourse has been a glaring omission in natural 
resource institutions for several decades, a void 
filled partially through processes such as 
environmental impact statement preparation and 
national forest planning efforts.  However, as 
discussed later, experience with watershed 
initiatives and similar mechanisms highly reliant 
on consensus decision-making suggest that many 
important issues are still frequently off-the-table 
in these processes, especially issues dealing with 
externalities and other “asymmetrical” situations 
(Kenney and Lord, 1999; Nickelsburg, 1998).39   
 The remaining argument against litigation is 
that it can subordinate the potential contributions 
of many concerned parties, including the general 
public and local interests, to technical elites such 
as lawyers, expert witnesses, and national 
interest groups.  Similar arguments are leveled at 
traditional processes of agency rule-making.  
Despite modern reforms requiring public 
participation processes and imposing broadened 
rules of standing, this complaint also appears to 
have considerable merit.  To conclude that this 
situation is inappropriate, however, goes beyond 
a factual statement to a more normative assertion 
that local interests should have a greater role in 
natural resources policy-making than well-
organized national interests—an assumption 
many parties are unwilling to accept 
(McCloskey, 1999).  These negative critiques of 
litigation also can be challenged on the grounds 
that they overlook the extent to which legal 
remedies have been a source of empowerment for 
many parties, including those representing public 
and local concerns (Sax, 1970; Holland, 1996).  
                                                        
38 Cited in NRLC (1996:2-62), and attributed to the 
Coquille Association’s Articles of Incorporation.  
39 The concept of symmetry is defined later. 
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Additionally, the idea that formal processes such 
as litigation are biased in favor of a specialized 
network of legal experts is hard to reconcile with 
the argument that the judiciary provides a 
valuable balance to inappropriate technocratic 
autonomy.  As Wenner (1990:189) observes, 
commenting on the controversial nature of 
litigation in natural resources and environmental 
management: 
 
[S]ome analysts argue that judges are 
singularly unsuited to make broad 
policy decisions because of their lack 
of expertise and the necessity for them 
to answer individual questions about 
particular cases.  Others caution 
against the dominance of technical 
experts and urge the continued use of 
lay judges to counterbalance the 
inequities that are certain to arise when 
there is an unrestrained technocracy 
controlling policy.  There exists 
constant tension between Americans’ 
desire for substantively “correct” 
decisions reached by technical experts 
and for democratic decisions made 
through public participation and 
facilitated by the courts’ insistence on 
due process.   
 
These comments again reinforce the 
observation that many of the presumably positive 
assertions are really normative in nature, and are 
based on cause-and-effect assumptions that are 
often not clearly specified or easily defended—a 
conclusion that is equally applicable to both the 
proponents and opponents of collaborative 
processes.  This observation is not intended to 
suggest that the criticisms of existing 
mechanisms of management and problem-solving 
are inaccurate, unfounded, or otherwise 
inappropriate, but they do suggest that many 
critics misunderstand (or misrepresent) the root 
cause of the problems identified, and 
subsequently, prescribe solutions of questionable 
utility.  Poor assumptions about the means of 
natural resources and environmental decision-
making portend future disappointments in the 
ends.  Ultimately, it is difficult to assert that our 
decision-making systems for natural resources 
and environmental management are “broken” or 
“fundamentally flawed” without calling in 
question many of the elemental concepts of the 
American system of governance, including 
dispersed power with multiple checks and 
balances, competing forums of decision-making, 
interest group activity, federalism, and several 
related qualities.  To the extent that these features 
are viewed as deficiencies to be overcome, then 
dramatic reforms are in fact called for—not only 
in natural resource institutions, but in broader 
arrangements in American governance.  If, 
instead, these qualities are viewed as reasonable 
constraints to work within, then the challenge is 
to more selectively and strategically implement 
substantive reforms within that framework that 
promise to more efficiently achieve agreed-upon 
goals, and procedural reforms that promise to 
better reconcile or balance competing objectives.  
Collaborative efforts can play a role under either 
scenario—viewed in the first as a replacement 
for existing processes and, in the second, as a 
supplement.  Resolving this larger issue will 
likely be a  key to addressing other concerns 
about collaborative efforts. 
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Question:  Will traditional means of 
management and problem-solving work 
in the future? 
 The answer to this question is largely 
dependent upon one’s perspective on the previous 
question, and neither question can be answered 
with any certainty, as both contain a strong 
normative element.  It is fair to say, however, 
that natural resource and environmental issues 
tend to change over time, and that different types 
of problems lend themselves to different types of 
solution strategies.  If some assumptions are 
made about the likely future shape of natural 
resource and environmental problems, then, 
presumably, it is possible to make some 
inferences about the solution strategies that will 
be most useful in future decades.  With few 
exceptions, most authors suggest that natural 
resource problems will only increase in scale and 
complexity, placing a premium on regional—
even global—problem-solving tools, and a new 
type of science capable of dealing with complex 
systems and cumulative impacts. 
 Several researchers have observed that 
emerging natural resource problems demand 
action that is more integrated, experimental, and 
collaborative than ever before.  For example, in 
an editorial written to shape the agenda of the 
journal Conservation Ecology, C.S. Holling 
(1998) observes that the ecological sciences are 
in transition, moving from an “analytical” 
tradition to an “integrative” approach.  The 
analytical approach is essentially experimental, 
reductionist, and disciplinary, while the 
integrative approach is largely interdisciplinary, 
recognizing that most phenomenon are the result 
of many different interacting factors often at 
multiple scales.  By asking the big questions with 
an immediate on-the-ground relevance, the 
integrative approach seeks to bridge the gap 
between science and resources management and 
problem-solving, an approach best implemented 
through adaptive management strategies. 
A similar line of reasoning is offered by 
Knight and Meffe (1997:678), using the 
terminology of ecosystem management40: 
                                                        
40 No effort is made here to define “adaptive 
management” or “ecosystem management,” as both 
 
The traditional approach to natural 
resource management, captured in the 
phrase “command-and-control,” may 
have worked well during a simpler, less 
confrontational era.  With the 
emergence of new and involved, and 
more, stakeholders on our public lands, 
and the realization that public and 
private lands are contiguous and 
function as holistic ecosystems, 
agencies can no longer hope to 
accomplish their missions following the 
traditional approach.  Ecosystem 
management calls for more open, 
participatory practices that emphasize 
partnerships, shared visions of the land, 
and decentralized agencies; in this 
model agencies promote risk-taking, 
shared initiatives, and adaptive 
management.  Because societal, 
institutional, and ecological approaches 
have become more complex with an 
ever-increasing human population, 
there is no going back to traditional 
methods.41 
 While many authors talking of a new era 
focus on issues of resources planning and 
management, especially as they involve public 
lands, others extend their reasoning to include the 
                                                                                   
terms are used in a variety of ways in the relevant 
literature.  The former emphasizes the iterative 
nature of new problem-solving strategies, with 
experimental on-the-ground actions being closely 
monitored and adjusted over time as research and 
problem-solving evolve together.  The latter term 
emphasizes the regional and systemic nature of 
environmental resources, promoting an integrated 
management philosophy often best implemented 
using adaptive management tools. 
41 Weber (1998:xvii) also sees the adoption of new 
administrative approaches as inevitable: “When it is 
considered that the pressures on government 
agencies to cope with adaptability, decentralization, 
and interdependence are only likely to increase over 
the next several decades, the expectation is that 
successful governance will more and more become 
associated with a robust assortment of alternative 
administrative arrangements.” 
 24
arena of environmental management and 
pollution control.  For example, the Western 
Governors’ Association (1998) is among the 
entities concluding that the “nature of 
environmental and natural resource problems is 
changing” and that strategies must adapt 
accordingly.  Specifically, the Governors argue 
for future strategies replacing command-and-
control regulatory tools with incentive-based 
systems and featuring a heavy reliance on 
collaborative processes of decision-making.  
Using terminology developed by Hawkins and 
Thomas (1984), the Governors appear to be 
advocating, at a minimum, for an evolution in 
regulatory strategies from a deterrence to a 
compliance system.  In a compliance system, the 
main goal of the agency is to achieve the broad 
goals of the regulatory statute by preventing 
violations and remedying underlying problems 
through the use of close and cooperative 
relationships with the regulated community, and 
through the joint promotion of creative, site-
specific solutions.  In contrast, deterrence 
systems maintain a more distant, adversarial, and 
inflexible relationship between the regulator and 
regulatee, with litigation and punishment taking 
precedence over collaboration and incentives.  
Most EPA programs can be classified as 
deterrence systems, but is that best?  Is the 
community/collaborative model of decision-
making the vehicle to more efficient and effective 
environmental protection, or is it simply a Trojan 
Horse being used by some unscrupulous parties 
to promote lax enforcement and lowered 
standards?42  Perhaps neither or both are true.  
Research by Kagan and Scholz (1984) support 
the seemingly obvious conclusion that a 
deterrence system is best if the regulated 
community cannot be trusted to obey the law; a 
compliance system is best when parties are 
cooperative.   
Should we assume that the regulated 
community will become more cooperative and 
                                                        
42 For example, Roush (1995) suggests that the 
rhetoric of community involvement has been 
appropriated by the Wise Use movement as a means 
of promoting the goals of the corporate, extractive 
industries. 
supportive of environmental protection programs 
in the future?  While likely an interesting debate, 
some scholars suggest that this is a moot 
question.  The more salient issue is whether or 
not future environmental problems will, by their 
unique nature, preclude the coercive policies of 
deterrence systems, thus encouraging by default 
the cooperative stance of compliance systems.  
To some extent, this assumption has surfaced in 
the emerging battle against nonpoint-source 
pollution, the widely acknowledged future of 
water pollution control activities (EPA and 
USDA, 1998).  Given that controlling nonpoint-
source pollution could require modifying the 
behavior of thousands of individuals, rather than 
dozens of discrete point source emitters, perhaps 
the more cooperative and flexible approach of a 
compliance system is warranted.  Clearly, this 
philosophy permeates the Clean Water Action 
Plan (EPA and USDA, 1998), and is routinely a 
component of discussions about ecosystem-scale 
environ-mental protection and global 
environmental issues.  As Paehlke (1990:363) 
observes: 
 
It would appear that several of the 
newer environmental issues will require 
solutions that are less “regulatory” in 
character.  The new forms of change 
will require both organizational and 
behavioral changes, rather than the 
regulatory coercion of a few economic 
actors.  …. Behavioral changes 
involving whole communities are less 
effectively monitored and enforced than 
promoted and encouraged.  …  
Democracy itself must be enhanced to 
effectively deal with environmental 
problems as they exist today and as 
they may exist in the future. 
 
These arguments support the cautious 
recommendations of Mintz (1995:106) 
encouraging EPA to “expand its outreach to the 
regulated community as a supplement to its 
enforcement activities.”   
 A reliance on regulatory approaches for 
resource protection is also of questionable merit 
in areas completely or largely in private 
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ownership.  As Breckenridge (1999:698-699) has 
observed: 
 
The federal government faces 
important legal and practical 
limitations on its ability to achieve 
environmental goals unilaterally.  Even 
though federal inquiry and concern may 
focus on problems of nonpoint source 
pollution, loss of biodiversity, and 
reductions in instream flows, federal 
agencies lack the coercive powers and 
funding necessary to revamp local uses 
of lands and waters through unilateral 
regulation or purchase.  State agencies 
also face legal and political obstacles to 
the effective management of 
environmental problems that arise on 
private lands or within the traditional 
gambit of local zoning controls.  In 
short, the ability of government 
agencies to identify and understand 
ecological problems has far exceeded 
governmental capacity to formulate and 
impose solutions through the exercise 
of coercive authority.  
 
Evolving into a “kinder-and-gentler” form of 
regulation, featuring an expanded use of 
collaborative decision-making, is only a partial 
solution or intermediate step in the minds of some 
observers, who instead call for a more 
fundamental move to true incentive-based 
systems reliant upon market mechanisms.  
Organizations such as the Political Economy 
Research Center (PERC) see a tremendous 
potential for market mechanisms in a wide 
variety of natural resource and environmental 
settings, based largely on the correct observation 
that most natural resource sectors and uses 
feature subsidies of questionable merit and 
bureaucratic inefficiencies.  However, market 
mechanisms, like collaborative processes, are not 
without limitations.  For example, Hockenstein et 
al. (1997) report that experimentation with 
market-based mechanisms for pollution control 
and resource conservation have often not 
achieved the successes promised.   
In some cases, market-based approaches are 
resisted on philosophical grounds by those who 
claim that they “legitimize” pollution, unduly 
discount non-market values, make some 
disadvantaged third parties vulnerable to 
inequitable situations, and inappropriately 
transfer public responsibilities to private hands 
(Hockenstein et al., 1997).  Other criticisms are 
more pragmatic, based on a fear of returning to 
the market failure conditions that were the 
original genesis of many environmental problems, 
or the observation that many market-based 
systems require a level of administrative 
oversight and control that may be prohibitive, 
much in the same way that deterrence systems 
are argued by some (such as Paehlke above) to 
be impractical.  For example, Hoffman (1996:10) 
offers a cautionary critique of those advocating 
the use of watershed-based permit trading 
programs in future water quality management 
programs—largely driven by TMDL (total 
maximum daily load) concerns—as a means of 
overcoming inefficiencies associated with 
program fragmentation and command-and-
control regulation: 
 
Because the watershed concept looks at 
the ecosystem as a whole, including all 
of its pollutant inputs, assimilative 
capacities, and biological and 
geophysical features, it has the 
potential to be more equitable in that, 
in theory, the most critical or most 
easily (or cost-effectively) controlled 
sources of a pollutant would be 
targeted for reduction.  However, in 
practice, the scientific and enforcement 
tools needed to make watershed 
permitting function as envisioned are 
absent.  For example, there are few 
effective means of enforcing nonpoint 
source controls of rural discharges; and 
urban and suburban stormwater flows 
are hard to define and quantify.  The 
pitfalls, then, may include resorting to 
imposing more controls on readily 
identified and quantified point sources, 




Many related concerns pertaining to the 
administrative and political demands of market-
based strategies are described in the economics 
and public administration literatures (e.g., 
Baumol and Oates, 1988; Hockenstein et al., 
1997; NAPA, 1997).  Some of these additional 
administrative considerations pertain to the 
different mix of skills needed as part of this 
transition to incentive systems (i.e., economists 
and administrators replacing lawyers and 
technicians), and the difficulty in overcoming the 
inertia of existing programs that, although 
imperfect, are a known entity for both 
environmental groups and the regulated 
community.  Perhaps most importantly, high 
transaction costs (primarily administrative costs) 
have ensured that market-based strategies rarely 
approach the cost savings expected in theory, an 
outcome that can undermine enthusiasm for these 
strategies while simultaneously increasing agency 
workloads and the internal strife of fundamental 
personnel transformations.  These observations 
suggest that regulatory agencies are increasingly 
placed in a paradoxical situation, facing calls for 
more market-oriented, site-specific, and 
performance-based management strategies on the 
one hand, but limited by administrative 
constraints and concerns over market failures on 
the other.  This situation has been aptly described 
by the National Academy of Public 
Administration (NAPA, 1997:xii): 
 
EPA’s paradox is that it must maintain 
national programs and seek national 
consistency while simultaneously 
attempting to make its programs and 
standards fit an incredibly diverse and 
dynamic nation.  Environmental 
conditions, problems, and trends vary 
from place to place and no “one-size-
fits-all” approach to regulation can 
accommodate such variety.  No 
laissez-faire approach will work, 
either.  The need for environmental 
protection arises from a failure of the 
marketplace.  Adam Smith, an 
eighteen-century economist, showed 
how “the invisible hand” of free 
markets would foster innovation, 
competitive pricing, and economic 
growth.  Two hundred years later, 
Garrett Hardin showed how the 
invisible hand could also produce the 
“tragedy of the commons,” the 
depletion of shared resources absent a 
collective decision to manage them for 
the public good. 
 
 This discussion about the pros and cons of 
different types of future regulatory strategies can 
quickly lead to more than a “simple” paradox, 
but can become a quagmire.  For example, if 
traditional regulatory tools are shown to be 
impractical given the inefficiency of uniform 
standards, if free market approaches cannot be 
trusted given the history of market failures and 
the prevalence of self-interest behavior, and if 
“regulated markets” (such as permit-trading 
programs) are too administratively demanding to 
be practical, then what is the appropriate 
strategy?  Again, collaborative problem-solving 
approaches may appear to rise to the top, not so 
much due to their documented ability to resolve 
problems, but to acknowledged deficiencies in 
other strategies. 
 Lessons gleaned from our experience with 
market mechanisms not only suggest that 
modifying regulatory regimes should be done 
with some caution, but suggest that a similar 
examination of the limits of collaboration should 
guide reform efforts aimed at institutionalizing 
consensus-based modes of decision-making and 
problem-solving.  After all, the two types of 
management and problem-solving approaches 
share much more than current popularity as the 
twin cornerstones of proposals such as Enlibra, 
but are based on similar structural tenets.  Those 
tenets include decentralization, local flexibility, 
and incentive-based management, stressing 
cooperation over conflict, and public and 
frequently ad hoc forums of decision-making 
over formal, bureaucratic mechanisms (Kenney 
and Lord, 1999).  Some of the lessons learned 
from the experience with market systems are 
clearly transferable, such as the finding that the 
community/collaborative model of decision-
making raises many normative issues while 
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addressing others.  As discussed in detail later, 
the equity features of these seemingly 
“democratic” processes are not always well 
understood by all proponents.  Similarly, 
collaborative processes raise many administrative 
demands that are often poorly understood—such 
as the finding described earlier by Manring 
(1998) that these efforts often reduce workloads 
of some agency personnel only at the expense of 
placing increased demands on others.  This 
conclusion is consistent with much of the 
anecdotal evidence. 
 Also of concern is the observation that the 
community/collaborative model is better suited to 
certain types of settings and problems than 
others, an issue attracting only modest scholarly 
attention spread across a variety of loosely 
related, but relevant, contexts.  For example, 
research by Bingham (1997:45) regarding the use 
of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in water 
conflicts concludes that these approaches work 
best under specific circumstances: 
 
ADR, particularly, mediation, has 
demonstrated positive results for 
resolving water resources disputes—
when objectives are clear and mutually 
agreed upon, when the process is 
voluntary and inclusive, when there are 
incentives to settle, when there are 
adequate resources for participation 
and for information collection, when 
parties keep their constituencies 
informed, and when reasonable 
deadlines exist.   
 
Kenney and Lord (1999) suggest that 
collaborative means of problem-solving are best 
suited to situations in which significant value 
conflicts have been resolved and when all 
involved parties have strong incentives for 
problem-solving, factors that are often tied to the 
physical qualities of the on-the-ground problem. 
Additional insights are provided by Ostrom’s 
(1990) well-known work on common pool 
resources, which suggest that collaborative 
problem-solving approaches are best suited to 
situations when the group is relatively small and 
homogeneous, the existing framework of rules 
and behavioral patterns is harmful to all parties, 
costs and benefits (of both existing and proposed 
rules) are distributed in a fairly equal manner, 
enforcement and compliance costs of new rules 
are relatively low, and when group members trust 
each other.   
Nickelsburg (1998) is among those who 
have made the observation that some of these 
prerequisites are not entirely consistent; namely, 
the idea that meaningful collaborative processes 
need to be inclusive (e.g., Bingham’s remarks), 
yet decision-making is best accomplished through 
forums featuring small, homogeneous groups 
(e.g., Ostrom’s remarks).  Nickelsburg sees this 
dichotomy as posing a real impediment to EPA’s 
construction of community-based environmental 
protection (CBEP), which is based on the 
assumption that sound ecosystem management 
requires action at scales sufficient to encompass 
all contributing factors, activities and individuals 
associated with a given problem, an approach 
certain to violate any notions of small, 
homogeneous working groups.43  Thus, while he 
concludes that the trust-building and educational 
functions of collaborative efforts will likely 
produce some benefits and can potentially help to 
remove some of the long-term obstacles to 
improved local decision-making, he cautions 
against the EPA’s seemingly excessive faith in 
CBEP methods, arguing that if the agency’s 
“mission is to address diffuse, cross-
jurisdictional, arguably national problems such 
as mobile source emissions and nonpoint-source 
runoff, it will need to employ not haphazard local 
encouragement, but more powerful statutory 
tools” (page 1409).  Clearly, many parties within 
EPA agree, as the support for CBEP methods 
appears far weaker at the agency’s lower levels, 
where traditional tools still dominate on-the-
ground action.44 
To some extent, Nickelsburg’s 
recommendation is similar to the philosophy 
articulated in the landmark works of Hardin 
                                                        
43 This observation can be useful in helping to 
highlight differences between “communities of 
interest” and “communities of place.” 
44 This observation is largely based on several off-
the-record conversations with EPA personnel. 
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(1968), Ophuls (1977), and Heilbroner (1980), 
who argued that future environmental problems 
will require more centralized governmental 
control.  This “centralist” school of thought 
spawned a counter, “decentralist,” school—
anchored by authors such as Passmore (1974), 
Sale (1991), Orr (1992), and Taylor (1992)—
suggesting that future problems instead call for 
transferring power to local, democratic 
communities practicing a “think globally, act 
locally” philosophy (Press, 1994).  Often, the key 
distinction in thinking between these two 
perspectives is that the centralists conclude that 
individual self-interest, rather than community 
well-being (as argued by the decentralists), 
predominate during environmental crises in the 
absence of strong centralized control.  Which 
viewpoint is correct?  Unfortunately, empirical 
studies do not exist to conclusively support either 
perspective, and even if they did, the 
centralist/decentralist debate is likely too narrow 
and dogmatic to support useful scholarly inquiry 
(Press, 1994).  What is clear is that in the 
modern era, authors advocating decentralist 
models—similar to the “unitary democracy” 
advocated by Mansbridge (1980) or the 
“democratic wish” described by Morone 
(1991)—predominate (Press, 1994).  As 
described later, this is largely a normative 
phenomenon, based on assumptions and ideas 
that are only partially amenable to formal testing.   
 
 
Collaborative Groups in Context 
 
Question:  What is the relationship 
between the traditional and alternative 
mechanisms of problem-solving? 
When debating the merits of collaborative 
efforts and other forms of alternative problem-
solving, a key normative issue is often whether 
these new approaches should be viewed as 
alternatives to traditional mechanisms, or as 
supplements.  Most reformers are quick to 
specify that alternative approaches should be 
supplementary, at least initially.  For example, 
the Enlibra principles articulated by the Western 
Governors Association contain language that 
explicitly describe desired reforms as 
supplemental to existing mechanisms.45  
Similarly, watershed initiative participants 
interviewed by the Natural Resources Law 
Center consistently articulate a desire to retain 
existing regulatory structures within which 
collaborative efforts occur (Kenney, 1997).  This 
apparent agreement, however, can obscure a 
lively debate, as there is considerable room for 
disagreement among reformers promoting only a 
few isolated experiments to those urging a much 
more ambitious agenda of reform presumably 
leading to the eventual replacement of traditional 
mechanisms.46  Additionally, many reform 
proposals contain qualifiers on this subject that 
are often vague or are not reflected in other 
statements and elements of reform proposals.  
                                                        
45 A brochure developed to answer questions about 
Enlibra list three things that Enlibra is not:  “1. 
Enlibra does not represent a rejection of the goals 
and objectives of Federal environmental laws such as 
the Endangered Species Act or Clean Water Act; 2. 
It is not a rejection of the need for national 
environmental standards; 3. This shared doctrine 
does not represent a rejection of the legitimate role of 
the federal government in regulation and 
enforcement.”  (Enlibra: A New Shared Doctrine for 
Environmental Management, Questions and 
Answers.  Western Governors’ Association.) 
46 Few parties categorically reject collaboration 
proposals.  The debate is at the margins; i.e., over 
issues about when and how collaborative approaches 
should be used, and what “fall-back” arrangements 
should exist. 
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For example, the Enlibra authors endorse 
processes such as the Quincy Library Group and 
the Oregon Plan (for salmon recovery) as 
successful models, even though these approaches 
were largely designed to bypass existing planning 
mechanisms (National Forest Management Act) 
and regulatory programs (Endangered Species 
Act), respectively (WGA, 1998).  
Less common, but perhaps most alarming to 
the skeptics, are those proposals that image a 
balance between traditional and alternative 
approaches that is heavily biased in favor of the 
alternative strategies.  Perhaps the best example 
is found in the final report of the Western Water 
Policy Review Advisory Commission (1998), 
which calls for watershed groups to be 
empowered to make and implement water 
management policies unless such actions are 
specifically (and promptly) deemed invalid by a 
relevant federal agency presumably acting in 
consort with some kind of river basin 
organization and plan.  Benson (1998:284) 
suggests that this approach would create a strong 
political impediment to the resource protection 
mandates of federal agencies:  
 
… the proposed governance approach 
would find watershed council actions 
consistent with all relevant laws unless 
a responsible agency declared them 
inconsistent within 60 days. ….  By 
allowing such projects to proceed 
unless vetoed within 60 days, the 
proposal would effectively support 
locally-favored development proposals 
at the expense of resource protection.  
And the proposed approach would 
ratchet up the already fierce political 
pressure faced by federal agencies.  
Once a proposed action has been 
blessed by a watershed council, any 
agency that would dare to block it risks 
a seriously damaging political bashing. 
 
Ambiguities and uncertainties of this nature 
generate mistrust and skepticism from many 
parties, especially environmentalists, about the 
motives of the reformers.47  Underlying many of 
the specific arguments of the skeptics identified 
earlier is a concern that is more visceral than 
empirical: i.e., the belief that pro-business (and 
presumably anti-environmental forces) are behind 
the push for more collaborative mechanisms of 
decision-making and problem-solving, exploiting 
the powerful symbolism associated with 
democracy and community involvement to 
maintain or expand industry control.   
This concern is not new.  As Amy (1987:98) 
observed in 1987 when writing about 
environmental mediation, “Part of what makes 
environmentalists nervous about mediation is the 
enthusiasm with which industry has embraced 
it.”48  Similar distrust of business and commodity 
interests—seemingly a timeless prerequisite to 
environmental activism—surrounds current 
resource management experiments using the 
community/collaborative model.  For example, 
noted natural resources attorney George 
Cameron Coggins (1998:31) suspects some 
collaborative efforts to be an “insincere rear-
guard holding action” orchestrated by declining 
commodity industries.49  Similar sentiments have 
been recorded by Burgess and Burgess (1997:1): 
 
… many traditionally disempowered 
groups believe that conflict resolution 
professionals have been coopted by 
powerful interests, and thus use this 
                                                        
47 It also suggests that many of the strongest 
proponents for expanding application of the 
community/collaborative model are not listening to 
many of the practitioners, who typically suggest a 
more modest expansion and application of this 
approach (Kenney, 1997). 
48 Environmental organizations receptive to this set 
of tools, namely the National Wildlife Federation 
and the Conservation Foundation, were shown to be 
unusually conservative among environmental 
organizations, and in the case of the Conservation 
Foundation, maintained unusually close contact with 
the business community (Amy, 1987). 
49 Coggins (1998:31) goes on to observe that “The 
industry and agency passion to find consensus 
evidently coincides with the degree to which the 
noneconomic interests have been successful in 
asserting newer and broader management priorities.” 
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process as a mechanism for “sugar-
coating” the continued domination of 
the disempowered groups.  Thus, many 
of these groups tend to distrust 
mediation and other conflict resolution 
processes, preferring to wage their 
battles in the courts or through direct 
action. 
 
Still others have questioned the lack of 
environmental group involvement in drafting the 
Enlibra principles of the Western Governors’ 
Association—a group rarely categorized as 
environmentally sensitive.  As long as the 
motives of the reformers remain in question, it is 
unlikely that an honest debate will evolve to 
examine the substantive merits of the emerging 
new tools.   
Instead of speculating herein about the 
motives of reform proponents, it is perhaps more 
useful to acknowledge that many experiments in 
alternative problem-solving are already occurring 
on the ground, and that these efforts provide an 
opportunity for drawing some substantiated 
conclusions about the usefulness of various 
decision-making and problem-solving tools.  
Whether viewed as supplements or eventual 
replacements, alternative mechanisms of 
decision-making and problem-solving currently 
coexist in many forms with traditional 
mechanisms.  This is perhaps best illustrated by 
the relationship between litigation and less 
adversarial decision-making techniques 
emphasizing negotiation and bargaining.  Using 
the term BATNA (best alternative to a negotiated 
agreement), Fisher and Ury (1981) make the 
observation that parties can be expected to 
vacillate between different decision-making forms 
and forums based on strategic criteria.  This 
clearly happens to a degree that is often 
unappreciated by the critics of traditional 
mechanisms.  For example, some estimates 
suggest that as few as 4 percent of criminal cases 
and 5 to 10 percent of civil cases are ultimately 
resolved through judicial determination (Kleiner, 
1999).  The others are dropped or settled out of 
court, largely through ADR strategies such as 
negotiation, mediation, and arbitration.50  
Negotiated settlements are also seen in natural 
resources and environmental conflicts, however, 
judicial decision-making still appears to hold a 
prominent place in resolving these types of 
issues. 
Many parties suggest that additional efforts 
should be made to aggressively promote the use 
of collaboration and consensus-based tools in 
natural resources and environmental issues.  This 
effort has been underway since the mid-1980s, 
resulting in legislation such as the Negotiated 
Rule-Making Act (NMRA) of 1990 and the 
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act (ADRA) 
of 1990 and 1996.51  NRMA provides a 
framework and procedural requirements within 
which agencies are encouraged to assemble 
diverse stakeholder groups for purposes of 
administrative rule-making; ADRA calls upon 
agencies to investigate opportunities of ADR in a 
variety of decision-making settings, including 
rule-making, issuing/revoking licenses and 
permits, contract administration, and litigation.  
Similarly, Executive Order 12,866 of September 
30, 1993, calls on federal agencies “to explore, 
                                                        
50 Note that when discussing ADR techniques, it is 
important to acknowledge the distinction between 
arbitration and techniques such as mediation and 
facilitation.  Arbitration effectively blurs the lines 
between traditional, adversarial decision-making 
processes and the alternative, cooperative strategies 
(such as mediation and facilitation), in that 
arbitrators are often empowered to make binding 
decisions.  Mediation and facilitation are good 
representatives of the voluntary and consensus-based 
tenets of “alternative problem-solving,” while 
arbitration retains many elements of adversarial 
competition.  It is also worthwhile to note that 
attorneys are increasingly involved in using both 
litigation and ADR techniques in their practices, 
moving strategically between traditional and 
alternative decision-making modes.  As of 1997, 714 
law schools offer courses in ADR, compared to just 
47 in 1984—a more than 15 fold increase (Kleiner, 
1999).   
51 Negotiated Rule-Making Act of 1990, P.L. 101-
648, 104 Stat. 4969; Administrative Dispute 
Resolution Act of 1990, P.L. 101-552, 104 Stat. 
2736; Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 
1996, P.L. 104-320, 110 Stat. 3870. 
 31
and where appropriate, use consensual 
mechanisms for developing regulations.”52  
Mechanisms for stakeholder-based collaborative 
resource planning mechanisms are also advocated 
in many circles, as evidenced by EPA support of 
watershed initiatives (as discussed earlier), the 
use of resource advisory councils by the Bureau 
of Land Management (Olinger, 1998), the rise of 
community forest groups nationally (Wondolleck 
and Yaffee, 1994), by efforts to promote 
collaboration as a tool for implementing the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),53 
and by suggestions to create more opportunities 
for ADR through amendments to the Clean 
Water Act, Endangered Species Act, and NEPA 
(Bingham, 1997).   
One of the more intriguing experiments has 
involved EPA’s usage of negotiated rule-making, 
a subject studied in depth by Harvard Professor 
Cary Coglianese (1997).  According to statute 
(NMRA), processes of negotiated rule-making 
are to be utilized “for the purpose of reaching a 
consensus in the development of a proposed 
rule,” with consensus meaning the “unanimous 
concurrence” or any lesser concurrence if agreed 
to unanimously by the committee.54  Negotiated 
rule-making has its origins in the New Deal, but 
did not receive its first large-scale application 
until the mid-1970s when Secretary of Labor 
John Dunlap chaired the National Coal Policy 
Project, which utilized negotiated rule-making to 
make decisions regarding hundreds of proposals 
(Coglianese, 1997).  Most proposals were never 
implemented, but the process was viewed by 
many as successful.  By the early 1980s, the 
Federal Aviation Administration and then the 
EPA began use of the tool.  Coglianese’s 
assessment of the EPA’s recent experience with 
                                                        
52 Executive Order No. 12,866, ' 6(a), 3 C.F.R. 638, 
645 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. ' 601 (1994). 
53 This was the premise behind a recent workshop 
organized jointly by the Institute for Environment 
and Natural Resources (University of Wyoming) and 
the Center for the Rocky Mountain West (University 
of Montana) entitled Communication and 
Consensus: Strategies for Fulfilling the Nation’s 
Environmental Policy, held in Florissant, Colorado 
on March 20-23, 1999. 
54 5 U.S.C. ' 562, 1994 & Supp I. 1995. 
negotiated rule-making shows that, much like 
earlier attempts, the rate of success has been 
overstated, with no compelling evidence to 
suggest this consensus-based process is quicker, 
cheaper, or otherwise preferable than the 
litigation it was designed to replace.55   
It can be argued that negotiated rule-making 
provides an excellent example of myth over 
substance.  In addition to questionable claims of 
greater efficiency in rule-making, proponents of 
negotiated rule-making—such as the leaders of 
the National Performance Review—often cite an 
80 percent litigation rate for EPA rules made 
through traditional mechanisms compared to 20 
percent for negotiated rule-making.56  Empirical 
research on the EPA, the agency that uses 
negotiated rule-making most frequently, however, 
shows the appeal rate for traditional rule-making 
to actually be about 26 percent compared to an 
appeal rate for negotiated rule-making decisions 
of 50 percent.57   
                                                        
55 Coglianese (1997:1308) provides the following 
summary:  “For years, proponents of negotiated 
rulemaking have touted it as the solution to a 
perceived problem of excessive litigation challenging 
federal regulations.  Yet the prevailing perception of 
this problem has been overdrawn.  The actual level 
of litigation over EPA rules is dramatically lower 
than has been widely believed, and litigation itself 
often provides a forum for continued negotiation in 
the rulemaking process.  Just as the extent of the 
supposed problem of litigation has been overstated, 
so too has the effectiveness of negotiated rulemaking 
as a means of reducing litigation over federal 
regulations.  The experience so far has been that 
legal challenges persist, and at a noticeably higher 
rate at the EPA, even after the agency has employed 
the negotiated rulemaking procedure.  As a means of 
reducing litigation, negotiated rulemaking has yet to 
show any demonstrable success.”  
56 For example, see Improving Regulatory Systems, 
Accompanying Report of the National Performance 
Review.  Office of the Vice President, 1993. 
57 This statistic is based on Coglianese’s (1997)  
review of the EPA litigation docket from 1987 to 
1991 using Federal Register data.  If data from OMB 
is used instead, the litigation rate is approximately 
19 percent.  The litigation rate for two of the 
agency’s most controversial statutes—the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act and the Clean Water 
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Additionally, a closer look at some of the 
“success stories” can dampen enthusiasm.  For 
example, probably the most celebrated success 
story of negotiated rule-making (although not 
technically conducted under the NRMA 
framework) produced new visibility rules for 
Grand Canyon National Park.  The effort 
featured an innovative and productive dialogue 
among many competing interests, and established 
a mechanism of problem-solving that is credited 
as the genesis of the Enlibra principles.58  What 
is frequently not reported is that the process was 
long and arduous, and the rules were later 
challenged in court—not by participants to the 
negotiations, but by interests that were outside 
the negotiation.59  Another of the well-known 
success stories, the rules for reformulated 
gasoline, also generated a flurry of litigation, and 
earned a degree of infamy for becoming the first 
U.S. regulation ever struck down by the World 
Trade Organization.60  While it is unlikely that 
traditional rule-making processes would have 
faired any better in these difficult disputes and 
the existence of a legal challenge does not 
                                                                                   
Act—is considerably higher, about 35 percent, but 
still does not remotely approach the 80 percent 
estimate that is widely circulated.  Data on appeal 
rates for negotiated rules should be used cautiously, 
given the small sample size.  As of 1997, only 12 
rules had been completed at EPA through negotiated 
rule-making, with 6 being appealed. 
58 Remarks of Jim Souby, Executive Director of the 
Western Governors’ Association, at the workshop 
entitled Communication and Consensus: Strategies 
for Fulfilling the Nation’s Environmental Policy, 
organized jointly by the Institute for Environment 
and Natural Resources (University of Wyoming) and 
the Center for the Rocky Mountain West (University 
of Montana).  Florissant, Colorado; March 21, 1999. 
59 Central Arizona Water Conservancy District v. 
United States, 990 F.2d 1531 (9thy Cir. 1993).  The 
rules were eventually upheld on appeal. 
60 Challenges came from a wide array of petroleum, 
fuel, and transportation interests.  International 
challenges were offered by Brazil and Venezuela, 
claiming discriminatory trade practices.  For 
additional information and citations, see 
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline Standards, 
59 Fed. Reg. 7716 (1994) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 
80) (EPA). 
necessarily indicate that the rules are poor or the 
decision-making process inappropriate, it is fair 
to conclude that the consensus-based tenet of 
negotiated rule-making is not a panacea for 
resolving divisive conflict or replacing litigation. 
To understand the implications of the 
negotiated rule-making experience for more ad 
hoc processes such as watershed initiatives 
requires a little digging, but at least two relevant 
conclusions emerge.  First, negotiated rule-
making does not introduce negotiation and 
bargaining into the rule-making process, but 
simply codifies and formalizes the process.  In 
traditional rule-making exercises, agencies are 
typically in contact with many concerned parties, 
engaging in a certain degree of bargaining and 
deal-making as part of “independent” agency 
rule-making.  However, in processes conducted 
under NRMA, these interactions occur in a much 
more formalized process.  Thus, one of the real 
conclusions of Coglianese’s research, as the 
author readily acknowledges, appears to be that 
the informal give-and-take between agencies and 
interest groups in support of agency decision-
making is perhaps more productive in most cases 
than producing decisions through formally 
sanctioned stakeholder negotiations.  This is a 
strong argument in favor of keeping watershed 
initiatives largely ad hoc and informal, and not 
an argument for formally codifying the multi-
stakeholder and consensus-based elements of 
watershed initiatives into new forms of 
governance.  Secondly, the experience with 
negotiated rule-making again raises the persistent 
issue of adequate representation in decision-
making, a concern that is magnified considerably 
when these multi-stakeholder negotiating groups 
are empowered, either formally through 
legislation or informally through custom or 
pressure, to serve as decision-making bodies.   
Another line of research to explore in 
assessing the relationship between traditional and 
alternative modes of decision-making and 
problem-solving center around the idea that 
different types of problems, just like different 
types of decision-making mechanisms, feature 
different sets of incentives.  As articulated in 
research by the National Academy of Public 
Administration (NAPA, 1997:37), effective 
 33
programs of resource governance and 
management are those that correctly match 
problem types to appropriate solution strategies:   
 
The simple phrase “environmental 
problems” may mask the diversity and 
complexity of the many different 
problems to which it refers, and hence 
falsely suggest there is a single best 
tool to address all problems.  The 
opposite is the case, making the task of 
selecting and implementing the most 
appropriate management tool a 
significant technical and political 
challenge. 
 
As mentioned briefly earlier, Kenney and 
Lord (1999) and Nickelsburg (1998), in 
unrelated studies, both focus on the concept of 
symmetry as a key determinant of problem-
solving incentives.  It is easiest to think of 
symmetrical problems as those that present 
similar incentives to all parties involved in 
creating and/or solving problems.  For example, 
all ranchers using the shared rangeland in 
Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons” share the 
burden, as well as the responsibility, for the 
degraded resource.  Consequently, each can be 
expected to have an incentive for problem 
resolution, a fact mentioned earlier in the review 
of Ostrom’s (1990) research identifying 
situations in which “common pool resource” 
(CPR) regimes are stable.  So-called “public 
good” situations can also share somewhat similar 
incentive structures in that all involved parties 
have the potential to benefit from a proposed 
action.61  These incentives are sometimes 
                                                        
61 A public good is usually defined by two key 
characteristics:  first, it is a benefit that, once 
provided to one party, is automatically made 
available to all parties; and second, the use of the 
benefit by one party does not diminish the 
availability of the benefit for other parties.  The 
classic example is national defense, but in the 
natural resources realm, examples can include clean 
air, biodiversity protection (and preservation of the 
associated existence values), and protection from 
hazards.   In contrast to the symmetrical incentives 
often provided by CPR and public good situations, 
adequate to voluntarily bring parties together in 
problem-solving groups (Ostrom, 1990; 
Bromley, 1992).  However, in many other cases, 
CPR and public good problems are not resolved 
through spontaneous group action, as group 
solutions cannot be implemented absent some 
means of ensuring compliance among all relevant 
parties.62  Consequently, a variety of allocation 
mechanisms (including property rights systems) 
and regulatory regimes exist to limit access to 
(and use of) resources, and taxation and other 
“coercive” systems exist to encourage uniform 
(at least in principle) public contributions to 
provide and protect public goods.  
What many local watershed initiatives and 
similar collaborative efforts are demonstrating is 
that the coercive power of the state is not always 
needed to ensure that individual behavior 
conforms to community interests.  Instead, social 
and cultural tools—implemented through 
approaches such as trust-building, peer pressure, 
and appeals to good citizenship—can sometimes 
be effectively used in many situations to affect 
positive change.  As discussed later and in the 
following remarks by Nickelsburg (1998:1393), 
watershed initiatives can utilize social 
mechanisms to achieve productive interactions: 
 
Parties who anticipate interacting in the 
future, rather than in a one-shot deal, 
no longer need assume that their 
                                                                                   
asymmetrical situations occur when parties have 
fundamentally different incentives.  The best 
example is externality situations.  For example, the 
challenge of pollution control is that the generators 
have incentives to pollute while those parties 
suffering from the pollution have an incentive to end 
the pollution (Kenney and Lord, 1999). 
62 For example, in Hardin’s overgrazed commons 
example, if only some farmers agreed to reduce 
consumption while others continued unabated, the 
conservation program would likely fail due to the 
overuse by the renegade users and by the 
disillusionment and likely defection of original 
cooperators.  Similarly, in a public goods situation, 
often some parties will not contribute to the group 
effort knowing that most others will, and that 
benefits will accrue equally to both the participants 
and the “free riders.” 
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bargaining partners will defect.  
Continuing interaction allows parties to 
build credibility, trust, and respect, or 
“social capital,” by dealing fairly, by 
performing their obligations, and by 
punishing defections. 
 
Case study data suggests that this social/cultural 
strategy is normally much more viable when 
dealing with symmetrical situations than 
asymmetrical situations (such as externalities), 
given that in the former, parties are not being 
asked to act in an altruistic manner, but instead 
are being asked to take actions that promise 
benefits to both the community and themselves.63   
The prevalence of western watershed groups 
dealing with broad “public” concerns such as 
ecological restoration and species protection, 
compared to the dearth of groups actively dealing 
with issues such as water supply, provide 
anecdotal support of this idea with a rich 
theoretical basis (Kenney and Lord, 1999).  
Issues such as water supply are probably not so 
readily amenable to resolution through western 
watershed initiatives in most situations since any 
group action that increases supply is likely to 
produce benefits accruing exclusively to the next 
appropriator in line.64  In contrast, group efforts 
to improve ecosystem health promise benefits for 
all, given the greater symmetry of the situation, 
and are presumably well suited to collaborative 
problem-solving strategies. 
Of course, the qualities of the problem itself 
are not the only source of behavioral incentives, 
                                                        
63 This observation is similar to other conclusions 
noting the necessity in collaborative efforts of 
finding positive-sum (or more accurately, Pareto 
optimal) solutions.  A Pareto optimal solution—also 
known as a win-win solution—is one that makes all 
involved parties better off, or at the least, none worse 
off.  Pareto optimal solutions are always positive-
sum, meaning that the benefits to all parties exceed 
the costs to all parties.  Conversely, many, but not 
all, positive-sum solutions are Pareto optimal, as 
benefits to many parties may hide a cost to another 
party.   
64 Note that this is a function of western water law.  
Consequently, this observation is not applicable to 
the East. 
and those qualities are not entirely inherent, but 
are shaped by the interaction of physical 
phenomena and institutional rules.  By 
manipulating rules, problem-solving incentives 
can change, thereby opening (or closing) the door 
to different problem solving strategies (Kenney 
and Lord, 1999).  For example, a common 
stimulus behind the formation of many western 
watershed initiatives is the specter of regulatory 
intervention under the Endangered Species Act 
and/or Clean Water Act.65  This phenomenon 
illustrates a clear symbiosis between the 
traditional and alternative problem-solving 
approaches that has significant implications for 
policy reformers.  For example, the opinion 
expressed by Schecter (1998:10) is illustrative of 
the larger debate surrounding alternative 
problem-solving: 
 
… contrary to Al Capone’s famous 
saying, “You can get more with a kind 
word and a gun than with a kind word 
alone,” evolving conditions indicate 
that maybe we can begin relaxing (but 
not giving up altogether!) our 
mandatory regulations that provide a 
credible threat of penalties, and rely 
more on voluntary self-regulation, 
guided by “self-interest” economic 
motives.   
 
The degree to which alternative problem-solving 
strategies should supplement or replace 
traditional mechanisms is largely shaped by 
whether or not you find the opinion of Capone or 
Schecter more compelling.  Certainly, the advice 
of Al Capone seems more apt when describing 
asymmetrical than symmetrical situations, and 
the “social pressure” asserted through watershed 
initiatives is undoubtedly augmented by the threat 
of federal regulatory hammers; but on both 
points, there remains plenty of room for learning 
and debate. 
 A second conclusion emerging from the 
research of Kenney and Lord (1999), Amy 
                                                        
65 For example, 81 of the 105 studies of cooperative 
ecosystem management featured in the Yaffee et al. 
(1996) book involved an ESA listed species. 
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(1987), Burgess and Burgess (1995), and 
countless other scholars involves the importance 
of resolving “value conflicts” prior to making 
progress on complex issues through collaborative 
modes of decision-making.  Lord (1979) 
identifies three major classes of conflict: value 
conflicts, which tend to focus on questions of 
principle, philosophy or morals at the heart of a 
proposed action; interest conflicts, which 
normally focus on distributional features of 
specific policies (e.g., allocation of costs and 
benefits), rather than questioning the overall 
scope or objective of a proposed action; and 
cognitive conflicts, which occur in situations 
where data or knowledge is considered 
inadequate.  Interest and cognitive conflicts are 
often readily amenable to ADR-type processes, 
but value conflicts normally cannot (and 
presumably should not) be negotiated away.66  
While this is an important limitation of 
consensus-based processes, what makes these 
efforts so intriguing is that in the hands of a 
skilled facilitator, an apparently intractable value 
conflict may be revealed as simply a 
miscommunication or a problem for which a 
compromise is available that satisfies competing 
needs without resolving the underlying value 
conflict.  If these approaches are not fruitful, 
however, then few effective decision-making 
options may exist outside of traditional forums, 
and specifically, the judicial arena where 
consensus is not a prerequisite to decision-
making.  The salience of the consensus 




                                                        
66 For example, the Southern Utah Wilderness 
Alliance (1994) observes that “Consensus works only 
when there is some basis of agreement to begin with; 
it does not work if participants are coming from 
diametrically opposing viewpoints.  A consensus can 
be reached, for instance, if participants agree a road 
should be built, but need to decide the best route.  A 
consensus cannot be reached when some participants 
want to clearcut, and others want to protect, a tract 
of forest.” 
Question:  Is there a cause-and-effect 
relationship between organizational 
achievements and subsequent on-the-
ground success?  Stated more generally, 
does the community/collaborative model 
of interaction and decision-making 
produce benefits that increase the ability 
of society to achieve social, economic and 
environmental goals? 
In order to answer this question, several 
years of monitoring and study of collaborative 
groups will be necessary.  This work is partially 
underway at many locations, including at the 
Natural Resources Law Center where western 
watershed initiatives are currently being studied 
as part of efforts to update The Watershed 
Source Book (NRLC, 1996). Even upon 
completion of that work, however, it will likely 
be difficult in the short-term to reach strong 
conclusions about the strength, of any, of the 
cause-and-effect relationship between 
organizational achievements and on-the-ground 
impacts.  Certainly, many of the case studies 
presented in the Source Book and subsequent 
research provide examples of watershed 
initiatives moving beyond “organizational 
achievements” (such as group formation, mission 
statement development, plan preparation, and 
related accomplishments) to have an on-the-
ground impact (NRLC, 1996; Kenney, 1997).  
Generating credible statistics about the expected 
frequency of such achievements by watershed 
initiatives throughout the West, however, will 
require additional effort, as watershed initiatives 
need time to experiment, and researchers need 
time to observe and analyze.  What may be more 
productive at this time is to think more broadly 
about questions of process and outcome, and in 
particular, how the “social environment” 
characteristic of the community/collaborative 
model of interaction can be expected to result in 
on-the-ground benefits. 
The belief that cooperative and collaborative 
interactions are likely to lead to stronger 
communities, better societies, and various types 
of on-the-ground benefits is perhaps best 
captured by the concept of “social capital.”  
Social capital is defined in many different ways 
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(Newton, 1997).  In its most general usage, the 
theory of social capital rests on the assumption 
that trust and reciprocity are essential elements 
for social stability and political cooperation 
(Simmel, 1950).  Viewed from this perspective, 
“social capital is important because it constitutes 
a force that helps to bind society together by 
transforming individuals from self-seeking and 
egocentric calculators, with little social 
conscience or sense of mutual obligation, into 
members of a community with shared interests, 
shared assumptions about social relations, and a 
sense of the common good” (Newton, 1997:576).  
Slightly different perspectives on social capital 
focus on the networks through which various 
parties can interact, building trust and 
encouraging cooperation (Tocqueville, 1968; 
Mill, 1910), or upon the more practical outputs 
(or consequences) that individuals can expect 
through such cooperative arrangements (Putnam, 
1993; Ostrom, 1990).   
While each perspective on social capital 
shares the assumption that benefits can be 
associated with actions and mechanisms that 
promote greater social collaboration, questions 
arise about cause-and-effect relationships, about 
the benefits of formal versus informal 
associations, about the importance and frequency 
of intangible and tangible benefits, and about the 
relationship between local associations (such as 
watershed initiatives) and national institutional 
structures within which local entities reside 
(Newton, 1997).  Much of the literature 
addressing such topics is not supported by (or is 
not readily amenable to) detailed empirical 
studies nor features precise definitions and/or 
explicitly identified assumptions, but rather is 
based on a wealth of anecdotal and hermeneutic 
evidence and nested within normative 
assumptions espousing the benefits of 
participatory processes.67  In the world of natural 
                                                        
67 Interestingly, social capital is an idea expressed 
much more frequently in international (especially 
third world) contexts. Some parties, such as Brick 
(1998:36), find this troubling: “In international 
conservation efforts, the need to work with local 
communities and indigenous peoples is axiomatic.  
But in this country the environmental movement 
resources and the environment, this information 
is most commonly found in the literature of 
community-based ecosystem management, which 
as Cortner et al. (in press:2) observe, is 
“premised on the belief that healthy democracies 
and sustainable ecosystems are both intertwined 
and interdependent.”68  At the core of this line of 
reasoning are two important assumptions: first is 
the belief that human well-being is largely 
dependent upon maintaining environmental 
health; and second is the assumption that certain 
types of processes—usually defined as those 
based on the community/collaborative model—
are most conducive to recognizing, respecting, 
and achieving this relationship.  While it is the 
second assumption that is most relevant to this 
discussion, both points deserve some attention 
given their close relationship. 
The first of these ideas—i.e., that human 
well-being is tied to ecological health—has long 
been obvious to conservationists and 
environmentalists and, undoubtedly, to many 
other individuals maintaining a close connection 
with the environment.  However, many of the 
behavioral patterns typical of the modern 
industrialized world seem oblivious to this 
relationship.  For example, Thomas Malthus 
(1798) generated a degree of lasting fame in 
environmental circles for his simple observation 
that many species embark on population booms 
that overwhelm those natural systems on which 
the species depend, leading often to precipitous 
population declines in the species.  Beginning 
largely in the 1960s, this “limits to growth” idea 
was widely applied to human society, becoming 
one of the cornerstones of the modern 
environmental movement.  Similar concerns over 
human “nest-fouling” also became more widely 
acknowledged in this era thanks largely to 
phenomenon such as the Cuyahoga River 
(draining in Lake Erie) fires and Rachael 
Carson’s (1962) frightening study showing how 
                                                                                   
often ignores this wisdom, preferring instead the 
hammer of national environmental legislation to 
accomplish its goals.” 
68 The philosophy of community-based 
environmental protection, as interpreted by the EPA, 
can be found at http://www.epa.gov/region5/cbep. 
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bioaccumulation can concentrate toxics in 
species near the top of food chains—including 
humans.  These concerns over resource 
consumption and ecological degradation are also 
joined by more metaphysical considerations, such 
as the preservationist argument of Henry David 
Thoreau who once remarked, “In wilderness is 
the preservation of the world.” 
Collectively, research and writings of this 
nature have helped to create an environment in 
the United States where the relationship between 
human well-being and ecological health is better 
appreciated than ever before.69 Yet, the policy 
response to issues such as growth (and 
consumption), climate change, biodiversity 
declines, and other pressing problems is generally 
considered by environmentalists to be 
disappointing (Ehrlich, 1996).  Making further 
progress will likely require better communicating 
this message about the connection between 
human and environmental health, and perhaps 
more significantly, in devising mechanisms that 
can achieve this desired balance on-the-ground.  
This again brings us back to the tenets of social 
capital and the merits of the 
community/collaborative model of decision-
making, which presumably provide a mechanism 
for achieving these objectives. 
 One of the functions for which watershed 
initiatives (and similar tools) are best suited is 
public education.70  In fact, many organizations, 
such as the Verde Watershed Association, 
consider this educational function to be their 
primary role.71  The collaborative environment of 
a watershed initiative can be ideal for fostering 
communication among interests and disciplines, 
between experts and laymen, between resource 
managers and stakeholders, and more generally, 
                                                        
69 Internationally, one of the better known 
discussions of this relationship is provided in the so-
called Brundtland Commission report (WCED, 
1987), which is often credited with pioneering the 
term “sustainable development.”   
70 The educational value of collaborative processes 
has been identified by a tremendous diversity of 
authors, including Sabatier (1988), Pateman (1970), 
and Blackburn and Bruce (1995). 
71 For more information on the Association, see 
http://www.verde.org/.  
between the community of resource users and 
managers and the public.72  Many groups pursue 
these goals through their broad memberships, 
through events such as conferences and planning 
exercises, and through the use of newsletters and 
web sites (NRLC, 1996).  This approach has the 
potential to not only increase the quantity of 
information flow, but to also improve the quality 
of the discussion, by framing issues in a broad 
and integrated manner, and with a degree of 
foresight often not afforded to management 
agencies burdened by immediate crises or by the 
demands of day-to-day program administration.   
 While it is difficult to precisely measure the 
value of public education and involvement in 
improving resource management and health, it 
seems apparent that it is unrealistic to expect 
people to care about those things they do not 
understand, to combat problems they do not 
recognize, or to implement solutions they have 
not considered.  Education, defined broadly to 
include almost any exchange of ideas, is an 
essential piece of the problem-solving puzzle, and 
is a cornerstone in the development of social 
capital.  It is erroneous, however, to suggest that 
this educational function can only occur through 
watershed initiatives using the 
community/collaborative model, or through ADR 
processes (Coglianese, 1997).  Tremendous 
amounts of data and insights are garnered 
through formal planning processes, through the 
discovery phase of litigation, through reporting 
and documentation requirements of permitting 
processes, and a host of related, “traditional” 
means of resource management and problem-
solving.  Where “alternative” approaches likely 
excel is in promoting a more extensive and honest 
disclosure of information (in part since the 
consensus requirement and non-adversarial 
nature create a safe environment for open 
discussion), and in pursuing a more holistic or 
integrated approach to defining problems and 
                                                        
72 Duane (1999:778) argues that “horizontal” 
interactions (i.e., those in which all parties are 
viewed as equal participants) are key to building 
social capital, unfortunate given that “most land and 
resource agencies are structured around vertical 
networks of control.” 
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solutions.  Obviously, this ideal is not 
accomplished in all settings, but it occurs with 
sufficient frequency within watershed initiatives 
to be a source of considerable excitement. 
 Returning to the underlying assumptions of 
community-based ecosystem management and 
Newton’s (1997) definition of social capital 
provided earlier, the next issue to address is 
whether or not interaction through the 
community/collaborative model is likely to 
change human behavioral motives from short-
term, individual self-interest, to longer-term, 
community interest.  Clearly, increased 
interaction among parties in a given 
“community” is likely to create forces that 
modify individual thinking and behavior.  
Utilizing terms such as socialization, bounded 
rationality, and embeddedness, many researchers 
have observed that individuals with decision-
making responsibilities are likely to modify their 
decision heuristics (or means of reasoning) to 
produce decisions that have broad acceptance to 
the group (Simon, 1982; Gregg et al., 1991).  As 
discussed earlier, Ostrom (1990) is among those 
authors who have found that social pressure can 
be a powerful force in encouraging people to act 
in a manner respectful of community interests.  
Nickelsburg (1998) and Kenney (1997), and 
countless other authors, have made similar 
observations, noting that frequent interactions 
within collaborative groups can generate a degree 
of social responsibility and obligation that is of 
practical value in addressing environmental 
issues. 
On the other hand, “community interests” 
are defined differently by different communities, 
many of whom believe that problems with 
resource management are problems of over-
regulation (and/or the subordination of private 
rights) and excessive restrictions on resource use, 
consumption, and/or degradation.  These groups 
do not show up in the Source Book (and many 
similar publications) simply because they were 
selected out; the Source Book is a reference for 
watershed initiatives pursuing environmentally 
friendly goals, a normative criterion adopted by 
the authors.  Thus, while many of the cases 
featured as representative of the western 
watershed movement can be cited as evidence 
that these groups promote social capital and the 
pursuit of community objectives, it is naï ve to 
assume that the goals of all such associations are 
environmentally beneficial or benign, or that the 
interests of local communities always correspond 
to those of larger communities of interests 
(Berman, 1997).   
In fact, the counter argument is well-
established in the environmental community, and 
largely explains why activists have historically 
fought to move the locus of decision-making 
from local communities presumably tied to 
commodity industries to more national 
“communities of interest.”73  Similarly, the fear 
of co-optation in collaborative processes is 
strong, and is not without historical precedent—
the control of federal rangelands by 1950s era 
grazing boards being the classic example (Foss, 
1960; Culhane, 1981).  “Socialization” of 
resource managers in consensus-based and 
collaborative processes can be viewed as highly 
unprofessional by fellow managers; there is much 
anecdotal evidence to suggest that managers 
participating in these processes often do so at the 
risk of losing status within the agency. Manring’s 
(1998:288) research on consensus building in the 
Forest Service is illustrative: 
                                                        
73 As described by Coggins (1999:604) in the context 
of federal devolution:  “The notion of devolving 
decisionmaking authority over federal resources 
down to local citizens' groups is anything but novel.  
From the birth of the Nation, local citizens have 
banded together, usually at the expense of the 
general public and often with the connivance of 
federal and local officials.  ‘Claims clubs’ were 
formed locally to dissuade outsiders, usually by 
illegal means, from bidding on lands the members 
wanted for themselves.  Similarly, local citizens 
assisted one another in stealing federal timber and 
lead mines in the Midwest. Local collaboration has 
been a favored technique in this century as well.  
Irrigators have organized to cheat the government 
out of reclamation subsidies.  Logging companies, 
loggers' unions, and timber dependent communities 
long have agreed on how the Forest Service should 
subsidize them.  The most egregious example are the 
grazing advisory councils composed of ranchers who 
dictated the winners and losers in federal forage 
allocation.  They won; small ranchers, nomadic 
sheepherders, and rangeland health lost.” 
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A survey by Cheng, White, Hacker, 
and Ellefson (1993) found that 
“National Forest managers rank 
conflict and how to deal with it at the 
top of all forest management issues” (p. 
ii).  Yet, according to a survey by 
Kennedy et al. (1992), only 31% of the 
respondents believed that consensus 
building is a value that should be 
rewarded by the agency.  
 
 A related issue involves the expanded use of 
market mechanisms in natural resources and 
environmental management.  As described 
earlier, the community/collaborative model of 
governance and the expanded use of market 
mechanisms are the twin pillars of many modern 
reform proposals, including those of the National 
Performance Review and the Western Governors’ 
Association (NPR, 1996; WGA, 1998).  Both of 
these tenets of the “era of alternative problem-
solving” are tied to normative ideas advocating 
voluntary incentives (rather than penalties), and 
promoting flexibility and creativity in decision-
making and problem-solving (Kenney and Lord, 
1999).  While these are powerful unifying 
principles, these two types of problem-solving 
strategies are quite different in their underlying 
assumptions about social capital—and quite 
possibly, according to Foley and Edwards 
(1996), work at cross-purposes.  
Proponents of the community/collaborative 
model argue that through increasing contact and 
communication among concerned individuals, 
social capital is created, resulting in joint 
decision-making efforts in which parties 
increasingly subordinate individual desires to 
community objectives.  Market proponents, in 
contrast, do not assume that any type of 
coordinated action or interaction among decision-
makers is necessary or even desirable, but rather 
conclude than individual self-interest can, 
through the “invisible hand” of markets, fulfill 
community objectives.  Both perspectives can be 
correct, but only to the extent that each problem-
solving strategy is correctly matched to particular 
types of problem situations, a prerequisite 
requiring an analysis of the strengths, limitations, 
and operational attributes of the various 
approaches.  Unfortunately, this type of analysis 
is rarely seen—buried too deep below 
unquestioned normative assumptions and 
dogmatic prose. 
 Finally, it is important to remember that 
educational and social capital building activities 
may be valued even if they cannot be shown to 
translate to achieving on-the-ground objectives.  
Nickelsburg (1998) is among those distinguishing 
between “extrarational” and “rational” benefits, 
the former entailing benefits such as trust, 
respect, friendship, and similar benefits possible 
through collective interaction; and the latter 
focusing more on achievement of on-the-ground 
objectives.74   Note that these two perspectives 
correspond to the earlier discussion about 
definitions of success.  Interview data by Press 
(1994:96) suggests that many environmentalists 
are less concerned with the “building 
community” (extrarational) definition of success 
than with the more pragmatic “on-the-ground 
results” characterization: 
 
[Environmentalists] wanted nothing 
less than substantial changes in the 
physical environment, even if they had 
to rely on “power brokers” or the 
courts to get their way.  Instead of 
“more democracy,” these respondents 
were looking for very specific physical 
outcomes …    
 
Interestingly, similar sentiments about the 
overriding importance of on-the-ground success 
were also expressed in interviews with the “anti-
environmental” activists, suggesting that those 
most passionate about resources may be least 
likely to engage in social capital building 
activities without some compelling argument that 
this will, in fact, lead to achievement of on-the-
ground objectives. 
 None of these observations, as expected, 
provide a precise answer to the question of 
whether or not organizational achievements lead 
to on-the-ground success.  Obviously, stake-
                                                        
74 The classic text on this subject is provided by 
Mancur Olson (1965). 
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holders would not volunteer their time, and 
agency’s would not allocate scarce resources to 
collaborative processes, if they did not assume 
that this cause-and-effect relationship existed.75  
The proliferation of these groups, many with 
broad memberships, suggests a strong and 
growing demand that is either based on real 
benefits or a strong expectation of future 
benefits.  The Source Book contains many cases 
where on-the-ground achievements have 
occurred.  Thus, the “social capital” concept 
underlying the community/collaborative model of 
problem-solving undoubtedly probably has at 
least some validity—do we really need empirical 
data to confirm this for us?—and it is a 
reasonable working assumption to conclude that 
this cause-and-effect relationship may be 
achievable in many situations.  The much more 
relevant question, then, is to determine which 
factors are likely to encourage or discourage this 
cause-and-effect relationship in a given case, an 
issue now discussed in several contexts and most 
likely linked to the types of incentive structures 
resulting from various problem types and 
solution strategies.  Of course, this task is greatly 
complicated by challenges in defining and 
measuring success, and must always be pursued 
with respect to lingering “governance issues” 
such as inadequate representation, co-optation, 
power imbalances, and so on.  If “healthy 
democracies” are indeed a prerequisite to 
environmental sustainability, then these issues of 
governance cannot be understated; to the 
contrary, they must be at the heart of our 
thinking.  The inherent limits of the “consensus” 
decision-rule are also an important consideration.  
Many of these issues are addressed further in the 
remaining pages.  
 
 
                                                        
75 Note that the vast literature pertaining to social 
capital building in third world environmental 
problem-solving is not reviewed here since the 
transferability of those findings is limited given the 
lack in those countries of strong governmental 
systems of resources management, property rights, 
markets, and other institutional features that can 
structure human relations and manage the 
human/nature interface. 
Question:  How does the consensus 
decision-rule typical of collaborative 
groups influence the quality of decisions 
and decision-making exercises?    
 The majority of mechanisms reliant upon the 
community/collaboration model of governance 
can be categorized as “consensus-based” 
processes.  Consensus is one of several poorly 
defined terms used to describe modern 
governance arrangements.76  In the context of this 
report, the term is recognized as having two 
related meanings.  The first is to describe an 
approach to decision-making that emphasizes 
cooperation, learning, and accommodation of 
diverse interests.  The second meaning is to 
describe a decision rule—i.e., a mechanism by 
which individual preferences are combined into a 
joint decision.77  As a practical matter, consensus 
as a decision-rule is usually synonymous with 
unanimity, meaning that all involved parties must 
agree—or agree not to disagree—on all 
decisions, although the former term can suggest 
that this level of agreement is, at least in part, a 
reflection of individuals giving in to group 
interests, while unanimity typically has no 
altruistic implications.78 
                                                        
76 Other terms defying easy definition are ecosystem 
management, sustainability, and as discussed later, 
democracy. 
77 The meaning of “consensus” in the context of 
collaborative groups is discussed in some detail by 
Cestero (1999:14). 
78 Misunderstandings about the decision-rule 
dictated by the “consensus” requirement have been a 
complicating factor in several collective processes 
for natural resources management.   For example,  
the interstate river basin commissions established 
pursuant to Title II of the Water Resources Planning 
Act of 1965 devised several different decision rules, 
although each was governed by the same statutory 
mandate to use consensus (ACIR, 1972).  The 
practical similarity between consensus and 
unanimity—and the lingering confusion between the 
two terms—is perhaps best illustrated by the 
definition of consensus provided in the Negotiated 
Rulemaking Act of 1990, which states “consensus 
means unanimous concurrence among the interests 
represented” unless the committee “agrees to define 
[consensus] to mean a general but not unanimous 
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 A similar point of confusion is associated 
with the term decision-making.  While groups 
that adopt formal policy positions are universally 
recognized as engaging in decision-making 
activities, some parties are hesitant to 
acknowledge that activities such as education, 
planning, and on-the-ground remediation also 
involve collective decision-making—even if a 
structured voting process does not occur or 
Robert’s Rules of Order are not invoked.  For 
example, the simple crafting of a group mission 
statement can involve making decisions about the 
definition of problems (often the most important 
stage in a problem-solving exercise), the selection 
of general preferences in solution strategies, and 
the adoption of procedural tenets to be used in 
guiding future actions.  To the extent that these 
issues may not be controversial in a particular 
group, the act of decision-making may be largely 
invisible—but decisions are nonetheless being 
made, and if the process is consensus-based, then 
those decisions are probably being made through 
unanimity.  This characteristic of many 
collaborative groups, including most watershed 
initiatives, can be highly salient in determining 
what these efforts can and cannot be expected to 
accomplish. 
 A strong mythology surrounds the 
phenomenon of consensus-based decision-
making.  A few of these assumptions have 
already been discussed; namely, the belief that 
consensus-based processes can produce decisions 
quicker, at lower cost, and of higher stability 
(measured by reduced legal challenges) than 
other processes.  Undoubtedly, this is true in 
many occasions, but it is often false in others—a 
conclusion evident in many scholarly works, 
including Coglianese’s (1997) review of 
negotiated rulemaking and Amy’s (1987) review 
of environmental dispute resolution.  The value 
of these findings is not to invalidate the claims of 
one side or the other, but to highlight the 
practical importance of understanding those 
situations and qualities that are likely to favor 
one decision-making approach other another.  
                                                                                   
concurrence” or “agrees upon another specified 
definition” (5 U.S.C. ' 562, 1994 & Supp I. 1995.) 
 The mythology of consensus transcends 
these “practical” considerations of speed, cost, 
and durability to include more normative notions 
of truth and social value.  This component of the 
consensus mythology has a long history, as 
shown by Rescher (1993:1): 
 
For much of the history of Western 
philosophy, consensus—uniformity of 
belief and evaluation—has been viewed 
as a desideratum whose ultimate 
realization can be taken as assured.  
Aquinas, in the Middle Ages, regarded 
consensus on fundamentals as a 
condition assured by God; Kant, in the 
eighteenth century, considered it as 
something rooted in the very nature of 
Reason; Hegel, in the nineteenth 
century, saw it as guaranteed by the 
spirit of cultivation working through 
the march of history ever enlarging its 
hold on human Society; Habermas in 
the twentieth century sees it as inherent 
in the very nature of Communication 
as an indispensable social praxis.  
Throughout much of the tradition 
consensus was viewed not just as 
something to be desired, but as 
something whose eventual actualization 
is effectively assured by some principle 
deep-rooted in the nature of things as 
we humans confront them in this world.  
 
 Consensus, we are told, is not merely a 
logical and inevitable product of the search for 
truth, but is something with a strong social value.  
This idea, especially strong in the tradition of 
German social thought extending from Hegel to 
Marx and to the Frankfurt School and beyond, 
assumes that maintaining social order requires a 
strong commitment to consensus in all public 
matters (Rescher, 1993).  Accepting this 
assumption could have tremendous ramifications 
for American society, in that it can provide a 
formidable bias against diversity and 
individualism, and can promote an intolerance of 
disagreement and those processes used in 
democratic societies to manage, rather than 
 42
suppress, social conflict.79  Equally troubling is 
the assumption that consensus is always possible 
given sufficient communication, education, and 
learning.80  While many success stories in ADR 
demonstrate that consensus is frequently 
achievable81, the assumption that this is always 
the case can only be considered as naï ve.  In the 
context of watershed initiatives, one component 
of this naivete is identified by Coggins (1998:29), 
who questions the assumption that all parties to 
natural resource and environmental disputes are 
reasonable and, ultimately, share similar values:   
 
The first assumption underlying most 
proposals to devolve authority to local 
collaboratives is that, at bottom, we are 
all reasonable people who will see both 
sides of the issue and reach appropriate 
compromises.  This assumption is 
demonstrably untrue.82   
                                                        
79 Reschner (1993:158) rejects the tradition of 
German social thought stressing social order through 
consensus, and instead calls for “a benevolent (or at 
any rate resigned) acceptance of the disagreement of 
others with respect to beliefs and values.  Such an 
approach envisions a posture of diversity conjoined 
with ‘live-and-let-live’, taking the line that a healthy 
democratic social order can not only tolerate, but 
even—within limits—welcome dissensus 
(disagreement, discord), provided that the conflicts 
involved are kept within ‘reasonable bounds’.” 
80 Forest activist Jim Britell suggests that this idea is 
a cornerstone of the Neo-Liberalism movement 
gaining ground internationally.  This philosophy 
asserts that value conflicts are not at the heart of 
disputes, and that through better management and 
consensus-building processes, win-win solutions can 
always be found.  This idea is articulated at 
www.britell.com/text/tuse11c.html. 
81 For examples from the world of environmental 
dispute resolution, see Bingham (1985), Blackburn 
and Bruce (1995), and Bacow and Wheeler (1984). 
82 Other assumptions challenged by Coggins include: 
“negotiated plans and agreements will leave all 
participants and the public interest better off” (page 
30); “the issues on which collaboration is needed are 
local problems better solved by local people with 
knowledge of local conditions” (page 30); and “the 
federal government is the bad guy” (page 30).  
Coggins concludes that “some of the assumptions on 
which the case for collaboration are premised are 
 
The other dominant idea at the root of the 
consensus mythology is that consensus-based 
processes are more likely to lead to the “correct” 
answer than are other processes of decision-
making.  Many accepted tools from the decision 
sciences—particularly, the Delphi Method—are 
based on the idea that decision processes which 
are iterative and learning-oriented can lead to 
more technically accurate group decisions, a 
conclusion based on considerable research 
(Helmer, 1983).  The strength of consensus-
based processes in managing and synthesizing 
data-intensive issues is also well established in 
practice (Bingham, 1986).  Thus, there is likely 
merit to this assumption in many situations; 
however, as Rescher (1993:29) observes, one 
should not confuse opinion and fact, even if that 
opinion is the product of group deliberation: 
The problem, of course, is that 
consensus does not bridge over the 
truth-opinion divide that has been on 
the agenda of philosophy ever since the 
days of Parmenides.  A consensus as 
such is still no more than a consensual 
opinion that reflects the beliefs of the 
group.  There may be safety in 
numbers, but they afford no 
guarantees. 
  
 Bridging the gap between issues of the 
“social value” of consensus and its likelihood to 
lead to correct decisions is the work of some 
social psychologists who have examined the 
types of decisions that emerge from consensus 
processes dealing with issues heavily steeped in 
opinion.  Many researchers have observed that 
when groups comprised of individuals with 
diverse opinions are organized to make collective 
decisions, the resulting decisions tend not to be 
the “average” of various positions, but rather an 
                                                                                   
contrary to human nature and human experience.  
Our legal system and our history recognize the 
inevitability of disputes and controversies not 
amenable to resolution by consensus building, and 
we have established an intentionally inefficient 
tripartite representative machine to resolve those 
disputes without bloodshed through law” (page 30). 
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extreme position.  This finding reflects common 
experience that suggests that individuals are 
bolder when acting within groups than in acting 
alone.  This phenomenon, termed “group 
polarization” by Moscovici and Zavalloni 
(1969), has been shown empirically under 
laboratory conditions.  Similar results are found 
in the work of Davis and Hinsz (1982), who 
observe that “moderating sessions” designed to 
calm protests often result in more extreme 
positions.  Presumably, these outcomes are most 
likely to occur when the level of participation is 
high, the opinions expressed are widely divergent, 
and when the stakes are perceived as high 
(Moscovici and Zavalloni, 1969; Moscovici and 
Doise, 1994).  This finding presents a further 
challenge to the mythology of consensus, and 
especially the idea that consensus-based 
processes promote social order by moderating 
extreme viewpoints.  As Moscovici and Doise 
(1994:14) observe:  
 
The importance of such results resides 
partly in the fact that one might expect 
group discussion to cause individuals 
to round off the rough edges, smooth 
out their attitudes, moderate their 
choices, and so on.  Now it appears, on 
the contrary, that the outcome is to 
make them more extreme. 
 
 Of course, much of this debate is rendered 
moot if you challenge that assumption that 
pursuing agreement is an inherently worthwhile 
endeavor.  Many parties take exception to the 
Neo-Liberal idea that conflict is inherently bad or 
socially destructive.  McCloskey (1996), for 
example, fears that in embracing collaboration, 
conflict is being “de-legitimized.”  Such ideas are 
not accepted by those embracing the tradition of 
social activism so central to many movements, 
including environmentalism, often with good 
reason.  The observations of Britell83 are typical 
of this line of thought: 
 
                                                        
83 Taken from the article, “The Myth of ‘Win-Win’,” 
accessed June 3, 1999 at 
www.britell.com/text/tuse11c.html. 
Our history from the revolution 
forward provides abundant examples 
that justice and liberty are sometimes 
best achieved by absolutely refusing to 
sit down and find “common ground” 
and “win-win” solutions.  In fact, it is 
arguable that of most turning points in 
history where great issues of human 
freedom were at stake, in-your-face 
confrontation saved the day.  On the 
other hand, when key turning points 
were resolved with “win-win” solutions 
like Chamberlain used at Munich on 
the eve of World War II, the greatest 
human calamities have ensued. 
 
Thus, while scholars such as Rescher 
(1993) worry that an over-reliance on consensus 
processes may unduly squelch or discredit 
diverse opinions, some of the findings of the 
social psychologists warn that consensus 
processes may exaggerate extreme positions—
likely reflecting the norms of the dominant 
personality, rather than a balanced spectrum of 
participant viewpoints.  Still others argue that the 
best processes are often those that deliberately 
avoid any attempt at reaching a mutually 
acceptable agreement, and instead celebrate 
conflict as legitimate and useful.  These findings 
are somewhat difficult to integrate, both on 
practical and normative grounds, but do suggest 
that it may be inappropriate to assume that a 
“consensus opinion” will approximate the 
“common good,” although generalizations on this 
subject are difficult to substantiate (Berman, 
1997).  Determining which behavioral 
phenomena might prevail in a given consensus-
based process is obviously extremely difficult, 
but it is worth observing that none of the 
outcomes described above by Rescher, the social 
psychologists, or the environmental activist 
(Britell), probably satisfy the idealistic image of 
consensus as promoting truth, harmony, and 
social stability.  Interviews with watershed 
initiative participants indicate that these ideals 
have been achieved in many cases, but not in 
many others.  To blindly assume that positive 
outcomes are an inherent component of 
consensus-based processes is to ignore a vast 
 44
body of literature, thought, and experimentation 
suggesting that these processes are highly 
complex on many levels, and that significant 
deviations can occur from case to case due to 
factors that are not easily understood. 
Of course, many of the concerns raised to 
challenge the merits of consensus-based 
processes have relatively little to do with broad 
theoretical issues or ongoing academic debates, 
or even the practical efficiency issues of time, 
cost, and stability identified earlier.  Strategic 
considerations are also of note.  One of the most 
salient issues of this nature involves the social 
pressure to compromise.  This phenomenon is 
discussed by Blackburn (1988:569) in the 
context of environmental mediation versus 
litigation, but is presumably applicable to a wide 
range of consensus-based processes: 
 
The internal dynamics of environ-
mental mediation are completely 
different [from] the courtroom context.  
Participants in mediation often develop 
bonds of trust, understanding and even 
affection, toward their opponents.  The 
climate of understanding and progress 
in working toward mutually 
satisfactory solutions creates subtle 
pressures to be reasonable and 
conciliatory.  These dynamics may 
undermine the determination of 
unsophisticated parties to stand their 
ground on issues. . . .  The parties with 
less experience and sophistication may 
walk away with an agreement which 
favors their perspective much less than 
would have been possible in a more 
public, adversarial context.84 
 
As Blackburn suggests, the susceptibility of 
a person to the social pressure to compromise is, 
                                                        
84 Similar sentiments are expressed by McCloskey 
(1996):  “It is also troubling that [collaborative] 
processes tend to de-legitimize conflict as a way of 
dealing with issues and of mobilizing support.  It is 
psychologically difficult to simultaneously negotiate 
and publicly attack bad proposals from the other 
side.  This tends to be seen as acting in bad faith.” 
at least in part, a function of experience and 
training.  Although many natural resources and 
environmental conflicts are much more complex 
than the classic characterization of the developer 
versus the environmentalist, it is certainly not 
uncommon for disputes to pit those with a clear 
economic interest against parties seeking non-
economic and/or broadly dispersed benefits.  In 
such cases, it is typical that the disputants will 
have very different skills in regards to dispute 
resolution, with the representatives of the 
economic interests normally possessing greater 
training and experience in the craft of negotiation 
(Amy, 1987, 1990).  Perhaps more importantly, 
environmental representatives in these efforts are 
frequently volunteers, resulting in a situation in 
which paid, professional negotiators are sitting 
across the table from volunteers.  As mentioned 
earlier, many parties believe this fact is behind 
the generally higher level of support in the 
business community than the environmental 
community for negotiated problem-solving.85  
The frustration expressed by environmentalist 
Michal Black is typical: 
 
It is extremely difficult for citizens to 
take the time and money to participate.  
…  Personally I become frustrated 
when I take the time and effort to 
attend these meetings, and look around 
the room and realize I am the only 
person present not getting paid to 
                                                        
85 The observations of Nickelsburg (1998:1391-
1392) are illuminating: “Bargaining is expensive.  
Although each step in the bargaining process may be 
less costly than the action required for a single, all-
encompassing solution, the complete effort may 
involve hours of meetings and information-gathering 
and may last for years.  Voluntary participation in a 
bargaining regime is itself a collective action 
problem subject to its own structural barriers.  
Community members may lack the time to devote to 
an exhausting, collaborative effort.  Moreover, 
professional and scientific assistance may not be 
available or may be prohibitively expensive.  The 
probability that citizens will undertake such long-
term collective action varies widely from community 
to community, most likely in correlation with the 
economic prosperity of the inhabitants.” 
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attend.  Volunteer resources can only 
go so far.86  
 
Another strategic concern is one of 
inadequate representation.  This is a chronic 
issue to the environmental activist, as many 
modes of public policy-making are biased in 
favor of economic interests (e.g., the pluralism 
model described by Lowi, 1979).  In the context 
of collaborative groups such as watershed 
initiatives, concerns over environmental group 
under-representation are inexorably tied to the 
larger issue of local versus national decision-
making.87  As Michael McCloskey (1996:7), 
chairman of the Sierra Club, has observed: 
 
Few of the proposals for stakeholder 
collaboration provide any way for 
distant stakeholders to be effectively 
represented.  While we may have 
activists in some nearby communities, 
we don’t have them in all of the small 
towns involved.  It is curious that these 
ideas would have the effect of 
transferring influence to the very 
communities where we are least 
organized and potent.  They would 
maximize the influence of those who 
are least attracted to the environmental 
cause and most alienated from it. 
 
Similar concerns over inadequate representation 
have also been articulated in congressional 
testimony by The Wilderness Society’s Louis 
Blumberg (1997:6): 
 
The fundamental problem of adequate 
representation remains a significant 
obstacle to successful collaborative 
                                                        
86 This comment was one of many similar opinions 
expressed in a Sierra Club listserve discussion of 
collaborative groups (RMC-CONS-WATER) 
occurring primarily in late October, 1998.  
87 Reflecting on his experiences mostly in the Pacific 
Northwest, Oregon WaterWatch’s Reed Benson 
(1998:284) asserts that “Today’s watershed councils 
tend to be heavily weighted in favor of local 
economic interests, to the disadvantage of resource 
protection.”   
efforts.  Questions remain as to how 
national and regional interests can be 
fairly represented in an exclusively 
local process?  Who speaks for the 
environment?  One particular local 
environmentalist does not necessarily 
speak for other local or national 
environmental interests.  Who speaks 
for the land and future generations?  
Achieving a full range of stakeholders 
is quite difficult, especially when the 
land under debate is all public lands. 
 
If greater involvement of “local” interests is 
achieved only at the expense of a reduced 
presence of national environmental interests, then 
the assumed problem of inadequate 
representation in natural resources management 
has not been resolved, but only modified.  
Ultimately, issues of skills and 
representation in consensus-based processes are 
components of the larger issue of power, an issue 
closely tied to the qualities of the decision-rule of 
unanimity.  Forums utilizing unanimity are 
widely assumed to be a low risk arena for 
discussing problems and solutions, given that no 
group actions can take place in the absence of 
agreement by all parties—including minority 
interests (i.e., those advocating positions that are 
not widely held).  While that is true, the practical 
ramifications of unanimity are not always so 
obvious.  Falk (1982) is among those researchers 
who have studied the relationship between 
decision-rules and power.  In a comparison of 
three situations—one where no decision rule 
existed, one where unanimity was utilized, and 
one where majority-rule was featured—Falk 
found that it was the majority-rule framework 
that most increased the power of minority (i.e., 
underrepresented) interests, such as 
environmentalists, to achieve desired outcomes.88  
                                                        
88 Falk’s (1982) empirical research shows that in the 
no-rule situation, powerful parties dominate by 
virtue of their greater resources and expertise; 
minority interests have no mechanism to be heard or 
to exercise influence.  In a unanimity situation, two 
outcomes are possible, neither of which help 
minority interests.  First, minority interests may veto 
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This result should not come as a surprise to 
environmental activists, who have found their 
greatest victories in Congress and the courts, 
arenas where the consent of their “anti-
environmental” counterparts is not a prerequisite 
to successful decision-making. 
From the standpoint of parties advocating 
minority positions, the real benefit of consensus-
based processes is often best described as the 
ability to prevent further defeats (or action of any 
kind), rather than the ability to formulate victory 
(Press, 1994).  Of course, this “benefit” is not 
useful to environmental interests participating in 
ecological restoration programs, where the 
impetus is on taking action rather than preventing 
action.  As Luecke (1999:8) observes:  
 
In a multi-party process, the efficacy 
and weight of one interest (even more 
so for a minority party) is often 
imperceptible.  Its influence is thin and 
diffuse.  At best, one party can usually 
do little more than form a coalition (or 
voting block) to stop an action it does 
not support.  It cannot move the 
process in a direction it thinks it should 
go.  It may be able to create a 
stalemate, but not progress. 
 
This is somewhat ironic, given that 
collaborative efforts are often described as a 
solution to gridlock.  Of the three apparent 
strategies for dealing with gridlock in consensus-
based processes, two are of dubious merit.  The 
first is to ensure decision-making by limiting 
representation to only a sub-set of all relevant 
                                                                                   
a given action, resulting in a situation of gridlock 
that harms all interests with an interest in problem-
solving.  Second, the veto may have the practical 
result of stymieing the collective decision-making 
process, encouraging the powerful party to result 
back to the no-rule situation where winners and 
losers are largely dependent on other power sources, 
such as economic might.  However, in the majority-
rule situation, an opportunity exists for minority 
interests to impact the final decision through 
bargaining, or to perhaps dominate the final outcome 
through coalition-building with other low-power 
entities. 
interests, with extreme interests being 
systematically excluded.  As Nickelsburg (1998), 
McCloskey (1996), and many others have 
observed, this strategy can be devastating to any 
minority interest—the typical situation for 
environmental and public interest activists.89  A 
much more positive strategy is to foster an 
exchange of information and ideas, synthesize 
this data in a creative way, and craft a solution 
that satisfies the needs of all parties.  It is this 
potential that is at the heart of the profession of 
alternative dispute resolution, and as discussed 
earlier, is often a realistic option in situations 
featuring symmetrical incentives, positive-sum 
solutions, and/or relatively low (or avoidable) 
value conflicts.  
The third strategy is simply to avoid issues 
where strong dissenting opinions exist.  This may 
not be a significant impediment, at least initially, 
in many collaborative groups if a sufficient 
supply of easily resolved problems and readily 
available solutions exist to facilitate problem-
solving (i.e., the “low hanging fruit” argument).   
However, difficult issues eventually must either 
be faced, leading to the prospect of gridlock, or 
they must be sidestepped.  According to 
Coglianese (1999), this phenomenon was aptly 
demonstrated by the Enterprise for the 
Environment experience.  Enterprise for the 
Environment (a.k.a., E4E) was a multi-
stakeholder consensus-based effort led by former 
EPA Administrator William Ruckelhaus—in 
cooperation with the National Academy of Public 
Administration, the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, and the Keystone Center—
to reform environmental policy.  The goal of the 
effort was to use a consensus-based process to 
develop new environmental policies/programs, 
which would presumably also likely feature 
consensus processes.   In drafting the E4E report, 
however, the group was unable to reach 
                                                        
89 Research on interest group politics suggests that 
environmental and public interest advocates will 
likely always remain as minority interests in public 
policy debates, given that the system of rewards in 
public policy systems is strongly biased in favor of 
narrow, economic interests.  This is a fundamental 
quality of pluralism (Olson, 1965; Lowi, 1979). 
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agreement on most significant issues.  Thus, 
when the group issued their report (The 
Environmental Protection System in 
Transition90) in 1998, it went nowhere—in part 
because many important parties (e.g., the Natural 
Resources Defense Council) refused to sign.  
Coglianese (1999:4) suggests this reflects an 
inherent weakness of consensus-based efforts to 
reach conclusions on divisive issues, thereby 
encouraging vague and weak statements that 
overestimate the progress reached: 
 
The report recommends that the U.S. 
“adapt and adjust policies, strategies, 
and systems based on experience and 
new information,” that it “generate, 
disseminate, and rely on the best-
available scientific and economic 
information,” and that it “place 
authority, responsibility, and 
accountability at the appropriate level 
of government.”  Yet no one seriously 
argues government to place authority at 
inappropriate levels, generate shaky 
data, or ignore the lessons of 
experience.  The E4E report does not 
tell us what specifically are the 
appropriate levels of government, or 
even what “appropriate” means.  It 
does not discuss the accuracy of certain 
kinds of information or how to resolve 
the tradeoff between the desire to 
gather additional information and the 
desire to take action.  Finally, the 
report does not explain how to interpret 
experience in order to make policy 
changes.  The E4E members 
themselves, recall, could not agree on 
the lessons to be drawn from the past 
thirty years of environmental 
regulation.  The devil, as well as much 
                                                        
90 Note that the E4E report contains an excellent 
review (and endorsement) of many key features of 
modern reform proposals: e.g., performance-based 
management, market incentives, place-based 
strategies, consensus.  Yet, these ideas are expressed 
in a highly abstract and general way, since reaching 
consensus on the details proved impossible. 
of the needed direction, lies in the 
details.  
 
 Presumably, what is needed are decision-
making mechanisms that allow problems to be 
addressed in the absence of consensus, and in a 
manner that is broadly-focused and creative.  It is 
this first criterion that can limit the use of 
collaborative groups, while the second criterion is 
most troublesome for approaches reliant on 
judicial action, some market mechanisms91, and 
legislative tools (which at least partially fail both 
criteria due to the political requirements of 
pluralism).  Again, this limitation on watershed 
initiatives and similar efforts should not be 
interpreted as a reason to abandon or discredit 
the use of this tool, but rather to use it more 
realistically and strategically.   As Born and 
Genskow (1999:58) observe: 
 
[I]t is critical to note that some of the 
major issues that must be dealt with in 
watershed protection and restoration 
not only have huge distributional 
consequences (i.e., there are winners 
and losers), but for any number of 
reasons may be intractable and 
impossible to resolve via “win-win” 
consensual solutions.  Experienced 
mediators can help diagnose those 
issues and circumstances where 
consensus approaches have little 
likelihood of success, and help avoid 
protracted watershed processes that are 
either doomed to fail or can at best 
produce inefficacious “lowest-
common-denominator” results.  We say 
this not to diminish the potential of 
collaborative watershed approaches, 
but to straightforwardly note that much 
of watershed planning, decision-making 
                                                        
91 The ability of market regimes to promote creative 
and innovative solutions is not questioned.  The 
limitations of markets in this context pertains to the 
fact that, unless cleverly nested within an innovative 
institutional structure, markets cannot be expected to 
promote integrated goals serving public, rather than 
private (consumer), interests. 
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and management involves conflict 
resolution among competing interests.  
General agreement among stakeholders 
about such lofty aspirations such as 
“clean water,” “healthy sustainable 
ecosystems,” and a “healthy economy” 




Democratic Decision-Making: An 
Evolution of Normative Ideas 
 
 The preceding discussion summarizes much 
of what is currently known or presumed 
regarding the efficacy of western watershed 
initiatives and similar strategies in community-
based environmental protection.  Clearly, much 
more empirical research is needed to test many of 
the positive and speculative opinions identified in 
this report.  Yet, it would foolish to travel further 
in that direction without acknowledging that 
research alone will not guide activism and policy-
making in this subject area, as it is an area 
dominated by strong normative opinions only 
partially amenable to formal testing.  The 
pragmatic definition of success offered earlier 
captures only part of the stimulus behind the 
western watershed movement.  The other 
dimension involves issues of what is, and is not, 
an appropriate form of governance.  Ultimately, 
this is a philosophical debate that must be played 
out on a political stage only indirectly influenced 
by the academic community.  As Cortner et al. 
(in press:3) observe: 
 
Issues surrounding the who, what, 
where and how of governing are, by 
their very nature, highly political.  
They reach to the very core of the 
nation’s democratic and federal system 
of government and to the balances 
struck among levels and branches of 
government and between citizens and 
their government.   
 
While an extensive review of all the 
potentially relevant normative ideas guiding 
trends in governance is well beyond the scope of 
this report, the following pages do provide some 
discussion about changing norms regarding 
democratic institutions and competing modes of 
decision-making.  The current popularity of the 
community/collaborative model of decision-
making, after all, is a product of centuries of 
experimentation and learning, and is undoubtedly 
a step to a yet unknown preferred future form of 
governance and problem-solving.  As always, 
normative ideas about democracy will have a 
strong influence in guiding this ongoing process 
of institutional evolution.  
 Democracy, it turns out, is a term that 
means many things to many people (Graham, 
1986).  Virtually all meanings of the term are 
faithful to the original Greek term demos in that 
democracy is seen as a system of governance that 
allows for participation of the populace—i.e., 
government of the people, by the people, and for 
the people.  But who are the people, and how are 
they to govern?  Two centuries ago, the demos in 
the United States was not presumed to include 
those of African descent; similarly, less than a 
century ago, woman were also systematically 
excluded from a public policy role.  When 
Gifford Pinchot was building a national forest 
bureaucracy based on the premise of “the 
greatest good for the greatest number,” half of 
that number, the women, were still awaiting the 
right to vote, something not secured until passage 
of the 19th Amendment in 1920, long after the 
creation of the Forest Service—and, incidentally, 
the National Park Service, the Corps of 
Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation, and many 
other still-influential natural resource agencies 
and the programs they implement.  Even slower 
has been the recognition in law and custom of 
Native American rights and, more generally, the 
rights of those parties who do not own land or 
possess water rights, or who do not enjoy special 
access to resources due to leases, contracts, or 
other historic arrangements derivative of 
extractive natural resource industries.92  The 
                                                        
92 Thus, when noted western author Charles 
Wilkinson (1992) speaks of the “lords of yesterday,” 
he typically is not talking about an aristocracy of 
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rights of communities is also an issue of great 
complexity and concern. 
 In addition to issues of “who” is involved, 
any working definition of democracy must also 
address issues of “how”—i.e., the processes of 
decision-making and governance.  Clearly, some 
processes of public decision-making are viewed 
as being more democratic than others, although 
again, this is not an area with great consistency 
or stability.  This is perhaps best seen by 
examining decision-rules, a particularly relevant 
topic given the focus in this paper on consensus 
processes.  Most systems of democracy 
prominently utilize majority-rule; e.g., presidents 
are elected and bills become law primarily 
through majority-rule processes.  But not all 
majority-rule is created equal.  In parliamentary 
systems, for example, garnering 40 percent of the 
vote typically entitles a party to select 40 percent 
of the representatives; in the United States, 40 
percent of the popular vote is no better than zero 
(assuming the other candidate gets the remaining 
60 percent).  Which system is democratic?  
Similarly, are processes reliant upon unanimity—
the typical decision-rule of consensus-based 
processes—democratic?  Graham (1986:17) is 
among those that answer no: 
 
The unanimity requirement … 
effectively places a veto in the hands of 
a single dissenter and therefore falls 
foul of any principle of equality of 
influence which may be embedded in 
the notion of democracy.   
 
If, as Graham suggests, “equality of 
influence” is the key distinction of democratic 
processes, then we must evaluate the democracy 
of processes by the opportunities they present to 
all recognized parties to participate and to affect 
an outcome—but how much participation is 
required, how should participants be selected, 
through what means must this occur, and how 
much impact on the final decision is required?  
Ultimately, the answers to such questions are 
normative, in that they speak to what we feel is 
                                                                                   
heterogeneous values or ethnicity, nor is he talking 
about ancient history.  
“appropriate.”93  These questions are always 
being debated in various forums and contexts, 
following a sometimes peculiar path, and 
frequently circling back to ideas abandoned in 
earlier debates.94  In many respects, it is this 
longer-term process, rather than the set of rules 
or norms prevailing at any given time, that best 
defines democracy. 
 
Democracy and the American West 
Underlying the debate surrounding 
watershed initiatives and related mechanisms of 
decision-making heavily reliant on direct 
stakeholder involvement are centuries of 
scholarly debate regarding the merits of 
democratic institutions.95  Among proponents of 
democratic governance, a key area of debate is 
often described as pitting the proponents of  
“direct democracy”—also known as 
“participatory” or “pure” democracy—
advocating direct citizen involvement and 
deliberation in public policy decision-making, 
against supporters of “representative democracy” 
arguing for decision-making by elected public 
officials in competitive forums only partially 
subject to popular control (Cortner et al., in 
press; Kemmis, 1990).  While undoubtedly 
important, in the context of western collaborative 
groups, this dichotomy can be overly simplistic, 
obscuring the salient influence of two tangential 
issues that have dramatically influenced 
democratic institutions for natural resources 
management: namely, the merits of utilizing an 
elite and largely independent decision-making 
                                                        
93 To the extent that a process satisfies our norms, it 
is labeled democratic.  As Graham (1986:9) has 
observed: “The concept of democracy has a strong 
normative aspect: to call a system democratic is not 
merely to describe it, in however imprecise a way; it 
is generally to express a favourable attitude toward 
it…” 
94 The current debate over reforming Affirmative 
Action programs is a good example. 
95 Cortner and Moote (1999) provide a thoughtful 
review of the relationship between democracy and 
resource management in The Politics of Ecosystem 
Management.   Also useful is McKinney’s (1999) 
analysis which  focuses squarely on the management 
of western natural resources. 
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class—technocratic in this case rather than 
aristocratic—and the forces supporting the 
evolution of an interest-group mode of decision-
making.  These issues all have a long history. 
While the merits of democratic decision-
making have been debated in many nations over 
several centuries, the United States has long been 
viewed as the preeminent laboratory of 
experimentation in democracy ever since the 
colonies revolted against a tyrannical British 
monocracy.  Upon completion of the 
revolutionary war, the Constitutional Convention 
of the United States capped a lengthy and spirited 
period of debate between the proponents of 
participatory democracy, such as Thomas 
Jefferson, and those of representative democracy, 
such as James Madison, both united in a common 
adherence of aristocratic monarchies, but 
harboring different opinions regarding the merits 
of popular, majority-rule governance.  While 
Madison’s perspective generally prevailed in the 
structuring of the U.S. Constitution, it is 
Jefferson’s notions of direct citizen involvement 
in policy-making that secured a special place in 
American culture, and in subsequent nineteenth 
century descriptions of the United States by 
outside commentators such as Alexis de 
Tocqueville (1968).   
Western watershed initiatives reflect the 
spirit of direct democracy described so 
passionately by Jefferson, and put in context a 
century later in the writings of John Wesley 
Powell (1890:113) calling for “local self-
government by hydrographic basins” in the arid 
and semi-arid regions of the American West: 
 
… in the name of the men who labor I 
demand that the laborers shall employ 
themselves; that the enterprise shall be 
controlled by the men who have the 
genius to organize, and whose homes 
are in the lands developed, and that the 
money shall be furnished by the people; 
and I say to the Government: Hands 
off!  Furnish the people with 
institutions of justice, and let them do 
the work themselves.   
 
It is a historical reality—many would say 
mistake—that this vision of Powell was not 
adopted, as a federal reclamation program 
emerged in the West concentrating federal 
technical and financial resources on the 
development and management of shared 
resources (Kenney, 1999b).  With astounding 
effectiveness, this new model of resource 
development not only transformed the physical 
landscapes of the West, but introduced the 
region’s institutional landscape to decision-
making processes featuring outside technical 
elites and organized interest groups.  Rather than 
Jeffersonian self-determination or even elected 
representation on the Madisonian model, the 
“iron triangles”96 of federal water development 
frequently cast local interests in an advocacy 
role, supporting narrowly-focused interest groups 
seeking to gain a share of federal investments in 
resource development.  The subsequent allocation 
of developed water resources to private parties 
further divorced resources from coordinated 
public control. 
 It is more than a little ironic that the 
fundamental argument aired during the 
Constitutional Convention in favor of 
representative, rather than direct, democracy, 
was that a “tyranny of the majority” might occur 
in a pure democracy, with majority-rule systems 
providing no protection to minority opinions.97  
This fear was widely held, although parties 
disagreed over the significance of the issue and 
the best mechanisms for dealing with the concern.  
What was not envisioned was the “tyranny of the 
minority” that has occurred in the natural 
resources realm in at least two forms and eras.  
The first expression occurred largely in the late 
1800s, when western expansionism combined 
with largely unregulated capitalism and a weak 
                                                        
96 The term “iron triangles” is used by many authors 
(e.g., McCool, 1987) to describe the political 
subsystem through which much of western water 
policy was fashioned by the joint action of three 
groups with similar objectives: pro-development 
interest groups (project beneficiaries), key 
congressional committee members, and the federal 
bureaucracy (i.e., the Bureau of Reclamation). 
97 The classic source for this debate is The Federalist 
Papers (see Fairfield, 1961). 
 51
federal government to result in strong private 
monopolies and tremendous economic disparities.  
Concerns over the social and environmental 
consequences of unregulated capitalism were a 
primary concern of the Progressives, the 
dominant political party at the turn of the century 
(Hays, 1959).  The so-called Progressive 
Conservation movement (circa 1890-1920) 
featured an emphasis on federal land retention 
and preservation, and the corresponding 
evolution of a cadre of federal technocratic 
resource managers, perhaps best illustrated by 
Pinchot’s Forest Service (Kaufman, 1967; 
Pinchot, 1947).  Thus, bureaucratic control 
through regulation, rather than private 
entrepreneurialism (often buttressed by 
governmental subsidies and inattention), became 
a dominant expression of natural resources 
democracy during the early twentieth century. 
 The expansion of the federal natural 
resources bureaucracy was given further stimulus 
in the Great Depression era, when centralized 
planning was in vogue, and federally orchestrated 
natural resource development projects were 
initiated to address problems of unemployment 
and economic stagnation—the classic example 
being the Hoover Dam project.98  As the nation 
emerged from Depression and a second World 
War, however, the fundamental quality of 
American democratic institutions changed, giving 
rise to a second variation on the tyranny of the 
minority.  In this era, the role of interest groups 
in establishing public policy was sharply 
elevated, leading to a form of democracy 
described by Theodore Lowi (1979) as the 
“Second Republic.”99  This is the era of pluralism 
(also known as interest-group liberalism), which 
is based on the normative idea that it is 
appropriate and “democratic” for organized 
interests, acting through a system of bargaining 
                                                        
98 By the mid 1930s, the four largest concrete dams 
ever built were under construction: Hoover, Shasta, 
Bonneville, and Grand Coulee, prompting Reisner 
(1986) to refer to this era as the “Go-Go Years.” 
99 The “First Republic” is the government described 
in the Constitution, which calls for a weak federal 
government and strong state (and presumably local) 
governments (Lowi, 1979). 
and compromise, to determine public policy.100  
Unfortunately, much like unfettered capitalism, 
the incentive structure of pluralism typically 
favors narrow economic interests over broad 
social goals and disadvantaged parties, issues of 
particular concern in the realm of natural 
resources and the environment.  As Amy 
(1987:131-132) has observed:  
 
Environmentalists’ concerns about 
basic imbalances in political and 
economic power have found support in 
the work of a number of prominent 
political scientists and political 
theorists.  Political thinkers as diverse 
as E.E. Schattsschneider, Grant 
McConnell, and Charles Lindblom 
have taken issue with the pluralist 
vision of power in American politics.  
They have argued that there exists a 
persistent inequality between interest 
groups in American politics, with a 
decided bias in favor of large business 
and financial institutions.  Other 
scholars, like Mancur Olson, have also 
noted that environmentalists and other 
public interest groups always face a 
number of unique and substantial 
obstacles in their efforts to balance out 
the political power of concentrated 
economic interests.   
  
 Pluralism, described in this way, certainly 
does not satisfy the “equality of influence” 
measure of democracy presented earlier by 
British philosopher Keith Graham (1986:17).  On 
the other hand, authors such as Nicholas Rescher 
(1993:158)—in arguing against consensus-based 
processes—make the case that “a benign social 
order can be unabashedly pluralistic,” in that this 
form of governance accommodates the 
expression of a wide diversity of opinions.  In 
fact, pluralism makes no assumptions about the 
                                                        
100 Substantively, pluralism is without real normative 
content, as policies are not judged to be good or bad, 
but simply are either politically viable or not viable 
(Lowi, 1979). 
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possibility of, or value of, reaching consensus.101  
How, then, do we accommodate a desire for full 
access of people and ideas into the public policy 
arena, while ensuring that once engaged, all 
parties will have an equality of influence?  How 
can equality of influence be achieved or even 
measured in systems that do not provide a 
practical means for reaching decision?  Further, 
how do we achieve an equality of influence 
without suffering the inequalities inherent to 
systems that link influence to economic power 
(either through owning resources privately or 
through a competitive advantage in public policy-
making systems), without abandoning the 
efficiencies provided by market systems and the 
equality of opportunity potentially achievable 
through capitalism, or without disrespecting 
investments and traditions highly reliant upon 
maintaining private property systems?  If 
democracy means that everyone participates and 
every viewpoint prevails in the decision-making 
process, then the very survival of democracy 
depends upon our ability to reach consensus—a 
wonderful vision when achievable, but clearly not 
a realistic option in many situations.  And even if 
consensus can be reached, should we assume that 
the consensus decision is technically sound? 
 This set of issues can become overwhelming 
when applied to our natural resource agencies, 
who are expected to blend “impartial” science, 
public input, and considerations of the larger 
public good, all nested within legislative and 
administrative mandates, to produce sound policy 
outcomes on issues presumably too complex and 
specialized to handle through less formal means 
                                                        
101 Rescher (1993:4) argues that consensus is often 
an unrealistic goal of questionable merit:  “The fact 
is we live in an imperfect world.  The resources at 
our disposal are limited—our own intellectual 
resources included.  We have to be prepared for the 
fact that a consensus among people, be it global or 
local in scope, international or familial, is in general 
unattainable.  In a world of pervasive disagreement 
we must take recourse to damage control.  We must 
learn to live with dissensus—with pluralism in 
matters of opinion.  And we must and can bring to 
realization frameworks of social inclination that 
make collaboration possible despite diversity and 
that facilitate co-operation in the face of dissensus.” 
of self-government, and too vulnerable to abuse 
to be left to market approaches.  The practical 
logic of utilizing a technical elite has always been 
difficult to reconcile with the philosophical 
attraction of democracy, especially in subject 
matters such as natural resources which feature 
difficult issues with both technical and value 
dimensions.  John Stuart Mill, for example, while 
a strong proponent of direct democracy, 
identified representative democracy as a more 
practical means of concentrating knowledge and 
expertise in public policy-making, even arguing 
for graduated voting systems that gave the most 
enlightened parties the greatest voting strength 
(Mill, 1861).102  This form of representative 
democracy, a compromise between direct 
democracy and reliance upon a technical elite, 
would not likely have been persuasive with 
Jefferson, who made the timeless argument in 
favor of an educated populace: 
 
I know of no safe depository of the 
ultimate powers of the society but the 
people themselves; and if we think 
them not enlightened enough to exercise 
their control with a wholesome 
direction, the remedy is not to take it 
from them, but to inform their 
discretion by education.103  
 
 While the word “wholesome” probably 
indicates that Jefferson’s words were more about 
the potential for unjust rather than technically 
                                                        
102 Representative Government (1861).  Note that 
Mill does not advocate representative government 
over direct democracy due to the tyranny of the 
majority concern, but due to more practical 
considerations: “But since all cannot, in a 
community exceeding a single small town, 
participate personally in any but some very minor 
portions of the public business, it follows that the 
ideal type of a perfect government must be 
representative.”  Furthermore, his review of 
governance arrangements suggested that 
bureaucratic governments are best are concentrating 
technical skills on public problem-solving. 
103 Quote attributed to Thomas Jefferson, in a letter 
to William Charles Jarvis, 1821.  Cited in Cortner et 
al. (in press:34). 
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deficient citizen decision-making, this second 
issue deserves some attention, as it influences our 
notions about what forms of governance are 
democratic and which are not.  The belated 
recognition of the “social component” of 
scientific decision-making is particularly 
important, as the “reliance upon technical 
expertise has helped obscure responsibility for 
major social decisions, weakening the system of 
checks and balances” (Nelkin, 1977:12).  For 
example, commenting upon the impact of 
historical decisions on modern water institutions, 
Feldman (1991:54) writes: 
 
The failure of water law places 
extraordinary responsibility for 
implementing water policy in the hands 
of engineers.  Unfortunately, engineers 
are inadequately trained to address 
ethical issues in environmental 
management.  As a consequence, issues 
of equity, feasibility, transactions costs, 
noneconomic values, and public 
participation have been insufficiently 
incorporated in water policy.  The 
conferring of water rights upon a few 
groups and the placement of authority 
for policy in the hands of an 
engineering elite have produced a water 
policy both undemocratic and 
unresponsive to environmental 
concerns.  (Emphasis added.) 
 
 Deciding who should decide has never been 
an easy determination in the design of natural 
resource institutions.  True, while it is clearly 
inappropriate to concentrate value decisions in 
the hands of technical experts, or conversely, 
technical decisions in the hands of untrained 
citizens, the distinction between the two types of 
content is not always obvious.  As Lord 
(1984:653) observes, confusion between values 
and facts—i.e., between normative and positive 
opinions—is a serious and frequently common 
problem plaguing modern water resource 
institutions: 
 
Science and technology are concerned 
with facts and means, not with values 
and ends.  Ethics and politics are 
concerned with values and ends.  Bad 
water management often occurs when 
facts are confused with values, when 
means are confused with ends, and 
when technical judgments are made by 
citizens and politicians while value 
judgments are made by scientists and 
professionals. 
 
 Further complicating the distinction between 
technical decisions and broader policy issues has 
been a growing distrust of science and technology 
itself: 
 
Decisions once defined as technical are 
increasingly forced into the political 
arena by people who are skeptical 
about the value of technological 
progress, who perceive a gap between 
technological and human needs, or who 
mistrust the concentration of authority 
in bureaucracies responsible for 
technological change.  Policies 
concerning science and technology once 
based on the assumption that 
technology equals progress now involve 
difficult social choices.  (Nelkin, 
1977:10). 
 
 It is against this complex background—this 
swirling maelstrom of issues regarding 
democratic institutions of governance—that the 
environmental movement of the 1960’s and 
1970’s was nested, one element in a loose 
amalgam of social movements challenging 
fundamental issues of private rights, public 
powers, and societal responsibilities (Paehlke, 
1989).104  In the realm of natural resources and 
the environment, emerging programs for 
pollution control, species protection, project 
review, and public land management all reflected 
                                                        
104 Several ongoing social movements, generally 
thought of as discrete phenomenon, shared many 
similar tenets.  Of particular note are the social 
equity components of environmentalism, civil rights, 
feminism, and pacifism (e.g., anti-Vietnam War 
protests) (Paehlke, 1989).   
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prevailing normative ideas of the era.  Of 
particular note was the expressed preference in 
favor of regulatory, rather than market-based 
processes; the desire to nest scientific expertise 
within democratic decision-making processes 
stressing citizen participation; the gradual 
expansion of state and local governmental roles 
in implementing programs with federal origins; 
and the empowerment of disenfranchised interests 
through litigation opportunities, arising in part 
from relaxed rules of standing and the 
proliferation of class action lawsuits.  The result 
has been heavily formalized procedures of 
decision-making and conflict resolution, 
exhibiting qualities of both participatory and 
representative democracy, as well as decision-
making by interest groups and technical elites.  
The result has also been gridlock, a situation 
where the distribution of power is sufficiently 
diverse and conflict sufficiently prevalent to 
impede most decision-making. 
 A theme common to many of these 
normative ideas is the idea that agencies cannot 
be trusted to exercise discretion, a criticism 
emerging in part from growing public 
unwillingness in the Second Republic to tolerate 
the frequent inability of technocratic decision-
makers to resist the influence of special interests 
and the prostitution of scientific expertise.  One 
expression of this changing perception, 
fundamentally different than that of the 
Progressive Conservation era, has been to expect 
more and more from our technical bureaucracies, 
all while curtailing their independence through 
judicial mechanisms.  As Holland (1996:180) 
observes: 
 
To a greater extent than in any other 
country, environmental policies in the 
United States are shaped by the 
judiciary.  Beset by crowded calendars 
and adverse to controversy, Congress 
has delegated more and more legislative 
power over the environment to 
regulatory agencies.  Administrators, in 
turn, have found their discretion 
hemmed in at every turn by the federal 
courts.  Members of public interest 
advocacy groups, disillusioned with 
what they regard as a legislature overly 
sensitive to special interest lobbying 
and administrative agencies captured 
by the interests they were intended to 
regulate, have turned to the federal 
judiciary, the institution least 
responsive to special interests and 
public participation.  
 
 In addition to reflecting a growing distrust 
of technical decision-makers and science itself 
(especially when nested within pluralist systems), 
the rise of judicial involvement also reflects a 
refocus on the value of public participation and 
direct democracy.  Many scholars over time have 
tackled the difficult question of determining 
which factors result in successful and vibrant 
democracies (Berman, 1997).  A generation ago, 
much of the research focused on economic, 
political, or institutional factors.  In recent years, 
however, societal and cultural variables are often 
cited as most salient.  These arguments are often 
associated with the Neo-Tocquevillians, who 
assert that civic activity (e.g., direct citizen 
participation in the public arena) is the key to 
strong democracies (Putnam, 1993).105  Many 
scholars have argued in favor of greater citizen 
involvement in the policy-making process using a 
variety of rationales.  Whether writing under the 
auspices of modern political theory (Pateman, 
1970; Thompson, 1970), critical theory 
(Habermas, 1984), postpositivism (deLeon, 
1997), or some other perspective, most 
arguments in favor of greater citizen involvement 
either rest on a normative belief that citizen 
involvement is an inherently worthy component 
of democratic process, and/or a belief that such 
involvement is needed to achieve substantively 
accurate or socially legitimate policies. 
A fundamentally different, and troubling, 
perspective is provided by Sheri Berman (1997), 
who concludes that to understand whether or not 
civic activity will have a positive or negative 
                                                        
105 In many respects, the Neo-Tocquevillians are 
retracing arguments used several decades ago by the 
so-called “mass society” theorists concerned with 
barbarism in Europe during the interwar years 
(Berman, 1997). 
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impact on strengthening democratic institutions 
depends upon the political context in which the 
civic activity occurs.  If that activity occurs out 
of frustration with existing institutional 
arrangements for governance and problem-
solving, then the impacts of “associationism” 
may not be to strengthen or improve democratic 
society, but to undermine it: 
 
If a country’s political institutions are 
capable of channeling and redressing 
grievances, then associationism will 
probably buttress political stability and 
democracy by placing its resources and 
beneficial effects in the service of the 
status quo.  This is the pattern 
Tocqueville ([1968]) described. 
If, on the other hand, political 
institutions are weak and/or the 
existing political regime is perceived to 
be ineffectual and illegitimate, then 
civil society activity may become an 
alternative to politics for dissatisfied 
citizens, increasingly absorbing their 
energies and satisfying their basic 
needs.  In such situations, 
associationism will probably undermine 
political stability and have negative 
consequences for democracy by 
deepening cleavages, furthering 
dissatisfaction, and providing rich soil 
for oppositional movements.  A 
flourishing civil society under these 
circumstances signals governmental 
and institutional failure and bodes ill 
for political stability and democracy. 
(Berman, 1997:569-570). 
 
Certainly, these ideas are not universally 
held, and to extrapolate these conclusions to the 
special situation of collaborative groups, or more 
specifically, western watershed initiatives, is 
clearly a reach.  However, it is also clearly a 
reach to assume that the recent popularity of the 
community/collaborative model of resource 
management and problem-solving is not without 
potential limitations or even risks.  If the 
proliferation of collaborative groups is more a 
sign of sickness than health in our democratic 
institutions,106 then civic environmentalism may 
be better characterized as a symptom than a 
cure—an embarrassing point of confusion with 
potentially significant ramifications. 
 Ultimately, when faced with a competing 
mix of ideas and philosophies about our 
democratic institutions, it may be worth returning 
to some of the general ideas of performance-
based management (PBM) introduced earlier, and 
the idea that good arrangements are simply those 
which help us to achieve those outcomes we 
deem as valuable.  To ascribe a special social 
value to consensus-based processes—to call them 
democratic—is certainly merited when those 
processes can provide both procedural and 
substantive outcomes consistent with societal 
norms.  But what if achieving one of these goals 
is only made possible by sacrificing the other?  
Kraft (1990:105) sees this situation as a real 
dilemma:   
 
For environmental as well as other 
issues, the policy dilemma associated 
with gridlock derives from the tension 
between two competing expectations 
for the policy process.  One emphasizes 
prompt and rational problem solving; 
the other stresses representation of 
pertinent interests and policy 
legitimization.  
 
For others, like Coglianese (1999:11-12), the 
choice is clear, as evident in his warnings to 
public resource managers about consensus-based 
processes: 
 
An additional risk with growing calls 
for consensus-building is that public 
managers will begin to pursue 
consensus for its own sake.  They may 
commit themselves to time-consuming 
processes on tractable issues when the 
same resources would be better used 
for outreach or analysis on less 
tractable, but more important, issues.  
                                                        
106 Public confidence in American political 
institutions has been steadily declining since the 
1960s (Lipset, 1995). 
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They may come to rely on stakeholder 
processes as their sole measure of good 
public policy, even though these 
processes can almost never be fully 
representative and can face constraints 
from group dynamics.  They may also 
find themselves caught up in the inertia 
of negotiations even when they doubt, 
or should doubt, that the resulting 
agreement will meet the proper legal 
standards and serve the public interest.  
Rather than conflict as the problem and 
consensus as the solution, public 
managers should instead focus squarely 
on the substantive problems facing the 
environment and regulated firms.  They 
should decide when and how to engage 
in public dialogue based foremost on 
what will serve the overall public 
interest, not on what will lead to a 
consensus among those inside the 
policy loop.107  
 
The Current Agenda for Democratic Reform 
 It is against this backdrop that our 
institutions for governance evolve, with each era 
of reform featuring a redefinition of democracy 
prompted by the perceived deficiencies of the 
preceding era.  Currently, we appear to be 
embarking on a refinement of norms adopted 
during the modern environmental movement.  
While many of the reforms of the environmental 
movement addressed troubling equity issues, 
others have emerged, and perhaps of more 
political salience, concerns over decision-making 
inefficiency have become increasingly common.  
Many parties, as Cortner et al. (in press:35) 
observe, see the modern form of natural 
resources federalism as yielding only a “federal 
behemoth, interest-group polarization, and 
gridlock.”  In a more general context, Howard 
(1994) has lamented The Death of Common 
Sense in American governance, while Osborne 
and Gaebler’s (1992) seminal work on 
                                                        
107 Many authors argue that agencies embrace 
collaborative processes primarily as a means of 
“passing the buck” on difficult issues (e.g., Coggins, 
1999). 
Reinventing Government paved the way for 
comprehensive governmental reform programs 
such as the National Performance Review.  Thus, 
it is not surprising that most of the dominant 
features of the emerging “era of alternative 
problem-solving” feature procedural reforms 
presumably designed to increase decision-making 
efficiency and pragmatism.  Preferred strategies 
in this era tend to be those that are ad hoc rather 
than formal, collaborative rather than 
confrontational, decentralized rather than 
centralized, and that take advantage of market 
efficiencies and private-sector involvement.  The 
value of “local knowledge” has been elevated; 
similarly, the credibility of technocratic managers 
and outside interest groups are both viewed with 
skepticism.  Jeffersonian democracy is again in 
vogue—arguably more popular today than in 
Jefferson’s time—a trend described by John 
(1994) in the aptly named book Civic 
Environmentalism.108   
 What is perhaps most interesting in this 
review of changing democratic norms is how the 
same issues keep resurfacing in different forms.  
Of particular salience is the issue of “who 
decides,” a question currently being played out in 
the context of the word community.  Drawing on 
notions of fairness and respect, a convincing 
argument has been made that communities should 
be more involved in natural resources decision-
making.109  But which communities are we 
talking about?  This is a deceptively complex 
                                                        
108 John (1994) is among those authors that have 
documented this emerging transformation away from 
a mode of "interest group governance" to one of 
"civic governance," the former featuring a 
substantively narrow and geographically uniform 
focus compared to the substantively broad and 
geographically situational focus of civic governance. 
109 For example, reflecting on her tenure in the 
Interior Department, Betsy Rieke (1997:39) 
remarked: “I believe that it’s important to try to get 
the consent of the governed to natural resource 
decisions.  That doesn’t mean that if you can’t do so 
you don’t go forward. But it is very important to 
strive to get the consent of the governed to important 
decisions that have major impacts on their lifestyle, 
on their occupation, on their ability to continue to 
graze, or to farm, or to mine, or whatever.” 
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question, as Duane (1999:772-773) has 
observed: 
 
But what do we mean when we use the 
term "community"?  There are at least 
three types of communities that must 
be considered in ecosystem 
management, and they sometimes 
overlap and/or conflict: 1) communities 
of place, which are tied to a physical 
space through geography; 2) 
communities of identity, which are tied 
to each other through social 
characteristics but may transcend 
place; and, 3) communities of interest, 
which may have commonalties in how 
they relate to a particular ecosystem or 
resource as beneficiaries of that place 
or contributors to its condition.  …  [A] 
privileged position for communities of 
place may conflict with existing 
arrangements that may favor particular 
communities of interest.  There is 
consequently a need to reconcile 
communities of interest with 
communities of place in ecosystem 
management in order to address the full 
range of human concerns.  This is 
fundamentally a political challenge for 
democracy, not a technical challenge 
for resource "managers," and we must 
address it as such.  
 
 Typically, the reformers—as Duane 
acknowledges—are talking about empowering 
communities of place.  But is this needed, and 
does this help fulfill the promise of democracy?  
Blumberg (1999:91) is among those who are 
unconvinced: 
 
Rather than the “timber wars,” the 
current state of public lands policy 
might be better characterized as “the 
jargon wars.”  Sure, everybody loves 
the notion of more public involvement, 
more responsive public agencies, and 
adversaries putting aside their 
differences.  How can anyone not 
praise processes that reduce tension 
and promote social harmony, especially 
in small, rural communities?  Dialogue 
is good, but that does not justify 
replacing the existing public 
participation process with local control 
of federal resources. 
 
Also speaking about forest management, 
McCloskey (1999:625) approaches the issue 
from a somewhat different perspective, 
suggesting that local empowerment is a poor 
solution to a non-existent problem: 
 
[L]ocal communities already have a 
larger voice [than larger communities 
of interest] in debates over national 
forests.  Lawmakers customarily defer 
to the views of the Congressperson 
from the district involved; and business 
interests in such communities long ago 
captured predominant influence over 
the management of federal grazing 
lands and state lands. 
 
If this is true, why then is it nearly impossible to 
take a breath of western air or a drink of western 
water without hearing laments of federal 
paternalism, and without being aware of the 
stirrings of new “Sagebrush Rebellions” (e.g., the 
Wise Use, County Supremacy, and privatization 
movements) all purporting to return decision-
making to local interests?   Additionally, how can 
we even claim to know what a further 
empowerment of local interests would mean for 
natural resources.110  Unlike previous eras, the 
latest population boom in the West is not being 
                                                        
110 Additionally, there is some evidence to suggest 
that efforts to empower local collaborative groups 
may do so at the expense of disempowering local 
governments.  For example, Paulson and 
Chamberlein’s (1998:9) survey of collaborative 
groups yielded the following observation: 
“Collaborative groups were perceived by some local 
officials to be given more credence than local 
government by important non-local policy-makers.  
There was a perception among several local officials 
that many of the issues dealt with in the 
collaborative context were redundant of their 
responsibility of the local governing board.”   
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driven by ranchers, miners, loggers, or other 
members of the extractive industries; to the 
contrary, environmental amenities such as 
outdoor recreation opportunities, unspoiled 
viewsheds, and low pollution are largely driving 
the demographic transformation of the region 
(Power, 1996).    
 These and related observations lead to only 
one readily defendable conclusion: Whether or 
not the currently evolving form of decision-
making and problem-solving proves to be good or 
bad for natural resources is still an open and 
important research question. Also important is 
whether or not it constitutes an “appropriate” 
approach to federalism and governance.111  
Regrettably, these are questions that society is 
not pausing to consider.  As Weber (1998:xvii) 
observes: 
 
[W]e may not like, or we may 
rightfully fear, the burgeoning use of 
alternative institutional arrangements 
that potentially threaten cherished 
ideals of liberal democracy, increase 
the risk of agency capture and special-
interest government, or place citizen 
input on a seeming par with policy 
mandates from elected officials.  But, 
whether we like it or not, policy makers 
and administrators are not waiting on 
scholars to decide whether such 





                                                        
111 If history is our teacher, than we must expect that 
dominant normative ideas regarding appropriate 
processes for natural resources management and 
problem-solving will continue to change as the 






 It is difficult to travel far into the literature 
of the western watershed movement without 
hearing that it is a marriage of Jeffersonian 
democracy and John Wesley Powell’s vision of 
watershed-scale governance institutions (Kenney, 
1999b).  Given this historically-grounded 
ideological background, it can be argued that the 
arrangements under development are not entirely 
novel or unproven.  To a point that is true.  
Local-level collaboration on natural resource 
matters is certainly not new to the region, as 
evidenced by community-based irrigation 
systems, agricultural coops, conservation 
districts (and associated planning processes; e.g., 
CRMPs), and by the tangential involvement in 
natural resources of many other types of 
business, civic, religious, and cultural 
associations.  However, Jeffersonian democracy 
did not prevail in the Constitutional 
Convention—Madison’s ideas of representative 
democracy proved more persuasive; and Powell’s 
ideas of local “hydrographic democracies” faired 
even worse, giving way to the private rights 
tenets of prior appropriation and federal 
involvement in water development and 
management via the reclamation program.  Thus, 
while many of the ideas currently in favor have a 
long history, it is often not a history of on-the-
ground experimentation.  As Press (1994:137) 
has observed, “This country has never truly 
tested participatory democracy in environmental 
dilemmas.”  Additionally, to the extent that past 
experimentation has occurred, it is difficult to 
assess the relevance of those efforts, given that 
the modern western watersheds movement is 
taking place in an era of startling change in terms 
of demographics, ideologies, and norms about 
good government and democracy (WWPRAC, 
1998).   
We should be careful, therefore, to not 
blindly lament the demise of all public 
institutions and to nostalgically reflect back to an 
unblemished and utopian past.  The reality is that 
in natural resources—as in all policy areas—we 
continue to muddle along, and in recent decades, 
our muddling has produced both successes and 
failures, just as it always has.  Using an on-the-
ground measure of success, it is difficult to 
conclude with any certainty that the existing 
system is hopelessly broken; nor is the system—
actually a complex maze of many systems—an 
unqualified success.  Clearly, many policies have 
very real shortcomings; yet, several of the 
accomplishments of recent decades are nothing 
short of astounding.  The failure to effectively 
address nonpoint source water pollution, for 
example, can be countered with success stories of 
point source regulation. Failures to limit carbon 
dioxide emissions do not invalidate the 
considerable national success in reducing lead 
emissions and the international success in 
reducing CFC discharges.  And the generally 
disappointing track record of the Endangered 
Species Act should not invalidate recent efforts in 
habitat protection and restoration, such as state 
instream flow programs, experimental flood 
releases from Glen Canyon Dam, and ongoing 
ecosystem recovery programs in the Everglades, 
Chesapeake Bay, California Bay-Delta, and the 
South Platte Basin.  More generally, modern 
problems of decision-making inefficiency and 
“gridlock” are largely offset by, and are 
somewhat a product of, previous reforms that 
have partially remedied the tremendous equity 
deficiencies associated with historically closed 
systems of resources governance and problem-
solving. 
 In an era and culture where “sound bites” 
and bumper stickers have replaced essays and 
debates as the dominant means of policy 
discourse, and where the lines between dogma 
and science have become painfully obscure, we 
have been conditioned to define both problems 
and solutions simply.  In the context of 
governance arrangements for ecological 
restoration and management, this approach might 
be appropriate if western communities were 
homogeneous and stable in terms of values, 
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economies, populations, and political ideologies; 
if demands on resources were fixed; if 
intergovernmental relationships were not a source 
of friction and debate; if questions of private 
rights and public responsibilities were non-
existent; and if the roles of scientific and public 
decision-makers were clearly defined.  However, 
this is clearly not the case.  Nor is it the case that 
all parties active in these issues share similar 
skills, resources, or interests.  
 Consequently, it is naï ve to think that 
collaborative processes will emerge as a simple 
and effective solution to the full range of resource 
management and governance deficiencies.  
Similarly, it is equally naï ve to think that these 
processes are without merit and pragmatic 
application.  As Brick (1998:34) argues: 
 
[J]ust because local collaborative 
conservation efforts can’t solve all our 
problems does not mean that they can’t 
begin to address some of them.  
Similarly, just because reliance on 
national activism and law is no panacea 
does not imply that it is not 
indispensable. 
 
Similar wisdom is offered by Bingham (1997:4): 
 
In the legitimate search for alternatives 
to improve our capacity to resolve 
complex issues, we should not make 
the mistake of assuming that existing 
tools should be disregarded.  If 
something must be “alternative” to be 
worthwhile, we will miss the value in 
what we are already doing right. 
 
 
The Next Step Forward 
 
 This study admittedly does not provide a 
definitive assessment of the merits of western 
watershed initiatives and similar collaborative 
efforts, nor does it provide the final word on any 
of the “salient research questions” discussed in 
some detail in the text.  As a practical matter, 
answering those questions must be viewed as a 
long-term goal, even though a short-term need for 
this information already exists.  Additionally, the 
text pays more attention to the arguments of the 
skeptics than the proponents, a deliberate (and 
readily acknowledged) approach utilized to 
address a strong under-representation of 
dissenting viewpoints in much of the available 
literature on natural resources governance and 
problem-solving.  Despite these limitations, there 
is sufficient wisdom in the preceding pages to 
reinforce two longstanding conclusions 
articulated in earlier publications of the Natural 
Resources Law Center:112 
  
♦ (1) Guarded Optimism.  Most western 
watershed initiatives and similar 
collaborative efforts are promising and 
exciting, but still largely incomplete, 
experiments, and should therefore be treated 
by policy-makers with “guarded optimism.”  
This conclusion primarily reflects the youth 
of most efforts, the lack of scholarly review, 
and the on-the-surface legitimacy of concerns 
raised by an apparently growing cadre of 
skeptics.113  Reforms that modify the “who” 
and “how” of decision-making can have 
extremely broad and lasting implications, and 
should not be pursued without considerable 
deliberation and reflection, and without 
assuring adequate fallback measures. 
  Existing research suggests that many of 
the qualities ascribed to alternative problem-
solving approaches, including processes 
reliant on collaborative decision-making, are 
not likely in practice to consistently achieve 
the lofty goals assumed by some proponents.  
Under certain circumstances, we should 
expect collaborative approaches to lead to 
successful outcomes; in other situations we 
should expect the opposite.  Unfortunately, 
                                                        
112 In particular, see Kenney (1997) and NRLC 
(1998).   
113 While difficult, if not impossible, to document 
empirically, it has been the experience of the author 
that skeptics of collaborative efforts have rapidly 
proliferated in the past 3 years, and/or these skeptics 
have become more aggressive in asserting their 
concerns. 
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many parties involved in the policy debate do 
not appear to be fully cognizant of this fact, 
and the research community has generally 
not been highly successful in providing 
useful guidelines for distinguishing among 
these two types of situations.  Until this 
deficiency is rectified, caution should be a 
guiding principle. 
 
♦ (2) Scholarly Critiques.  Reform efforts 
should be designed and implemented 
strategically, aimed at addressing agreed-
upon problems and subject to critical review 
and periodic assessment.114  Learning 
through experimentation is a legitimate 
means of identifying improved institutional 
arrangements only to the extent that these 
“experiments” are faithful to the scientific 
construction of experimentation—namely, 
that issues and assumptions are well defined, 
that information is collected and analyzed in 
a credible manner to test those assumptions, 
that measurable results are explicitly used to 
shape conclusions, and that peer review is 
used to validate results.   
  It is important to remember, however, 
that normative issues are at the core of many 
debates.  Often, these issues are not readily 
amenable to resolution through 
experimentation, but can be assessed only in 
part through focused inquiries. 
 
 
Epilogue:  Skeptics are People Too 
 
It is unfortunate and more than a little ironic 
that the skeptics of collaborative processes are 
frequently isolated from the proponents, both in 
terms of on-the-ground experiments and in policy 
discussions.  For example, consider the 
involvement of environmentalists (the most 
common source of skepticism) in many notable 
                                                        
114 Arguably, assessments of this nature may not be 
justified, unless welcomed by participants, for 
activities undertaken without public funding and 
focused solely on resources in private ownership.  
These conditions are rarely satisfied, however, in the 
types of efforts discussed in this research. 
collaborative processes.  Ongoing survey 
research by the Natural Resources Law Center 
suggests that about half of the watershed 
initiatives in the Interior West do not include 
environmental representatives; furthermore, in 
about two-fifths of those groups, membership is 
not completely open.115  At a policy level, many 
environ-mentalists have also complained about 
being excluded from the drafting of the Enlibra 
principles.116  Exclusion of dissenting parties has 
also been a frequent criticism of the Quincy 
Library Group117, the best-known of the 
community forestry groups in the West, as have 
questions about the “collaborative” nature of 
internal decision-making in the effort.118  This is 
not to suggest that the absence of dissenting 
voices is often a deliberate practice; to the 
contrary, the absence of many skeptics is often 
not due to a lack of an invitation, but may reflect 
other factors: e.g., a lack of resources (to cover 
travel and time expenses), a lack of faith in the 
process, or the belief that other processes offer 
more bang-for-the-buck.119 It is worthwhile to 
explore the reasons behind missing parties, 
particularly if you accept the common tenet of 
                                                        
115 This is highly preliminary survey results of 
approximately 50 groups.  Final results will be 
published as part of the revised Watershed Source 
Book. 
116 Various personal communications with 
environmental activists. 
117 In congressional testimony regarding proposed 
legislation to enact the Quincy Library Group’s 
forest plan, Blumberg (1997:3-4) observes that the 
alleged consensus product is “opposed by every 
environmental group that works on forest protection 
issues in the state of California.”   
118 Speaking about the Quincy Library Group, 
founding member Michael Jackson observes: “We 
started out as a collaborative process but [we’re not 
anymore]—now we’re a consensus-acquiescence 
process . . . we intimidate the hell out of each other.” 
(Cited in Duane, 1997 at page 795.) 
119 In an attempt to secure participation of all 
interests, the Applegate Partnership has offered to 
cover travel expenses of any willing environmental 
representative.  Thus far, they have had no takers.  
(Personal communication with Jack Shipley, October 
8, 1999.) 
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consensus-building that suggests all concerned 
parties need to be at the decision-making table. 
 The frequent subordination of dissenting 
opinions regarding collaborative processes is 
easily understood, as it can be hard to imagine a 
reasonable party objecting to the goals of 
consensus-based processes—a point articulated 
by Rescher (1993:157-158): 
 
To be sure, the widely favoured 
allocation of a pride of place to 
consensus sounds benevolent, irenic, 
and socially delectable.  Indeed, it may 
sound so plausible at first hearing that 
it is difficult to see how a person of 
reasonableness and goodwill could fail 
to go along.  
 
Yet, many reasonable people are concerned, as 
discussed in the previous pages.  Many of those 
skeptics are far from irrational or 
uncompromising, but are simply seeking more 
sidebars and protections—i.e., more caution—in 
the use of processes which are frequently ad hoc 
and unstructured.   
 It is useful to conclude by revisiting the 
statements of some of the more outspoken 
skeptics: namely, Louis Blumberg of The 
Wilderness Society; Jim Britell, environmental 
activist and consultant; George Cameron 
Coggins, noted legal scholar; Reed Benson of 
Oregon WaterWatch; and the Dean of the 
skeptics, Michael McCloskey of the Sierra Club.  
The positions they articulate regarding 
collaborative processes should not be an affront 
to the proponents, but should serve as a jumping-
off point in a thoughtful debate.  For example, 
few proponents should take exception to the 
tempered remarks of Blumberg (1997:2) and his 
simple plea for adequate representation of all 
interests: 
 
Collaborative efforts can play a 
constructive role if all stakeholders and 
interests are represented.  They can be 
helpful by generating dialogue and 
fostering greater education about 
environmental issues and the state of 
the local environment.  People who 
understand the importance of a healthy 
ecosystem to a healthy economy are 
more likely to work to protect both.  
These processes can also decrease 
polarization and promote social 
harmony in local communities, and 
may achieve agreements about what 
should happen on the ground. 
 
Equally reflective are the words of Jim Britell120, 
commenting on the Quincy Library Group model: 
 
I am not opposed to local consensus 
processes per se; for certain kinds of 
problems where public assets are not 
on the table and the parties do not have 
large financial interests, they can be 
extremely productive.  But I am 
concerned that we are moving headlong 
into adopting unproven new processes 
that will make long term decisions 
about the future of our public assets 
without thinking them through and 
before thoroughly testing them; and I 
am especially concerned that forest 
activists are not well prepared to take 
on this new role of protecting the 
public interest by serving as the 
public’s representative and advocate on 
such groups.   
 
Even George Cameron Coggins (1999:603), 
the self-professed curmudgeon, sees a 
potential role for these processes, while 
raising strong concerns about the devolution 
of public responsibilities:   
Collaboration, consensus, civility, 
cooperation, and community of course 
are not bad attributes or characteristics 
in themselves.  They are entirely 
appropriate for resolving local issues 
over use of private property. 
Confrontation, controversy, and 
                                                        
120 Taken from the article “Partnerships, 
Roundtables and Quincy-Type Groups Are Bad Ideas 
That Cannot Resolve Environmental Conflicts,” 
accessed June 3, 1999 at 
www.britell.com/text/tuse10.html. 
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litigation usually are best avoided. 
Consensual transactions, such as 
Nature Conservancy land purchases, 
serve many public and private values.  
But national lands are not private 
lands, and allocation of national 
resources is not a local issue.  
Ownership does matter. When the 
subject is every American's natural 
heritage, devolved local 
collaborationism is entirely 
inappropriate.  
 
Commenting on western watershed initiatives, 
Reed Benson (1998:267), speaking on behalf of 
many in the environmental community121, 
identifies a still broader range of concerns, but 
returns back to a stance that is clearly 
reasonable: 
 
Within the environmental community, a 
wide range of opinions exists on these 
voluntary local efforts. We can agree, 
however, on a few general points. First, 
as noted above, many of the most 
promising "cooperative" efforts began 
in response to regulatory action under 
federal law.  In many cases, continued 
application of federal laws seems 
necessary to focus and motivate these 
local efforts.  Second, while many of 
these efforts have shown progress in 
bringing people together, they have not 
yet demonstrated much success in 
actually restoring and protecting 
watershed health.  The federal 
government should be cautious in 
devoting its scarce resources to these 
efforts, at least until they show that 
they can effectively protect national 
(not just local) interests.  Third, the 
                                                        
121 Identified contributing authors include American 
Rivers, Colorado Environmental Coalition, Idaho 
Rivers United, Land and Water Fund of the Rockies, 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Pacific Rivers 
Council, Trout Unlimited, WaterWatch, National 
Audubon Society, Columbia/Pacific Institute, and the 
Environmental Defense Fund. 
federal government must ensure that 
national interests are protected even if 
voluntary local efforts do not succeed.  
There must be a clear course of action 
if these efforts fail to reach consensus 
or to meet resource protection goals. … 
 With those caveats, we do urge 
federal agencies to work with voluntary 
local groups as resources and laws 
permit. The agencies can help by 
identifying both the requirements and 
points of flexibility in applicable 
federal law, improving coordination, 
supplying data and technical expertise, 
and providing other assistance.  
 
Finally, Michael McCloskey (in Harmon, 
1998:1-2) offers a healthy challenge to 
proponents and researchers alike, based on the 
performance-based management (PBM) concept 
identified earlier: 
 
At this point the burden is on the 
promoters of [collaboration] to 
demonstrate that it can work; that it 
can be fair and involve all stakeholders, 
especially where broad issues are at 
stake; that it can respect agency 
legitimacy; that it can get beyond good 
feeling to produce management 
solutions; and that it can be worth the 
time it requires. 
 





ACIR (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations).  1972.  Multistate Regionalism.  Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
 
Amy, Douglas J.  1987.  The Politics of Environmental Mediation.  New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Amy, Douglas J.  1990.  “Environmental Dispute Resolution: The Promise and the Pitfalls.”  In:  Environmental 
Policy in the 1990s: Toward a New Agenda, pages 211-234.  Norman J. Vig and Michael E. Kraft (editors).  
Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. 
 
Anderson, Terry L. (editor).  1994.  Multiple Conflicts Over Multiple Uses.  Bozeman, Montana: Political 
Economy Research Center. 
 
Bacow, Lawrence S., and Michael Wheeler.  1984.  Environmental Dispute Resolution.  New York: Plenum Press. 
 
Baumol, William J., and Wallace E. Oates.  1988.  The Theory of Environmental Policy.  Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Benson, Reed D.  1998.  “Saying the Right Thing at the Wrong Time: A Conservationist Considers Water in the 
West.”  Rivers, 6(4):281-286. 
 
Berman, Sheri.  1997.  “Civil Society and Political Institutionalization.”  American Behavioral Scientist.  
40(5):562-574. 
 
Bingham, Gail.  1986.  Resolving Environmental Disputes: A Decade of Experience.  Washington, D.C.: 
Conservation Foundation. 
 
Bingham, Gail.  1997.  Seeking Solutions: Alternative Dispute Resolution and Western Water Issues.  Denver:  
Report to the Western Water Policy Review Advisory Commission.  
 
Blackburn, J. Walton.  1988.  “Environmental Mediation as an Alternative to Litigation.”  Policy Studies Journal, 
16(3):562-574. 
 
Blackburn, Walton J., and Willa Marie Bruce (editors).  1995.  Mediating Environmental Conflicts: Theory and 
Practice.  Westport, Connecticut: Quorum Books. 
 
Blumberg, Louis.  1997.  Statement of Louis Blumberg, Assistant Regional Director of The Wilderness Society, 
California/Nevada Office, Before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Subcommittee on 
Forests and Public Land Management, Workshop on Community Based Approaches in Conflict Resolution in 
Public Lands Management.  May 22.  
 
Blumberg, Louis.  1999.  “Preserving the Public Trust.”  Forum for Applied Research and Public Policy, 14(2):89-
93, Summer.   
 
Born, Stephen M., and Kenneth D. Genskow.  1999.  Exploring the “Watershed Approach”—Critical Dimensions 
of State-Local Partnerships.  Extension Report 99-1.  Madison: Department of Urban and Regional Planning, 
University of Wisconsin. 
 
Breckenridge, Lee P.  1999.  “Nonprofit Environmental Organizations and the Restructuring of Institutions for 
Ecosystem Management.”  Ecology Law Quarterly, 25(4):692-706. 
 65
 
Brick, Phil.  1998.  “Of Imposters, Optimists, and Kings.”  Chronicle of Community, 2(2):34-38, Winter. 
 
Bromley, Daniel W.  1992.  Making the Commons Work.  San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies. 
 
Burgess, Guy, and Heidi Burgess.  1995.  “Beyond the Limits: Dispute Resolution of Intractable Environmental 
Conflicts,” pages 101-119.  In:  Mediating Environmental Conflicts.  Walton J. Blackburn and Willa Marie Bruce, 
editors.  Connecticut: Quorum Books. 
 
Burgess, Guy, and Heidi Burgess.  1997.  Constructive Confrontation: A Strategy for Dealing with Intractable 
Environmental Conflicts.  Paper presented to the Conference on Environmental Conflict Resolution in the West; 
Udall Center, University of Arizona; March 20. 
 
Campos, Paul F.  1998.  Jurismania: The Madness of American Law.  New York: Oxford University Press.  
 
Carroll, Matthew S.  1995.  Community and the Northwest Logger.  Boulder: Westview Press. 
 
Carson, Rachel.  1962.  Silent Spring.  Boston: Houghton Miffilin. 
 
Case, Pamela, and Gregory Alward.  1997.   Patterns of Demographic, Economic and Value Change in the 
Western United States: Implications for Water Management.  Denver: Report to the Western Water Policy Review 
Advisory Commission.  
 
Cestero, Barb.  1999.  Beyond the Hundreth Meeting: A Field Guide to Collaborative Conservation on the West’s 
Public Lands.  Tucson: Sonoran Institute. 
 
Cheng, A.S., T.A. White, J.J. Hacker, and P.V. Ellefson.  1993.  Managing public forests in a shared-power world: 
The integration of conflict management principles into USDA-Forest Service planning and management.  
Published as Paper No. 20,820 of the miscellaneous journal series of the Minnesota Agricultural Research Station. 
 
Coggins, George Cameron.  1998.  “Of Californicators, Quislings, and Crazies: some perils of devolved 
collaboration.”  Chronicle of Community, 2(2):27-33, Winter. 
 
Coggins, George C.  1999.  “Regulating Federal Natural Resources: A Summary Case Against Devolved 
Collaboration.”  Ecology Law Quarterly, 25(4):602-610. 
 
Coglianese, Cary.  1997.  “Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking.”  Duke 
Law Journal, 46:1225-1348. 
 
Coglianese, Cary.  1999.  The Limits of Consensus.  Working Draft.  Cambridge:  John F. Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University. 
 
Cortner, Hanna J., and Margaret A. Moote.  1999.  The Politics of Ecosystem Management.  Washington, D.C.: 
Island Press. 
 
Cortner, H.J., S. Burns, L. R.Clark, W.H. Sanders, G. Townes, and M. Twarkins.  In press.  “Governance and 
Institutions: Opportunities and Challenges.”   In: Understanding Community Based Ecosystem Management in the 
United States.  G. Gray, M. Enzer, and J. Kusel (editors).  New York: Haworth Press. 
 
Coughlin, Christine W., Merrick L. Hoben, Dirk W. Manskopf, and Shannon W. Quesada.  1999.  A Systematic 
Assessment of Collaborative Resource Management Partnerships.  Masters Project.  Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan, School of Natural Resources and Environment. 
 
 66
Craig, Senator Larry E.  (R-ID).  1999.  “Down-home mediation solves conflicts.”  The Denver Post Online, 
October 31.  Available online at www.denverpost.com/. 
 
Culhane, Paul J.  1981.  Public Lands Politics.  Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future. 
 
Daniels, Steven E.  1993.  Public Participation in Natural Resources Management: Theoretical Considerations and 
Suggestions for Research.  Department of Forest Resources, Oregon State University.  
 
Davies, J. Clarence, and Jan Mazurek.  1997.  Regulating Pollution: Does the U.S. System Work?   Washington, 
D.C.: Resources for the Future. 
 
Davis, J.H., and V.B. Hinsz.  1982.  “Current research problems in group performance and group dynamics.”  In: 
Group Decision-Making, pages 1-20.  Edited by H. Brandstatter et al.  London: Academic Press.  
 
deLeon, Peter.  1997.   Democracy and the Policy Sciences.  Albany: State University of New York Press. 
 
Duane, Timothy P.  1999.  “Community Participation in Ecosystem Management.”  Ecology Law Quarterly, 
24:771-797. 
 
Easterbrook, Gregg.  1995.  A Moment on the Earth: The Coming Age of Environmental Optimism.  New York: 
Viking.. 
 
Ehrlich, Anne.  1996.  Betrayal of Science and Reason.  Washington, D.C.: Island Press.  
 
EPA (United States Environmental Protection Agency).  1996a.  Partnerships in Preventing Pollution.  EPA 100-
B-96-001, Spring.   Office of the Administrator. 
 
EPA (United States Environmental Protection Agency).  1996b.  Watershed Approach Framework.  EPA840-S-96-
001.  Washington, D.C.: EPA, Office of Water. 
 
EPA and USDA (United States Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. Department of Agriculture).  1998.  
Clean Water Action Plan: Restoring and Protecting America’s Rivers.  EPA-840-R-98-001.  Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office.  
 
Fairfield, Roy P. (editor).  1961.  The Federalist Papers.  Garden City, New York: Anchor Books. 
 
Falk, Gideon.  1982.  “An Empirical Study Measuring Conflicts in Problem-Solving Groups Which are Assigned 
Different Decision Rules.”  Human Relations, 35(12):1123-1138. 
 
Feldman, David Lewis.  1991.  Water Resources Management: In Search of An Environmental Ethic.  Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
Fisher, Roger W., and William Ury.  1981.  Getting to Yes.  Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 
 
Foley, M.W., and B. Edwards.  1996.  “The Paradox of Civil Society.”  Journal of Democracy, 7:38-52. 
 
Foss, Philip.  1960.  Politics and Grass.  Seattle: University of Washington Press. 
 
FWS (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service).  1994.   Recovery Program, Endangered and Threatened Species.  Report to 
Congress.  Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service.   
 
GAO (U.S. General Accounting Office).  1988.  Environmental Protection Agency: Protecting Human Health and 
the Environment through Improved Management. GAO/RCED-88-101, August. 
 
 67
GAO (U.S. General Accounting Office).  1997.  Managing For Results: Analytic Challenges in Measuring 
Performance.  GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-138, May. 
 
Graham, Keith.  1986.  The Battle of Democracy.  Totowa, New Jersey: Barnes & Noble Books. 
 
Gregg, Frank, Stephen M. Born, William B. Lord, and Marvin Waterstone.  1991.  Institutional Response to a 
Changing Water Policy Environment.  Tucson: University of Arizona, Water Resources Research Center. 
 
Goodsell, C.T.  1985.  The Case for Bureaucracy: A Public Administration Polemic.  Chatham, N.J.: Chatham 
House. 
 
GWEB (Governor’s Watershed Enhancement Board).  1999.   Program Status, 1995-1997.   Salem, Oregon.   
 
Habermas, Jurgen.  1984.  The Theory of Communicative Action I: Reason and Rationalization of Society.  
Boston: Beacon Press. 
 
Hardin, G.  1968.  “The Tragedy of the Commons.”  Science, 162:1243-1248, December 13. 
 
Harmon, Will.  1998.  “McCloskey on Collaboration – The Conversation Continues.”  The Compass, pages 1-2.  
Fall.   Publication of the Transboundary Initiative for Collaborative Problem-Solving. 
 
Hawkins, Keith, and John M. Thomas.  1984.  Enforcing Regulation.  Boston: Kluwer Nijhoff. 
 
Hays, Samuel P.  1959.  Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 
Heilbroner, Robert.  1980.  An Inquiry into the Human Prospect: Updated for the 1980s.  New York: Norton.  
 
Helmer, Olaf.  1983.  Looking Forward.  Beverly Hills: Sage Publications. 
 
Hockenstein, Jeremy B., Robert N. Stavins, and Bradley W. Whitehead.  1997.  “Crafting the Next Generation of 
Market-Based Environmental Tools.”  Environment, 39(4):12-33, May. 
 
Hoffman, Susan E.  1996.  “The dawn of watershed permitting.”  National Wetlands Newsletter, September-
October. 
 
Holland, Kenneth.  1996.  “The Role of the Courts in Making and Administration of Environmental Policy in the 
United States.”  In:  Federalism and the Environment, pages 159-183.  Kenneth M. Holland, F.L. Morton, and 
Brian Galligan (editors).  Westport: Greenwood Press. 
 
Holling, C.S.  1998.  “Two Cultures of Ecology.”  Conservation Ecology [online], 2(2):4.  Available online at 
www.consecol.org/vol2/iss2/art4. 
 
Holme, Howard (editor).  1994.  National Water Resources Regulation: Where is the Environmental Pendulum 
Now?  New York: American Society of Civil Engineers.  
 
Howard, P.K.  1994.  The Death of Common Sense.  New York: Warner Books. 
 
John, Dewitt.  1994.  Civic Environmentalism.  Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press. 
 
Kagan, Robert A.  1999.  “Trying to Have it Both Ways: Local Discretion, Central Control, and Adversarial 
Legalism in American Environmental Regulation.”  Ecology Law Quarterly, 25(4):718-732. 
 
Kagan, Robert A., and John T. Scholz.  1984.   “The ‘Criminology of the Corporation’ and Regulatory Strategies.”  
In: Enforcing Regulation, pages 67-86.  Keith Hawkins and John M. Thomas (editors).  Boston: Kluwer Nijhoff. 
 68
 
Kaufman, Herbert.  1967.  The Forest Ranger.  Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future. 
 
Kemmis, Daniel.  1990.  Community and the Politics of Place.  Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 
 
Kennedy, J.J., R.S. Krannich, T.M. Quigley, and L.A. Cramer.  1992.  How employees view the USDA-Forest 
Service value and reward system.  Career Development Project, College of Natural Resources and Agricultural 
Experiment Station, Utah State University, Logan, Utah. 
 
Kenney, Douglas S.  1997.  Resource Management at the Watershed Level.  Report to the Western Water Policy 
Review Advisory Commission.  Boulder: Natural Resources Law Center, University of Colorado School of Law. 
 
Kenney, Douglas S.  1998.  Values of the Federal Public Lands.  Boulder: Natural Resources Law Center, 
University of Colorado School of Law. 
 
Kenney, Douglas S.  1999a.  “Are Community-Based Watershed Groups Really Effective?:  Confronting the 
Thorny Issue of Measuring Success.”   Chronicle of Community, 3(2):33-38.  Publication of the Northern Lights 
Institute. 
 
Kenney, Douglas S.  1999b.  “Historical and Socioeconomic Context of the Western Watersheds Movement.”  
Journal of the American Water Resources Association, 35(3):493-503.  
 
Kenney, Douglas S., and William B. Lord.  1999.  Analysis of Institutional Innovation in the Natural Resources 
and Environmental Realm: The Emergence of Alternative Problem-Solving Strategies.  Boulder: Natural 
Resources Law Center, University of Colorado School of Law. 
 
Kerwin, Cornelis M., and Scott R. Furlong.  1992.  “Time and Rulemaking: An Empirical Test of Theory.”  2 
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 113.   
 
Kirchheim, Diana. 1999.  “The Endangered Species Act: Does ‘Endangered’ Refer to Species, Private Property 
Rights, the Act Itself, or all of the Above?”  Seattle University Law Review, 22:803. 
 
Kleiner, Carolyn.  1999.  “Wanted Peacemakers: A growing number of schools are teaching ‘alternative dispute 
resolution’.”  U.S. News Online, http://www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/beyond/grad/gbadr.htm.  (U.S. News Online 
is the online companion to U.S. News & World Report.)   
 
Knight, Richard L., and Gary K. Meffe.  1997.  “Ecosystem management: agency liberation from command and 
control.”  Wildlife Society Bulletin, 25(3):676-678. 
 
Kraft, Michael E.  1990.  “Searching for Consensus in Congress.”  In:  Environmental Policy in the 1990s: Toward 
a New Agenda, pages 103-124.  Norman J. Vig and Michael E. Kraft (editors).  Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. 
 
Lipset, S.M.  1995.   “Malaise and resiliency in America.”  Journal of Democracy, 6:4-18. 
 
Lord, William B.  1979.  “Conflict in Federal Water Resource Planning.”  Water Resources Bulletin, 15(5):1226-
1235. 
 
Lord, William B.  1984.  “Institutions and Technology: Keys to Better Water Management.”  Water Resources 
Bulletin, 20(5):651-656, October. 
 
Lowi, Theodore J.  1979.  The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States.  (Second edition.)  
New York: W.W. Norton & Company. 
 
 69
Luecke, Daniel F.  1999.  “An Environmental Perspective on Collaboration in Large Ecosystem Restoration 
Processes.”  Conference Notebook: Strategies in Western Water Law and Policy: Courts, Coercion and 
Collaboration, June 8-11, 1999.  Boulder: Natural Resources Law Center, University of Colorado School of Law. 
 
Lyden, F.J., B.W. Twight, and E.T. Tuchmann.  1990.  “Citizen Participation in Long-Range Planning: The RPA 
Experience.”  Natural Resources Journal, 30(1):123-138, Winter.  
 
Malthus, Thomas R.  1798.  An Essay on the Principle of Population.  London: J. Johnson.  
 
Mann, C., and M. Plummer. 1995.  Noah’s Choice: The Future of Endangered Species. New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf. 
 
Manring, Nancy J.  1998.  “Collaborative Resource Management.”  Administration and Society, 30(3):274-290, 
July.   
 
Mansbridge, J.  1980.  Beyond Adversarial Democracy.  New York: Basic Books. 
 
McCloskey, Michael.  1996.  “The skeptic: Collaboration has its limits.”  High Country News, 28(9):7, May 13.  
 
McCloskey, Michael.  1999.  “Local Communities and the Management of Public Forests.”  Ecology Law 
Quarterly, 25(4):624-629. 
 
McCool, Daniel.  1987.  Command of the Waters: Iron Triangles, Federal Water Development, and Indian Water.  
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
McKinney, Matthew.  1999.  “Governing Western Resources – A Confluence of Ideas.”  Rendezvous: The 
Humanities in Montana, 2(2):4-11. 
 
Mill, J.S.  1861.  Representative Government.  (In: The Great Book Series, 1952, Encyclopedia Britannica.  New 
York.) 
 
Mill, J.S.  1910.  Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative Government.  London: Dent. 
 
Mintz, Joel A.  1995.  Enforcement at the EPA: High Stakes and Hard Choices.  Austin: University of Texas Press. 
 
Morone, J.A.  1991.  The Democratic Wish:  Popular Participation and the Limits of American Government.  New 
York: Basic Books. 
 
Moscovici, Serge, and Willem Doise.  1994.  Conflict and Consensus.  London: Sage Publications. 
 
Moscovici, S. and M. Zavalloni.  1969.  “The group as a polarizer of attitudes.”  Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 12:125-135. 
 
NAPA (National Academy of Public Administration).  1997.  Resolving the Paradox of Environmental Protection: 
An Agenda for Congress, EPA, and the States.  Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Public Administration. 
 
Nelkin, Dorothy.  1977.  Technological Decisions and Democracy.  Beverly Hills: Sage Publications. 
 
Newton, Kenneth.  1997.  “Social Capital and Democracy.”  American Behavioral Scientist, 40(5):575-586, 
March/April. 
 
Nickelsburg, Stephen M.  1998.  “Mere Volunteers?  The Promise and Limits of Community-Based Environmental 
Protection.”  Virginia Law Review, 84:1371-1409, October. 
 
 70
NPR (National Performance Review).  1993.  Improving Regulatory Systems.  Accompanying Report of the 
National Performance Review. Office of the Vice President.  Washington, D.C. 
 
NPR (National Performance Review).  1996.  The Best Kept Secrets in Government.  Office of Vice President Al 
Gore.  September.  Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
 
NRCS (Natural Resources Conservation Service).  1996.   A Geography of Hope.  Program Aid 1548.  
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Agriculture.  
 
NRLC (Natural Resources Law Center).  1996.  The Watershed Source Book.  Boulder: Natural Resources Law 
Center, University of Colorado School of Law. 
 
NRLC (Natural Resources Law Center).  1998.  The State Role in Western Watershed Initiatives.  Boulder:  
Natural Resources Law Center, University of Colorado School of Law.   
 
NWF and NRDC (National Wildlife Federation and Natural Resources Defense Council).  1989.  Our Ailing 
Public Rangelands: Still Ailing!  Condition Report.  Prepared jointly by Johanna Wald and David Alberswerth.   
 
Olinger, Todd M.  1998.  “Public Rangeland Reform: New Prospects for Collaboration and Local Control Using 
the Resource Advisory Councils.”  University of Colorado Law Review, 69(2):633-692, Spring. 
 
Olson, Mancur.  1965.  The Logic of Collective Action.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 
Ophuls, Williams.  1977.  Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity.  San Francisco: W.H. Freeman. 
 
Orr, D.W.  1992.  Ecological Literacy: Education and the Transition to a Postmodern World.  Albany, N.Y.: 
SUNY Press.  
 
Osborne, David, and Ted Gaebler.  1992.  Reinventing Government.  Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing 
Company.   
 
Ostrom, Elinor.  1990.  Governing the Commons.  New York: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Paehlke, Robert C.  1989.  Environmentalism and the Future of Progressive Politics.  New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 
 
Paehlke, Robert C.  1990.  “Environmental Values and Democracy: The Challenge of the Next Century.”  In:  
Environmental Policy in the 1990s: Toward a New Agenda, pages 349-368.  Norman J. Vig and Michael E. Kraft 
(editors).  Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. 
 
Passmore, J.  1974.  Man’s Responsibility for Nature.  New York: Scribner’s. 
 
Pateman, C.  1970.  Participation and Democratic Theory.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Paulson, Deborah D., and Katherine M. Chamberlin.  1998.  Guidelines and Issues to Consider in Planning a 
Collaborative Process.  Laramie: Institute for Environment and Natural Resources, University of Wyoming. 
 
Pendley, William Perry.  1995.  War on the West: Government Tyranny on America’s Great Frontier.  
Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, Inc. 
 
Pinchot, Gifford.  1947.  Breaking New Ground.  Washington, D.C.: Island Press. 
 




Power, Thomas Michael.  1996.  Lost Landscapes and Failed Economies.  Washington, D.C.: Island Press. 
 
Press, Daniel.  1994.  Democratic Dilemmas in the Age of Ecology.  Durham: Duke University Press.   
 
Putnam, R.D.  1993.  Making Democracy Work.  Princeton: Princeton University Press.   
 
Ray, Dixie Lee, and Lou Guzzo.  1990.  Thrashing the Planet.  Washington, D.C.: Regnery Gateway. 
 
Rescher, Nicholas.  1993.  Pluralism: Against the Demand for Consensus.  Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
 
Reisner, Marc.  1986.  Cadillac Desert.  New York: Viking Penguin.   
 
Reike, Betsy.  1997.  “A Conservation with Betsy Rieke.”  Chronicle of Community, 1(2):36-40, Winter. 
 
Rosenbaum, W.A.  1995.  Environmental Politics and Policy.  Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.  
 
Roush, Jon.  1995.  “Freedom and Responsibility: What We Can Learn from the Wise Use Movement,” pages 1-10.  
In: Let the People Judge: Wise Use and the Property Movement, John Echeverria and Ray Booth Eby (editors).  
Washington, D.C.: Island Press. 
 
Sabatier, P.  1988.  “An Advocacy  Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the Role of Policy-oriented 
Learning Therein.”  Policy Sciences, 21:129-168. 
 
Sale, K.  1991.  Dwellers in the Land: The Bioregional Vision.  Philadelphia: New Society Publishers. 
 
Sax, Joseph L.  1970.  Defending the Environment: A Handbook for Citizen Action.  New York:  Vintage Books.     
 
Schechter, Mordechai.  1998.  “Economy and the Environment: A New Partnership.”  Israel Environment Bulletin, 
21(2):10-11, Spring. 
 
Senate Hearing (Hearing of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs).  1996.  Improving Management and 
Organization in Federal Natural Resources and Environmental Functions.  Thursday, June 27, 1996; 104th 
Congress, Second Session, Washington, D.C.. 
 
Simmel, G.  1950.   The Sociology of Georg Simmel.  New York: Free Press. 
 
Simon, Herbert A.  1982.  Models of Bounded Rationality.  Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
Sipe, Neal G.  1998.  “An Empirical Analysis of Environmental Mediation.”  Journal of the American Planning 
Association, 64(3):275-285.  
 
Solley, Wayne B.  1997.  Estimates of Water Use in the Western United States.  Denver: Western Water Policy 
Review Advisory Commission. 
 
Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA).  1994.  “Why one advocacy group steers clear of consensus efforts.”  
High Country News, 26(10), May 30.  Available at www.hcn.org/1994/may30/dir/advocacy.html; last accessed 
June 14, 1999. 
 
Taylor, B.P.  1992.  Our Limits Transgressed: Environmental Political Thought in America.  Lawrence, KS: 
University Press of Kansas. 
 
Thompson, Dennis F.  1970.  The Democratic Citizen: Social Science and Democratic Theory in the Twentieth 
Century.  Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.  
 72
 
Tocqueville, A. de.  1968.  Democracy in America.  London: Fontana.  (Also published in 1969 by Harper & Row, 
New York.) 
 
United States Geological Survey.  1999.  Status and Trends of the Nation’s Biological Resources.  Washington, 
D.C. 
 
WCED (World Commission on Environment and Development).  1987.  Our Common Future.  Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
 
Weber, Edward P.  1998.  Pluralism by the Rule: Conflict and Cooperation in Environmental Regulation.  
Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press. 
 
Wenner, Lettie M.  1990.  “Environmental Policy in the Courts.”  In:  Environmental Policy in the 1990s: Toward 
a New Agenda, pages 189-210.  Norman J. Vig and Michael E. Kraft (editors).  Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. 
 
Western Governors= Association.  1993.  Our Lands: New Strategies for Protecting the West.  Denver. 
 
Western Governors’ Association.  1998.  Principles for Environmental Management in the West.  Resolution 98-
001.  February 24.  Denver. 
 
Western Water Policy Review Advisory Commission.   See:  WWPRAC. 
 
Wilcove, David S.  1998.  “The Promise and Disappointment of the Endangered Species Act.”  New York 
University Environmental Law Journal, 6:275. 
 
Wilkinson, Charles F.  1992.   Crossing the Next Meridian.  Washington, D.C.: Island Press. 
 
WGA.  See: Western Governors’ Association. 
 
Wondolleck, J., and S. Yaffee.  1994.  Building Bridges Across Agency Boundaries: In Search of Excellence in the 
United States Forest Service.  Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, School of Natural Resources and Environment. 
 
WSWC (Western States Water Council).  1998.   State Watershed Strategy Guidebook.   
 
WWPRAC (Western Water Policy Review Advisory Commission).  1998.  Water in the West: Challenge for the 
Next Century.  Final report of the Western Water Policy Review Advisory Commission.  Denver. 
 
Yaffee, Steven L., Ali F. Phillips, Irene C. Frentz, Paul W. Hardy, Sussanne M. Maleki, and Barbara E. Thorpe.  
1996.   Ecosystem Management in the United States.  Washington, D.C.: Island Press. 
 
 
C:\Arguing\Arguing, full report.doc 
 
 
